

International Cooperation Development in the post-2015 scenario: agendas for the Brazilian Civil Society Organizations

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Presentation


Since October 2019, Brazilian civil society organizations and networks have been organizing a space for debates and proposals on the policy of International Cooperation for Development relations with Brazil. The considerations are based on the national and international context, as well as on the different national and international advocacy initiatives conducted by different Brazilian organizations and networks, in order to bring visibility to human rights violations, ongoing threats to democracy and possible impacts of Free Trade Agreements (European Union and Mercosul and EFTA). In this context, this study identifies the main global challenges of international cooperation relations for development and especially in relation to Brazil, in view of the current government's cooperation policy and its implications for the Brazilian society, as well as the role played by civil society organizations and networks working in defense of democracy, human rights and common goods.

This study is a subsidy to the advocacy actions of Brazilian CSOs in the International Forums and Organizations regarding International Cooperation for Development programs with Brazil, in the context of the SDGs.

This study intends to present:

1. Definitions and important concepts of the International Cooperation for Development System, as well as the main ongoing official cooperation programs with Brazil, particularly with countries such as Germany, France, England, Norway and Switzerland.
2. Advocacy arguments for strengthening international cooperation programs via CSOs, with an analysis of the current government conjuncture (2018/2020) and possible deviations of purpose in some official cooperation programs with Brazil.
3. Advocacy arguments for strengthening international cooperation programs via CSOs based on references to official speeches, International Cooperation Forum Statements, which refer to the importance of CSO participation, as well as academic studies;
4. Recommendations and arguments in favor of strengthening cooperation with CSOs to promote SDGs in political contexts such as the Brazilian one.

Executive Summary



In 2015, the development agenda was renewed with the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The document *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* announced 17 goals to be met by 2030 with a strong call for global solidarity that integrates all actors. This baseline study reveals the significance of the International Cooperation for Development agenda after 2015 and provides a framework on donors' approaches to cooperation with Brazil, identifying possibilities of participation and actions for Brazilian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

The main instrument of International Cooperation, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has become a large-scale mechanism for the transfer of public resources with a volume, in 2019, of US\$ 152.8 billion, from the contributing countries that make up the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD).

In 2015, as part of 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Reduction and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) were also adopted. The Paris Agreement places the agenda for mitigation and adaptation to climate change at the heart of International Development Cooperation. The 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes that more domestic and external resources need to be leveraged to achieve this SDG, which total estimates are \$2.5 trillion per year. The limited public budgets for ODA have led development actors to establish partnerships with the private sector to leverage and/or subsidize private investment with impact. Since then, the OECD has been coordinating the development of *Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD)*, a new international statistical framework to monitor, account for, and publish not only official resources, but also private financing raised through official interventions in support of sustainable development.

In the new cooperation agenda, we find themes such as: climate change; promotion of energy transition; support for responsible business conduct and sustainable value chains; promotion of fair trade and social and ecological sustainability in global supply chains; loans and contributions to leverage market funds to protect global assets; protection, conservation and sustainable use of forests; sustainable infrastructure; biodiversity; regulation of sustainable financial markets and green bonds.

In 2019, only 13.8% of the total ODA accounted for by the DAC/OECD was directed to partnerships with NGOs, mostly based in donor countries. Between 2017 and 2018, CSOs based in developing countries received only 5.3% of this amount.

Among donor countries, the percentage of bilateral ODA channeled via CSOs varies: Switzerland - 34.7%; Norway - 26.5%; United Kingdom - 16%; Germany - 7% and France - 3.7%.

There is also a variation in the profile of the CSOs with which donors cooperate: Germany cooperates almost exclusively through its territory-based organizations; France cooperates mainly with its territory-based organizations, followed by international ones; Norway cooperates significantly with CSOs located in the beneficiary country (in 2019, 94% of the budget of its bilateral cooperation with Brazil was via CSOs - 46 Brazilian, 13 international and 17 Norwegian); the UK directs ODA via donor-country-based and international CSOs; Switzerland prioritizes territory-based CSOs, followed by significant contributions with international ones and, to a lesser extent, partner-country-based CSOs.

The common discourse of donors and the OECD on the role to be played by CSOs converges on the need to strengthen this relationship, whether in implementing projects and programs or monitoring and overseeing the engagement of the private sector.


Among the agendas for official cooperation with Brazil in the 5 countries analyzed in 2019, we highlight some recurring themes: climate; forest protection and conservation; sustainable financial market regulation; sustainable production chains; low carbon agriculture; and increased private sector investment in sustainable development.

Several Brazilian CSOs have accumulated extensive experience of partnerships with international organizations. As donor countries emphasize the importance of including CSOs in the Sustainable Development agenda, it is recommended that Brazilian CSOs make public the expertise accumulated in these partnerships. Brazilian CSOs have experience that is aligned with the current international agenda and accredit them as partners, for: developing actions among people in vulnerable situations; supervising actions in favor of sustainable and inclusive development; providing complementary services to those provided by governments in a participatory manner; and having methodological flexibility to work on issues such as education, health and environment.

In the context of the post-2015 Agenda, two main lines of action for Brazilian CSOs in advocacy are suggested: critical focus on the allocation of ODA resources to leverage private sector investments to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); greater participation of Civil Society both in the execution of ODA programs and in monitoring the actions of the State and private companies.

Brazilian CSOs should seek to take part of the two main networks of CSOs operating within the DAC/OECD framework, engaging in debates on the effectiveness of international aid while verifying possible changes in their management and accountability mechanisms. Without abandoning previously established channels, it is important to further cooperation with countries that have direct partnerships with developing country CSOs, such as Norway, and to create bonds with CSOs in donor countries that allocate significant amounts of their ODA to civil society organizations based in their territory, such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Finally, the strengthening of International Development Cooperation via Civil Society Organizations deserves greater consideration at a time when civil society participation in government spaces is minimized and criminalized in several developing countries, including Brazil.



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About this reference document

The International Dialogue and Articulation Process (PAD) and the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG) have requested this base document to offer their members analyses and perspectives on International Development Cooperation and to provide a framework on donors' approaches to cooperation with Brazil, identifying the main development agendas and possibilities for participation and actions of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). This document provides an overview of donor engagement with Brazil and Civil Society from official information, consultancies and academic studies. As a document review, it is not based on explicit evidence from the field, although interviews have been used to compose backgrounds of some organizations and clarify some information. The document is based on the observation of trends, issues and analyses presented in official documents and websites and in literature to support Brazilian civil society advocacy actions in international cooperation.


The document begins with a session that brings a vision of the International Cooperation for Development we are discussing, the emerging international agenda, the participation of CSOs and the main ongoing programs of some donors with Brazil (section 1.0); it continues to provide a parenthesis for a presentation of traces of the situation of the Fellowship government and the implications of its conduct and decisions in some official cooperation programs with Brazil (section 2.0). It then presents the most recent official speeches of the organizations that make up the International Development Cooperation System regarding the importance of CSO participation, corroborated by academic studies (section 3.0). The following section presents two examples of Brazilian CSOs' programs, supported by International Cooperation Organizations, which have been outstandingly successful in the sustainable development agenda (section 4.0). The document concludes by suggesting arguments in favor of strengthening cooperation with CSOs to promote ODS and some advocacy agendas, within the Brazilian political context and the current International Development Cooperation agenda (section 5.0).



Chapter

I

Concepts and modalities of the International Development Cooperation system and main agendas



Concepts and modalities of the International Development Cooperation system and main agendas

International Development Cooperation is understood by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) *as international actions that have the objective of helping other countries in their efforts for social and economic progress*. The OECD recognizes as actors of International Development Cooperation: *States, Individuals, Civil Society (Non-Profit Organizations), Multilateral Organizations, Philanthropic Foundations and the Private Sector*¹. The International Cooperation for Development North/South represents a relevant part of the relations between states, as well as with part of the civil society, guided by values and interests of a specific vision of the world and of development itself².

The modality that is more central in the debates of International Cooperation, to the point of being commonly confused with it, is the *Official Development Assistance (ODA)*. ODA deals with transfers of public resources from donor countries, delivered directly by governments through their Official Cooperation Agencies, via Multilateral Organizations or via Non-Governmental Institutions (the latter not only act with their own resources, but also access government resources from the countries where they are established)³.

ODA statistics are monitored, systematized and published by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD). The DAC is an International Forum composed of the largest aid providers, with 30 members (29 countries + European Union). The World Bank, the Asian/African/Inter-American Regional Development Banks, the IMF and the UNDP participate as observers.⁴

¹OECD (2019). Development Co-operation Report 2019: A Fairer, Greener, Safer Tomorrow, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9a58c83f-en>.

²PESSINA, Maria Elisa Huber. O não governamental na Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento após 1990: entre as circunstâncias e as peculiaridades do caso alemão. Salvador: Edufba, 2017; KRAYCHETE, Elsa Sousa. Sociedade civil e desenvolvimento. (entry). In: IVO, Anete, KRAYCHETE, Elsa Sousa et al. Dicionário temático desenvolvimento e questão social: 110 temáticas contemporâneas. São Paulo: Editora AnnaBlume, 2020.

³ More recently, the term Concessional Public Finance became more popular as a synonym to Official Development Aid. However, most OCDE statistics still employ the term ODA.

⁴ See: <http://www.oecd.org/dac>

To be recognized as ODA, resource flows must meet the following criteria:

- (a) be of public origin;*
- (b) have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and well-being;*
- (c) when granting financial loans, have a minimum concessionality level (donation) of 25%.*

Donations of products by developed countries like medicines, food, technology and other components of humanitarian aid, in addition to cancellation or reduction of foreign debt and contributions to non-governmental organizations are also counted as ODA. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded, as well as transactions that have primarily commercial objectives.⁵

ODA has become a large-scale multinational industry with an annual volume of resources in 2018 of \$143 billion⁶ and \$152.8 billion in 2019, accounting for only the countries that make up the DAC⁷. The direct contact between potential donors and beneficiaries would not be able to reach such large amounts of transfers, making it necessary to have a vast organizational structure to facilitate their intermediation.

International Development Cooperation can be classified as bilateral or multilateral. The main characteristic of Multilateral Cooperation is that it does not identify the origin of the resources, forming a common contribution that will be transferred on behalf of the multilateral institution. Multilateral Cooperation agents include the Multilateral Development Banks (World Bank and Regional Development Banks), the European Union, and the UN (its Agencies, Programs and Funds)⁸. The contribution via multilateral organizations has been increasingly encouraged after the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals - SDG (2015 - 2030), based on the assumption of greater efficiency of multilateral channels.⁹

⁵ See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm>

⁶ OCDE, 2019.

⁷ OECD (2020a). "Six decades of ODA: insights and outlook in the COVID-19 crisis", OECD Development Co-operation Profiles 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en>.

⁸ IGLESIA-CARUNCHO, Manuel. El impacto económico y social de la cooperación para el desarrollo. Madrid, La Catarata/IUDC-UCM, 2005.

⁹ OECD, 2020a

Bilateral Cooperation is the one in which the donor country is directly identified. Most countries have an Official Agency to enforce their cooperation policies, usually linked to the Ministry of Cooperation for Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, or Ministry of the Environment. ODA resources are also counted as bilateral when executed via multilateral organizations, in the form of contributions to specified projects (projects executed by multilateral organizations but with the donor country controlling the destination of funds (earmarked contributions), Non-Governmental Organizations¹⁰ and, more recently, public-private partnerships.

It is worth mentioning that the performance of Non-Governmental Organizations of International Development Cooperation (NGDOs), or International Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGO), when using contributions of public resources, is computed in statistics as bilateral ODA. However, most NGDOs work with both public and private resources (donations, inheritances, church resources, among others).¹¹

The main modalities of ODA are Financial and Technical Assistance. *Financial Assistance* may occur by means of grants or loans that obey a 25% concessionality level (donation). *Technical Assistance* is provided in the form of services such as consultancy, training and technical and professional development¹².

In addition to ODA, there is International Development Finance, which is composed of financial flows that can fulfill the same objectives as ODA, but do not reach the concessionality level of the latter¹³.

The Financial Assistance is carried out by the Development Banks of donor countries, Multilateral Development Banks (World Bank and Regional Development Banks) or Multilateral Development Agencies - specialized agencies of the United Nations and the external aid programs of the European Commission. Multilateral Development Banks provide ODA through so-called concessional windows (soft windows) that mix loans and grants within loans provided to developing countries at subsidized interest rates.¹⁴

¹⁰ IGLESIA-CARUNCHO, 2005

¹¹ See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm>;

¹² IGLESIA-CARUNCHO, 2005; <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm>

¹³ Idem.

¹⁴ RODRIK, Dani. Why is there multilateral lending?. National bureau of economic research, 1995.

Since the late 1990s, International Organizations have devoted enormous attention to the *effectiveness of International Aid program resources*. Since 2000, the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (2003; 2005; 2008; 2011) have been the main spaces for discussion on increasing the effectiveness of international development cooperation, replaced in 2011 by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), a global platform to promote the effectiveness of development efforts of all actors, on the board in which civil society has a seat.

The main policy instruments used to achieve effectiveness have become the establishment of agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for example, and management - complementarity, non-overlap of projects, results-based management, among others - coordinated by DAC/OECD¹⁵.

Main agendas and figures of the post-2015 scenario

In 2015, the development agenda was renewed with the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development. The document *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* announced goals to be met by 2030, “leaving no one behind”, which involve diverse themes such as: poverty eradication, food security and agriculture, health, education, gender equality, water and sanitation, energy, sustainable economic growth, infrastructure, reducing inequalities, sustainable cities, sustainable patterns of consumption and production, climate change, protection and sustainable use of oceans and terrestrial ecosystems, peaceful, just and inclusive societies and partners in implementation.

The SDGs make a strong call for global solidarity that integrates all actors. Thus, the 2030 Agenda has been implemented through formal and informal mechanisms: traditional donors - the Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD); developing countries - the G-77, the BRICS and regional groups; and emerging global governance structures such as the G20. However, the central arena and main promoter of this “global dialogue” has been the UN. Its main monitoring space is the High Level Policy Forum of the SDGs, held annually in New York, with the purpose of a more open and inclusive discussion¹⁶.

¹⁵ See High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2011.

¹⁶ GIL, Carlos Gómez. *Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS): una revisión crítica. Papeles de relaciones ecosociales y cambio global*, (140), p. 107-118, 2018.

Also in 2015, the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place, which resulted in the Paris Climate Agreement. The signatories of the Paris Agreement accepted to drastically reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, with measures such as increased investment in renewable energy and combat against deforestation, in order to contain global warming. The Paris Agreement is a very important part of the current IDC agenda, as it has established a system for periodic review of all countries' efforts to limit temperature increase, as well as financial mechanisms to help less developed countries make the transition to cleaner economies. In Paris, developed countries committed to assisting emerging countries in their mitigation and adaptation plans and strategies by deploying climate finance beyond previous efforts.

According to the OECD (2019), the objective of the current international development cooperation agenda revolves around "Investing in green and clean development cooperation, bridging the gap between climate and development to promote people-centered and climate-resilient development paths."¹⁷

The 2010 Conference of the Parties (COP16) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in which the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created, aimed at managing resources for low-carbon and climate-resilient projects and programs in developing countries, is also worth mentioning. Another instrument developed in the scope of COP 16 was the payment for actions of *Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation - REDD+*. The compliance with REDD+ safeguards, also known as Cancun Safeguards, is very important for developing countries, including Brazil, to continue receiving financial compensation resources from the Green Climate Fund and international cooperation as a whole for the carbon not emitted into the atmosphere. Among the Cancun Safeguards, the full and effective participation of stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, is noteworthy¹⁸.

¹⁷ OCDE, 2019.

¹⁸ Norway, Germany and the UK made a joint commitment in 2015 to invest \$5 billion in REDD+ globally by 2020. <https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/us-uk-norway-launch-next-stage-redd-finance-mechanism-under-world-bank/>

Recognizing that the impact of environmental degradation and climate change is felt most acutely in developing countries, and among the poorest and most vulnerable people, the OECD argues that the issue should be further strengthened within ODA.¹⁹ Since 2015, overall ODA levels in support of environmental sustainability and climate change have increased. In 2018, DAC countries committed 33% of ODA to the environment issue, either as a major or significant objective, and 26% of ODA had climate change as a major or significant objective, with a greater focus on mitigation (20% in 2018) than adaptation (12%) (OECD, 2020b).

The third meeting in 2015 that conforms to the current agenda of International Development Cooperation was the Addis Ababa International Conference on Financing for Development. The *Addis Ababa Action Agenda* (AAAA) calls for a diverse set of actors - governments, businesses, foundations, and individuals - to mobilize greater financial resources to reach ODS, for which an annual investment of \$2.5 trillion has been estimated.

Among the AAAA's recommendations, we highlight the following points that have become a constant theme in Cooperation reports and speeches post-2015:

- 1) a call for greater mobilization of domestic resources (broaden the collection base, improve tax collection, and combat tax evasion and illicit financial flow);
- 2) the importance of aligning private investment for sustainable development with public policies and regulatory frameworks to establish the right incentives.²⁰

Donors have already been promoting private sector engagement in developing countries through their International Aid programs, but in recent years, the focus on partnerships with the private sector to promote development has escalated. In different international fora, donor governments have made repeated commitments to increase partnerships with the private sector, either at the G20 Summits or in the context of the United Nations, when they announced “the private sector as equal partners around key development issues” (DCED, 2010).

¹⁹To do so, it presents two guiding documents: the *Aligning Development Co-operation and Climate Action: The Only Way Forward* (2019), which invites all development cooperation providers to align their activities with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and the *Greening Development Co-operation: Lessons from the OECD Development Assistance Committee*, which invites DAC donors to adopt more robust policies and approaches to integrate the environment into all their development cooperation activities.

²⁰ UN. *Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development* (Addis Ababa Action Agenda). New York, 2015

²¹DCED (Donor Committee for Enterprise Development). 2010. *Bilateral Donors' Statement in Support of Private Sector Partnerships for Development*. <http://www.enterprisedevelopment.org/download.ashx?id=1645>.

Also within the OECD, participants in the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in 2011 legitimized a prominent focus on the private sector in international development cooperation programs.²²

According to the OECD, the scale and complexity of the present sustainable development challenges call for a multi-stakeholder approach that draws on contributions from all parts of society - government, private sector and civil society²³. Since Addis Ababa, the DAC/OECD has been developing approaches to increase private sector participation in achieving the SDGs, both by developing international public financing instruments to leverage private sector involvement and by monitoring and measuring private sector engagement. At the Addis Ababa meeting, it was established that a new platform would be created to compile international statistics to reflect the new development-financing scenario characterized by the inclusion of new actors, such as emerging suppliers and the private sector, as well as new financial instruments. Since then, the OECD has been coordinating the development of the *Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD)*, a new international statistical framework to monitor, account for, and publish not only official resources, but also private financing raised through official interventions in support of sustainable development²⁴,

This is the case of so-called blended finance, defined by the OECD/DAC as “the strategic use of official funds, including concessional resources (grants), to leverage additional capital flows (public and/or private) to emerging and border markets”²⁵.

Under this mechanism, resources from a combination of private initiative and ODA or philanthropic money can finance projects with an impact, either directly or in support of initiatives considered excessively risky by the market. The presence of public or philanthropic money reduces the risk to the private sector, thanks to vehicles such as protection insurance or other guarantees to the creditor. This is a way to attract capital from the market to fill financial gaps and help achieve the UN’s sustainable development goals. According to the OECD, “raising additional capital that would not otherwise support development results is increasingly necessary to displace the trillions needed to meet the SDGs. Blended finance is an approach that aims to attract commercial capital for projects that benefit society while providing financial returns to investors”²⁶.

²² See Pessina, 2017 e HLF4 (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness). 2011. Expanding and Enhancing Public and Private Cooperation for Broad-Based, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/36/49211825.pdf>.

²³ OECD, 2020a.

²⁴ See: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/tossd/>. See also OECD (2016), Private Sector Engagement for Sustainable Development: Lessons from the DAC, OECD Publishing, Paris,

²⁵ Idem

²⁶ See: <http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/blended-finance-principles/> and <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/OECD-Blended-Finance-Principles.pdf>.

Currently, at least 17 OECD DAC members conduct Blended Finance operations. The consolidated portfolio of the 15 members of the European Development Finance Institutions was EUR 41.2 billion in 2018, against EUR 11 billion in 2005²⁷. The strategy, however, is facing difficulties in establishing itself and growing. Data from the non-profit organization *Convergence* show that the flow of public and private resources for mixed projects (Blended Finance) has been halted. Reasons include a conflict of interest between private investors, who seek maximum payback for a given level of risk, and donors, who wish to increase the impact of the investment. The balance between the two sides is rare, according to Christoph Kuhn of the European Investment Bank²⁸. Another challenge, according to the OECD (2019), has been to get such combined financing to the places where it is most needed. Between 2012 and 2017, only 6% (USD 9.7 billion) of private funding mobilized by ODA went to the least developed countries, while more than 70% went to middle-income countries²⁹.

According to the OECD (2018), the new financial instruments and interactions have not yet mobilized the necessary resources in sufficient volumes, and there are many doubts about the opportunities and risks faced by the various actors in this complex new global financing system. In other words, the OECD argues that the financing needed to achieve the SDGs is in the international financial system, but recognizes the challenge of engaging actors and, above all, aligning and monitoring interests³¹. The OECD (2019) recognizes the challenges of public-private partnership for international cooperation, scoring on issues related to transparency, common rules and balanced accountability with concerns about financial returns. The OECD points out that some reforms are needed to improve clarity and focus development financing where the need is greater. It also draws attention to the fact that, even in financial crises and global recessions, Official Development Assistance follows a steady growth curve. This is not the case for private flows or even donations from private entities such as philanthropic foundations, which vary greatly according to the crises³².

²⁷ OECD (2019). Development Co-operation Report 2019: A Fairer, Greener, Safer Tomorrow, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9a58c83f-en>.

²⁸ THE ECONOMIST. Blended finance is struggling to take off. 2020 <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/08/13/blended-finance-is-struggling-to-take-off>

²⁹ OCDE, 2019. Para maiores informações, vide o Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), um novo quadro estatístico internacional coordenado pela OCDE, proposto em Adis Abeba, para monitorar recursos oficiais e financiamento privado mobilizado por intervenções oficiais em apoio ao desenvolvimento sustentável: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/tossd/>; Vide também OECD (2016), Private Sector Engagement for Sustainable Development: Lessons from the DAC, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264266889-en>.

³⁰ OECD (2018), Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2019: Time to Face the Challenge, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307995-en>.

³¹ OECD, 2019, p.39.

³² OECD, 2019.

The Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the International Cooperation for Development

In 2019, only 20.0% of the total amount of OAD accounted for by the DAC was directed to partnerships with NGOs³³ and companies, with NGOs accounting for 13.8% and the business sector for 6.2% of that amount. PPPs received 0.6% of the total OAD. More than half of the total ODA (55.8%) was directed to the public sector, followed by multilateral organizations, which accounted for 18.5% of the total distributed. The remainder was shared with universities, research institutes and think tanks³⁴.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development refers to the need to involve CSOs in the implementation and monitoring of Sustainable Development Goals, highlighting their capacity to bring the voices of those in poverty, inequality and vulnerability to development processes, ensuring that “no one is left behind”. In this document, the OECD calls for greater efforts to foster and promote favorable environments for CSOs, while insisting that donor countries strive to make cooperation through their CSOs more effective and transparent, recommending how donor countries can improve the effectiveness of working with civil society³⁵.

DAC members report their official CSO spending to the OECD in two ways:

- 1) *Aid to CSOs*: contributions to organizations, i.e., the use of these funds is programmed by the CSO itself; and
- 2) *Aid channeled through CSOs*: these are funds channeled through CSOs for the implementation of donor-initiative projects. According to OECD data, financial support to CSOs through CSOs is much more used than direct support to CSOs, representing 85% of total ODA directed to CSOs.³⁶

³³ The OECD considers ONGS to be foundations, cooperative societies, trade unions, ad-hoc entities created to collect funds for a specific purpose, NGO umbrella organizations and NGO networks..

³⁴ OCDE (2020b). Aid for Civil Society Organisations Statistics based on DAC Members' reporting to the Creditor Reporting System database (CRS), 2017-2018, April 2020.

³⁵ OCDE (2020b). Development Assistance Committee Members and Civil Society, The Development Dimension, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020: <https://doi.org/10.1787/51eb6df1-en>.

³⁶ OCDE, 2020b.

The preference for CSOs established in the donor or recipient country varies. Most donors cooperate primarily through CSOs based in their country, which establish partnerships with CSOs in developing countries. However, some countries, such as Norway, cooperate significantly with established CSOs in developing countries. According to the OECD, developing country based organizations receive a smaller share of support among categories of CSOs, representing only 5.3% of the total passed on to CSOs between 2017 and 2018³⁷.

The significant growth in the participation of private foundations among International Aid donors is also noteworthy. They also make up the efforts of International Cooperation for Development within the framework of Private International Aid, but are not counted by the DAC/OECD as ODA. Recently, large private foundations have also begun to report their statistics to the OECD/DAC, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which was responsible for almost half of all philanthropic funding between 2013 and 2015. According to the OECD (2019), this Foundation is committing more money into development than many mid-sized DAC donor countries³⁸.

CSOs have been organizing themselves as *Networks and Platforms* to strengthen their views on aspects of the Cooperation agenda and the effectiveness guideline. In this sense, the work of some large networks, such as the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), which represents civil society in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), currently the main forum for discussion on the effectiveness of international development cooperation. CPDE defines itself as an open platform that gathers CSOs from all over the world articulated around effective development cooperation. Its structure is made up of Sector and Regional Coordination Units, among which we highlight the Alliance of CSOs for Development Effectiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean (AOED ALC).

Within the OECD, specifically, the DAC-CSO Reference Group stands out, which describes itself as an open platform of CSOs from DAC and non-DAC countries, Global North and Global South, to facilitate and coordinate involvement with the Development Assistance Committee and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD). The aim of the platform is to bring the positions of CSOs into these spaces, working as a means for members to plan and coordinate activities and positions related to the work of the DAC/OECD.

³⁷ Idem.

³⁸ OECD (2019). Development Co-operation Report 2019: A Fairer, Greener, Safer Tomorrow, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9a58c83f-en>

The aim of the platform is to bring the positions of CSOs into these spaces, working as a means for members to plan and coordinate activities and positions related to the work of the DAC/OECD. The DAC-CSO Reference Group includes organizations and networks such as ActionAid, CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), Oxfam International and The Reality of Aid, among others³⁹.

Focused on South-South Cooperation, the Southern CSO Alliance on South-South Cooperation, an independent group that brings together CSOs working in CSS, aims to facilitate and strengthen the involvement and participation of CSOs in the various arenas of CSS and push for the principle of horizontal development cooperation, including solidarity, mutuality, human rights, respect for sovereignty, and non-conditionality.

We also highlight the *International Forum of NGO Platforms - FORUS*, an initiative that was born in the framework of the World Social Forum and today brings together 69 countries and 7 regional platforms. The *Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG)* is a member of FORUS and currently composes its presidency. This means 22 thousand organizations around the world, ranging from small, medium and large organizations. The unique character of FORUS is the fact that these organizations cover a wide variety of topics and with a high level of organicity, a rare trait in international networks. Its mission is threefold: to connect, influence and support SCO through National Platforms. One of the debates that FORUS has been working on at the international level is called the Global Initiative, which seeks recognition for the work of its organizations not only in the area of financing, but also in strengthening CSOs, the so-called infrastructure of NGOs. FORUS has increasingly become involved in the debate on financing for development in dialogue with Addis Ababa's deliberations.


The fulfillment of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and the 2030 Agenda has been followed by the UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF), which has been held annually in New York since 2012 and which, after 2015, has become the central platform of the United Nations to follow up on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the review of the scope of the SDGs. Under the HLPF, CSOs have challenged the importance given to the private sector in international development cooperation.

³⁹ See: <https://www.dac-csoreferencgroup.com/>

Civil Society Articulations criticize AAAA, especially, on two points:

1. *being too “focused on the interests of the private sector, considered by the document as the possible main source for development through questionable Public-Private Partnerships and combined financing (blended finance)”*⁴⁰;
2. *excessive focus on raising domestic resources for national development.*

CSOs demand:

1. democratization of global economic governance; cancellation of external public debts;
 2. establishment of a mechanism for the exercise of debts at the UN, which would arbitrate over unsustainable and illegitimate debts;
 3. pressure for greater control and combat against tax havens, financial speculation and tax abuses of transnational corporations.⁴¹
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⁴⁰ See publications of the CSWG A2030 - Brazilian Civil Society WG for the 2030 Agenda. The group was formalized in September 2014, to follow the agenda after 2015, focusing on the Brazilian State and multilateral organizations for the promotion of sustainable development.
<https://gtagenda2030.org.br/>

⁴¹ SDG_Network. Open Letter to Heads of State Meeting at the United Nations. 2020. Available at <https://csoforffd.files.wordpress.com/2020/09/global-economic-solutions-now-with-signatures-eng.pdf>

Main International Cooperation for Development programs with Brazil by countries selected as major partners.

Germany

The latest OECD/DAC evaluation (2018) recognized Germany as a leader in prioritizing Climate Change in its Cooperation for Development as well as in *supporting responsible business conduct and sustainable value chains*.⁴²

In April 2020 Germany launched a reform document of its international cooperation strategy, *Reformkonzept BMZ 2030*: Umdenken - Umsteuern (Reform BMZ 2030: Rethinking - change of direction). The document highlights, among others, *the promotion of private investment* for the promotion of the SDGs in developing countries, especially by small and medium-sized enterprises, prioritizing the *promotion of fair trade and social and ecological sustainability in global supply chains*. The document introduces new categories of partnership, and Brazil is included in the *Global Partner category*⁴³, with which the BMZ will work strategically to protect global assets such as the *environment and climate protection, through loans and contributions to leverage market funds, among others*. However, Germany also announces the gradual withdrawal of bilateral cooperation from some countries, reducing direct actions from 85 to 60 partner countries⁴⁴ in the new strategy.

In 2019, Germany ranked sixth in the percentage of GDP invested in ODA (0.6%), and second in absolute volume (USD 26.5 billion). Germany's bilateral cooperation projects with the world are carried out primarily via its Ministries and Official Agencies (65.9%), only about 7% of its total bilateral ODA is allocated via CSOs and 2.2% via the private sector and PPPs.⁴⁵

Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Germany to Brazil peaked in 2014, since when it began to fall. In recent years, however, it has risen from \$194 million in 2017 to \$229 million in 2018.

The current focus of German cooperation projects with Brazil is:

- 1) *Conservation and sustainable use of the Amazon forest and*
- 2) *Production of renewable energy and energy efficiency.*

⁴² "Germany", in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1787/0079f636-en>.

⁴³ Category restricted to 7 other countries: India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Vietnam, China.

⁴⁴ BMZ 2030. Available at: http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/information_flyer/information_brochures/Materilie520_reform_strategy.pdf

⁴⁵ Idem; "Germany", Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1787/0079f636-en>

The GIZ (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH*) is responsible for technical cooperation projects in Brazil, with emphasis on support for renewable energy projects and preservation of the Amazon rainforest. GIZ also advises projects of the KFW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau⁴⁶), as in the case of the Amazon Fund or REDD+ REM, undertaking technical assistance functions⁴⁷. GIZ acts with CSOs in Brazil as stakeholders in the technical cooperation agreements signed with the Brazilian public power⁴⁸ (generally, ministries or state and municipal governments), according to a public notice for contracting institutions and organizations with legal entities registered in Brazil⁴⁹.

GIZ has 28 *Technical Cooperation Agreements* in force with Brazil, classified into three major areas:

1. *Protection and sustainable use of tropical forests* (biodiversity and climate);
2. *Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency* (sustainable infrastructure); and
3. *Multi-sectoral Programs and Initiatives*.⁵⁰

The *Rainforest Protection Programs* are the priority programs of the German government's cooperation with Brazil⁵¹, totaling 12 projects in this area carried out by GIZ in the Amazon, Atlantic Forest and Cerrado biomes. These programs draw attention due to the wide use of the mechanism for *receiving result-based payments* (REDD+), respecting the safeguard of *participative governance*, such as the REDD⁵²+ Program for Early Movers (REM). Thus, most of the programs aimed at the Protection of Forests have articulations with Civil Society Organizations at some level.

⁴⁶ German development finance bank responsible for implementing international loans and grants and for monitoring the quantitative and qualitative impacts of approved projects. See more at <http://www.bmz.de/en>

⁴⁷ See: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/12055.html>

⁴⁸ See the case of the participation of the International Institute of Education of Brazil (IEB) in the technical cooperation program "Protection and Sustainable Management in Indigenous Lands": <http://www.funai.gov.br/index.php/comunicacao/noticias/4688-funai-e-ieb-assinam-act-para-execucao-de-projeto-junto-ao-kfw>

⁴⁹ German technical cooperation with Brazil generally does not include the remittance of financial resources. The resources are mainly used for staff training, platform development, mobilization and articulation, specialized consultancies, etc.

⁵⁰ For detailed analysis of all programs, see the GIZ Brazil website: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/12055.html>

⁵¹ The main objectives are to combat illegal logging, protect biodiversity, encourage adaptation to climate change and promote sustainable ways of using natural resources, and include identifying forests as a cultural and livelihood means for indigenous peoples.

⁵² Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation – REDD. This mechanism is also adopted in the Amazon Fund.

GIZ has 6 projects in the area of *Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (Sustainable Infrastructure)* and 7 projects in the area of *Multi-sectoral Programs and Initiatives*. In this last category, we highlight the *Sustainable Financial Market Regulation and Green Bonds* program, initiated in 2018 in partnership with the Ministry of Economy, which aims to develop the so-called *Green Finance* in the Brazilian political agenda.⁵³

KfW, on the other hand, carries out the *Financial Cooperation* projects between Brazil and Germany, being the main projects focused on the *protection and conservation of the Amazon and the Atlantic Rainforest*. The cooperation is carried out via long-term loans at low interest rates and special conditions (with or without concessionality) or through the donation of resources in funds managed by Brazilian entities. Currently, KfW has 4 financial cooperation projects under execution in Brazil: *Wind Farm Program BNDES*⁵⁴; *Amazon Fund*⁵⁵; *Amazon Protect Areas (ARPA)* and the *Ecological Corridors* program.

As for Germany's Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations, the country has been increasing its ODA through these actors over the years. However, this cooperation takes place almost exclusively via *German-based CSOs*, which in turn establish partnerships with organizations established in developing countries.⁵⁶ Germany provides ODA via CSOs as a priority in projects involving *rapid response to emergencies, disasters and humanitarian aid*. German NGOs access their government's resources for international development cooperation in two ways: through special contracts with the German government (such as the agreements of German ecumenical agencies with the BMZ) or through access to open competition notices (with the BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office - AA or the BMU)⁵⁷.

⁵³ Germany believes that the topic is likely to become very important for Brazil, and to this end, the project supports the development of legal guidelines as well as the exchange of information between private and public actors. See more at <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/12055.html>


⁵⁴ See: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Evaluierung/Ergebnisse-und-Publikationen/PDF-Dokumente-A-D_EN/Brasilien_BNDES_2015_E.pdf

⁵⁵ See: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Evaluierung/Ergebnisse-und-Publikationen/PDF-Dokumente-A-D_EN/Brasilien_Amazonienfonds_2016_E.pdf

⁵⁶ With the exception of the small funds of the IKI (Internationale Klimaschutzinitiative) of the German Ministry of the Environment, in the modality Small Grants (see: <https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/project-funding/information-for-applicants/iki-small-and-medium-grants/iki-small-grants/>) and the notices of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtige Amt) for Humanitarian Aid (not applicable to Brazil).

For more information on German cooperation with civil society, see "Germany", in Development Cooperation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1787/0079f636-en>. See also: <https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/German-Funding-Instruments.png>

According to the German government, its priority is to “strengthen the forces of civil society in developing countries through cooperation with civil society”, whether in the implementation of projects and programs or by *drawing attention to the deficits of state and economic action (Watchdogs) in defense of the needs of socially and politically disadvantaged groups*.⁵⁸ In the Conceptual Reform document “BMZ 2030” it is stated that German cooperation will bring about “greater cooperation with civil society and the churches, which make an invaluable contribution to ensuring the survival of the poorest, especially in crisis and refugee areas”⁵⁹. For the OECD/DAC Private Sector Peer Learning - Country Report: Germany, the country states that CSOs play an important role in monitoring and supervising Private Sector Engagement, and advocates the provision of funds dedicated to multi-stakeholder partnerships to facilitate cooperation between such actors.⁶⁰



⁵⁸ BMZ, 2014, p.10. Strategie zur Zusammenarbeit von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft in der Entwicklungspolitik der Post-2015-Welt. BMZ 2014. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/strategie-zur-zusammenarbeit-von-staat-und-zivilgesellschaft-in-der-entwicklungspolitik-der-post-2015-welt-732380>

⁵⁹ BMZ 2030, p. 3.

⁶⁰ OECD (2016), p. 10. Private Sector Engagement for Sustainable Development: Lessons from the DAC, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264266889-en>

France

According to the French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement* - AFD), France and Brazil have committed to “promote a model of sustainable and solidary development, and climate is *a strong mark of their intervention* in the region. There are many ways AFD acts in Brazil: through loans to the public sector (and private, through Proparco, an AFD subsidiary⁶¹), with mobilization of grant funds to finance technical support, as well as through consultancy support and public policy dialogues⁶².

Em In 2019, France ranked ninth in the percentage of GDP invested in ODA (0.44%), and fifth in absolute volume (USD 12.2 billion). France prioritizes government-to-government cooperation. ODA delivered by France to the world is primarily delivered via governments. In 2018, the sectoral distribution of French cooperation corresponded to 73.6% agreed with the public sector, 6.5% with the private sector, and only 3.7% with NGOs.⁶³

ODA distributed by France in actions with Brazil had its peak in 2012, falling in recent years from US\$ 180 million in 2017 to US\$ 117 million in 2018. The actions in Brazil occur in three main areas: *support to urban territories; promotion of energy transition (renewable energies); partnerships for ODS and climate*⁶⁴.

In September 2020, the French cooperation with Brazil had 7 projects in force, totaling EUR 389,750,000.00. All of them result from agreements in partnership with public sector agencies, covering the thematic areas: *water and sanitation, sustainable cities, health and social protection, energy, climate, infrastructure and biodiversity*. In the ongoing French cooperation with Brazil, the absolute predominance of the climate and sustainability agenda is highlighted.⁶⁵

France is increasing its partnerships in ODA with sectors of civil society. Between 2013 and 2018, 6,310 Civil Society Organizations received funding via AFD⁶⁶. The profile of cooperation with the CSOs is mainly divided between partnerships with organizations based in France itself, and with international organizations. Priority areas for support are *refugees, sanitation and water supply, emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes, and promotion of partnerships with government and civil society agencies*⁶⁷.

⁶¹ O AFD Group gathers AFD and its subsidiary Proparco, dedicated to financing private sector stakeholders.

⁶² See: <https://www.afd.fr/pt/page-region-pays/brasil>

⁶³ See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-cooperation-report/> (Profiles - France).

⁶⁴ See: <https://www.afd.fr/pt/ressources/afd-e-o-brasil>; accessed on 14 September, 2020

⁶⁵ Idem.

⁶⁶ See: <https://www.afd.fr/en/civil-society-organizations>:

⁶⁷ For full information, see <https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-cooperation-report/> (Profiles - France).

Norway

Norway stands out for contributing above the UN target of 0.7% of the GDP allocated to ODA, reaching 1.2% in 2020. The Norwegian Cooperation uses the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)⁶⁸ and the *Norwegian In (Norfund)* as instruments for the implementation of its guidelines, a joint company whose objective is to promote the development of the private sector focused on attaining the SDGs in poorer countries.

Norway is noted for its bilateral ODA distributed mainly through multilateral organizations (41.8%), followed by CSOs (26.5%) and the public sector (25.1%). Only 1.5% of its bilateral ODA is delivered via the private sector.

The development assistance provided by Norway in 2019 allocated US\$ 14 million to projects with Brazil, distributed in the following areas: most of it to the *governance sector, civil society and conflict prevention, followed by environment and energy*.⁶⁹ In the area of environment and energy, the *Amazon Fund* stands out, where Norway is the major donor, and the Programs aimed at Support to Indigenous Peoples.

The relevance of the *Norwegian Program of Support to Indigenous Peoples* stands out for its close partnership with civil society. Managed by the Norwegian Embassy in Brazil, it works in partnership with indigenous associations and indigenist organizations.

Among the projects underway with Brazil in 2019, the partners with which Norway cooperated most were Norwegian NGOs, international and local NGOs, and *only a few projects with the Norwegian public sector* (such as the Amazon Fund).

Between 2014 and 2019, Norway's bilateral assistance with Brazil significantly declined from about US\$ 144 million in 2015 to about US\$ 14 million in 2019⁷⁰.

As for cooperation with Civil Society, it is growing in an inverse trend. *Of the total Norwegian ODA to Brazil in 2019, 94% was for cooperation with civil society*⁷¹. *Most of this was done via Brazilian CSOs: 46 from Brazil, 13 from abroad and 17 from Norway.*

⁶⁸ See: <https://norad.no/en/front/about-norad/>

⁶⁹ See: <https://norad.no/en/front/countries/latin-america/brazil/>

⁷⁰ Idem.

⁷¹ In NOK, of the total amount of NOK 128 million for ODA to Brazil, NOK 119, 5 million was earmarked for cooperation with civil society in 2019. Norwegian Aid Statistics: <https://norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/>

According to NORAD, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) require intense engagement of civil society. Norway argues that civil society should play a key role in “monitoring and holding authorities accountable, challenging power structures” and in “providing services to marginalized groups and individuals subject to discrimination or living in fragile environments”. As for the private sector, Norway’s discourse is that “civil society can also play a role in creating a more just structure within the private sector, whether through advocacy or establishing partnerships with commercial actors.”⁷²

According to an interview with Norwegian cooperation officials, despite the low number of partnerships with the private sector in cooperation with Brazil, its programs focus on the development of bases and structures that will facilitate this sector’s performance in impact investments and sustainable production chains⁷³.

The Norwegian cooperation with the global civil society includes topics such as *women’s rights*⁷⁴, *climate and forest financing*, *minority rights*, *private sector development*, among others. CSOs can submit proposals for calls and notices, provided and updated by NORAD at <https://norad.no/en/front/funding/>, or submit proposals to NORAD at any time⁷⁵.

⁷² NORAD, 2018, p.3. NORAD’S SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY: GUIDING PRINCIPLES. Oslo: June 2018. Available at: <https://norad.no/contentassets/396cdc788c09405490a96adce80ac040/norads-support-to-civil-society-guiding-principles.pdf>

⁷³ Interview with those responsible for cooperation programs in Environment and Energy with Brazil. October 2020.

⁷⁴ See: <https://norad.no/en/front/about-norad/news/2019/25-organisations-granted-funds-for-womens-rights/>

⁷⁵ Presently, 358 requests received by NORAD are being processed after the call for proposals for climate and forestry projects. Besides NORAD, it is also possible to have access to notices and calls, or even send direct proposals, through the websites of the Norwegian Embassy in Brazil, Norfund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment.

United Kingdom

The volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the UK is the third largest in absolute terms among DAC members. The UK prioritizes government-to-government cooperation. According to the OECD, in 2018, 34.8% of UK bilateral ODA was delivered via the public sector, 29.9% via multilateral bodies, 16% via CSOs and 8.7% via the private sector⁷⁶.

In September 2020, the Department for International Development (DfID) was replaced by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which coordinates several other departments and intra-governmental funds in delegation and implementation of international aid projects⁷⁷.

In 2015, the United Kingdom created the Prosperity Fund, which aims to support the UN ODS and the UK Aid Strategy (2015 UK Aid Strategy). The Fund works in line with the eighth pillar of the ODS (promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all) and, according to the FCDO, also aims to create business opportunities for UK companies.

The Fund includes non-ODA components and funding, and is in support of projects on: *climate change, gender and social inclusion, poverty reduction, improving the business environment, infrastructure and economic/financial reforms*.⁷⁸

According to the FCDO, Brazil's natural resources and ecosystem services (rainforest, arable land, fresh water, agricultural products) are globally significant. The UK government believes that Brazil has the potential to promote a cleaner and more sustainable development model for low-income countries, providing real experience on how developing countries can minimize the environmental impact of their growth.

Brazil is one of the Fund's priorities, with three major programs in the country: Energy Program (clean and renewable); Smart Cities Program (infrastructure and sanitation); Green Finance Program (leveraging the business environment and the use of financial mechanisms to allocate resources in the country)⁷⁹.

⁷⁶ OECD (2020), "United Kingdom", in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/ff4da321-en>.

⁷⁷ See: <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/departments>


⁷⁸ See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cross-government-prosperity-fund-programme/cross-government-prosperity-fund-update>

⁷⁹ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/845419/The_Pro Prosperity_Fund_Annual_Report_2018_19.pdf

In September 2020, the United Kingdom had 54 *projects* in effect in Brazil, distributed among different departments of the donor country. We highlight, among them, the programs in partnership with the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which conducts two projects in Brazil: *Low Carbon Agriculture for Reducing Deforestation and Combating Poverty*, which operates in the cerrado savanna biomes, aims to restore deforested and degraded areas by promoting sustainable agriculture; and the *Land Degradation Neutralization Fund*, in the public-private partnership modality, which uses public money to increase private sector investment in sustainable development.

We also highlight the work of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), which maintains 35 projects in force in Brazil, such as collaboration agreements for scientific and academic research in both the social and biological sciences. These are programs of high monetary value, conducted by British universities in partnership with Brazilian researchers.

The United Kingdom's cooperation with Civil Society Organizations has been decreasing since 2017. This modality of cooperation occurs via organizations based in the donor country and via International Organizations, with a higher percentage of ODA via international CSOs compared to the other donors analyzed. The United Kingdom's international aid via CSOs is aimed primarily at emergency projects that present rapid responses, such as those aimed at minimizing the effects of disasters and humanitarian aid⁸⁰. The Office for Civil Society (OCS)⁸¹ is the body responsible for actions with CSOs.



⁸⁰ See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-cooperation-report/> (Profiles – United Kingdom)

⁸¹ See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-for-civil-society/about>

Switzerland

The *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation* (SDC), the *Human Security Division* (HSD) and the *Economic Cooperation and Development Division of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs* (SECO) coordinate Swiss International Cooperation for Development. In 2019, Switzerland ranked eighth in terms of percentage of GDP invested in ODA (0.44%).

Switzerland is recognized directing *most of for its bilateral ODA via CSOs*. Switzerland's bilateral cooperation projects with the world are carried out primarily through non-governmental organizations (34.7%), followed by ministries and official agencies (SDC, HSD and SECO) (31.3%). Partnerships via the private sector receive 4.5% of total Swiss bilateral OD According to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), bilateral cooperation between Switzerland and Brazil has intensified since 2014, especially in the area of education, research and innovation, as a result of the proximity with the establishment of two offices of the Swiss Global Network for Education, Research and Innovation (Swissnex) in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.⁸³

ODA between Brazil and Switzerland remained relatively stable between 2009 and 2018, varying from US\$ 3 million to US\$ 4 million annually. According to the latest SECO report, *Brazil is not among the priority recipient countries* for Switzerland, but is part of the program to promote sustainability standards in emerging markets⁸⁴. *There is no Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development program underway with Brazil*.


Switzerland's main cooperation project in Brazil is the offices and scientific consulate, both linked to *Swissnex*. Those offices provide a platform for the exchange of knowledge and ideas related to education, research and innovation. Public events and study tours seek to highlight the best of Swiss and Brazilian ingenuity and create networking opportunities between several groups of professionals. The offices provide resources to enable contact with international guests, startups, advanced university posts, resident entrepreneurs and also offer scholarships⁸⁵.

⁸³ Brazil is one of the four countries where Swissnex has permanent offices. The others are in China (2), India (1) and USA (3). Brazil is also one of 19 countries to have a consulate, in Brasilia, focused exclusively on scientific co-operation (Science Counselor). <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/representations-and-travel-advice/brazil/switzerland-brazil.html>

⁸⁴ See: https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/laenderinformationen/lateinamerika.html

⁸⁵ See: <https://www.sbf.admin.ch/sbf/en/home/education/scholarships-and-grants/swiss-government-excellence-scholarships.html#782754137>

With regard to cooperation with CSOs, Switzerland stands out for its significant involvement in ODA partnerships with sectors of civil society. The distribution, however, prioritizes CSOs based in Switzerland itself, followed by significant contributions to international CSOs and, to a lesser extent, partner country-based CSOs⁸⁵. Switzerland does not cooperate directly with Brazilian CSOs, but via Swiss CSOs, such as Heks, which mainly works with projects related to rural communities in the Brazilian Cerrado⁸⁷.




⁸⁵ OECD (2020), “Switzerland”, in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/00eb9f0b-en>.

⁸⁶ See: https://en.heks.ch/sites/default/files/documents/2018-01/Factsheet18x_Country_Programme_Brazil_381200.pdf

Chapter

II

Traces of the Brazilian Context and possible deviations of purpose in some ODA programs with Brazil



Traces of the Brazilian Context and possible deviations of purpose in some ODA programs with Brazil

The election of Jair Bolsonaro as president of the Republic of Brazil, in office from 2019 to 2022, represented changes in the economy, in the government's relationship with society and in the country's external relations. The shift deepened the neoliberal vision reaffirming the election of the market, regarded as the driver of economic and social relations.

Brazilian foreign policy, in many aspects, has been analyzed as a break with the tradition of how Brazil presented and inserted itself in the international scenario. The Brazilian presence today is marked both by the president's and the chancellor's pronouncements, primarily by the ideological alignment with international agendas of less respect for human rights and libertarian causes. The ideological bias of Brazilian diplomacy is easily identifiable when it stands for defending punitive options when it comes to regional disputes, such as Venezuela and Bolivia. The alignment with current U.S. policy on Latin America explains the behavior of the Brazilian government today.

The Brazilian presence in the UN fora, under the stricter orientation of the chancellery, is guided by ideological and unscientific positions on issues such as *human rights, gender, reproductive rights, slave labor, LGBT rights, environment, climate, among others*. Brazil's position on frontier issues with civilizatory principles, in referrals that require actions between governments and world civil society, is worrisome and affects the cooperation system.

To govern under this stance implied not only repositioning the State before the market, but also reviewing the entire institutionality that regulated government actions. The proposals for institutional changes included: *the extinction and merging of ministries with different purposes into a single one, with an announced justification for cost reduction; the dismantling of councils with civil society participation; and the shattering of bodies responsible for state management in areas of little interest to the government*. The proposal to extinguish the Ministry of the Environment, considered an obstacle to business - agribusiness, especially - right at the beginning of the government, is an example, but not the only one. The radicality of the extinction proposal has raised protests in several sectors, from environmentalist and indigenous movements, concerned with biodiversity, climate and the destruction of the environment adequate to the preservation of the way of life and culture of the original communities, to business segments, driven by pressures coming from external markets concerned with the demands for environmentally responsible consumption.

The Ministry has not been extinguished, but it has been systematically uncharacterized with budget depletion and dismantling of the technical team responsible for the conception and monitoring of policies and enforcement of compliance with regulations. The National Council of the Environment (CONAMA) was shrunk at the beginning of the government, also under the logic of cost reduction and efficiency. Civil society representation was reduced, its representatives are chosen by drawing lots and will have a mandate of only one year, and civil society advisors cannot be reappointed. This was the new Council that recently tried to remove the protection of mangroves and sandbanks, a measure that meets the interests of the real estate sector, later revoked by the Federal Supreme Court (STF).

It is regrettable that the reduction of more than 80% of the deforestation of the Amazon, between 2004 and 2012, as a result of the increased capacity of the State to implement environmental legislation and the strengthening of inspection agencies, is now a thing of the past. The fire outbreaks registered by the National Space Research Institute (INPE) in the Pantanal, between January of August 2020, exceed those registered between 2014 and 2019, an area equivalent to the territory of Israel. While 25% of the Pantanal burns under fire, the Minister of Agriculture, who holds the position on behalf of agribusiness, said: “I speak something that people sometimes criticize. But the cattle raising, it helps. It is the “firefighter” of the Pantanal”⁸⁸.

No government preservation plan, only isolated and topical actions, no consistent debate and systematic attempts to discredit the stakeholders. If the interlocutor is an NGO, the argument is built in such a way as to degrade the organization’s image, linking it to foreign interests; if environmentalist or indigenous movements, they would be acting under interests that are not their own. The persecution to environmentalist NGOs gained international prominence, when the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), sent agents to monitor the action of the environmentalist organizations members of the Brazilian delegation at the United Nations Climate Conference (COP-25), held in December 2019, in Madrid. Sending secret agents to a conference commanded by a multilateral organization is further evidence of the conflicting posture that the Brazilian government wants to imprint on Multilateral Organizations⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ See: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/meio-ambiente/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/10/09/tereza-cristina-diz-que-mais-gado-no-pantanal-poderia-diminuir-desastre.htm>

⁸⁹ See: <https://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/governo-escalou-abin-para-monitorar-ongs-e-participantes-em-evento-climatico/>

With broad international repercussion, the government announced the possible removal of Brazil from the Paris Agreement. Even though it has not done so, the country seems to be ignoring the Agreement, and so far, there have been no signs of public discussion on the revision of the goals of the agreement, whose deadline expires in December 2020. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change (CIM), resurrected in 2019 just before COP 25 in Madrid, has never met⁹⁰.

Through Decree 9,759 of April 11, 2019, the National Commission for the SDGs (CNODS), an instance of national governance, was extinguished, revealing “absolute contempt for the word agreed at the UN in 2015, together with 192 other countries, to implement the 2030 Agenda and its goals”⁹¹.

On his first day in office, the President edited Provisional Measure 870, with the aim of modifying the structure of ministries and bodies linked to the Presidency of the Republic. This measure resulted in changes in the Food Security Law in items that have as practical consequence the extinction of the National Council of Food Security (Consea), fundamental for the drafting of the food security policy that removed Brazil from the map of hunger in 2014⁹², among others. Today, according to the head of the Brazilian office of the UN World Food Program, “Brazil is taking steps to return to the map of hunger. He supports his prognosis with data from the World Bank that attests that the country, in 2018, had 9.3 million people in extreme poverty and the expectation is that more than 5.4 million will be included in this situation as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic”⁹³.

The worrying Brazilian situation generates apprehension among Brazilians, but has repercussions in other countries and in international organizations. At the opening of the UN Human Rights Council, in the section of September 14, 2020, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michele Bachelet denounced: “In Brazil, we are receiving reports of rural violence and evictions from landless communities, as well as attacks on human rights defenders and journalists, with at least 10 murders of human rights defenders confirmed this year”⁹⁴.

⁹⁰ See: <https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2020/09/16/brasil-nao-da-sinais-do-que-pretende-com-a-cordo-de-paris.ghtml>

⁹¹ See: <https://gtagenda2030.org.br/2019/11/12/sociedade-civil-denuncia-desmonte-da-governanca-dos-ods-no-brasil-em-evento-no-vietna/>

⁹² <https://fase.org.br/pt/informe-se/artigos/extincao-do-conselho-nacional-de-seguranca-alimentar-e-nutricional-comida-de-verdade-e-cidadania-golpeadas/>

⁹³ <https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,brasil-esta-voltando-ao-mapa-da-fome-diz-chefe-de-agencia-da-onu.70003299359>

⁹⁴ <https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/jamil-chade/2020/09/14/onu-denuncia-crescente-envolvimento-militar-em-assuntos-publicos-no-brasil.htm>

The lack of commitment to the truth and disregard for the facts led the President, in his speech at the opening of the UN Assembly, to affirm that his government is aware and doing its best, and he attributed the negative repercussions on the government to an international press that echoes a worldwide campaign contrary to Brazil's interests.

In this scenario of institutional instability and lack of interest in the 2030 Agenda by the government, official International Cooperation for Development programs may have their results jeopardized.

Two land regularization programs, supported by German cooperation, have been questioned in their implementation: the *Land Regularization Program in the Amazon - Legal Land*⁹⁵ and the *Environmental Regularization Program in Brazil* (CAR).

In 2019, through Provisional Measure 870, the Secretariat for Land Regularization in the Legal Amazon (SERFAL), responsible for conducting the *Legal Land Program*, was dismantled. The accumulation of problems with the Program led to the approval of an audit by the Federal Audit Court (TCU) in April 2020, which concluded that the suspension of the *Legal Land Program's* operations in 2019 "leads the land situation in the Legal Amazon to scenarios similar to those of the 1980s [...] escalating an atmosphere of legal instability, leading to land squatting, the escalation of agrarian conflicts and the advance of deforestation". The TCU also noted a decrease of almost 80% in the program's operational activities between 2014 and 2017. According to the audit, "the results of the Legal Land Program have not been enough to address the problems of legal instability, land grabbing and the advance of deforestation in the region of the Legal Amazon," as well as "to promote the social function of land in this region".⁹⁶

The *Environmental Regularization Program in Brazil* (CAR) is supported by GIZ (EU \$21,335,000) and the World Bank (\$21 million). This is the technical cooperation program for which Germany allocates the most resources in Brazil. Started in 2017 and executed by the Brazilian Forestry Service (SFB) of the Ministry of the Environment, the Program is aimed at assisting in the regularization and environmental management of rural possessions in the Amazon region, including for traditional population groups⁹⁷.

⁹⁸ The Terra Legal Program was created in 2009 by the Brazilian government with the objective of promoting the regularization of federal public land without destination in the Amazon. The German government began to support the program with the objective of "protecting the rights to land and access to forest resources for small farmers, riparian and indigenous peoples of the Amazon region through the regularization of their properties. The activities included, especially, increasing the capacity of public actors to solve the region's complex territorial problems. See: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/68794.html>.

⁹⁶ All information regarding the TCU audit was taken from document PGR-00080259/2020, of the FEDERAL PUBLIC MINISTRY, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT OF CITIZENS' RIGHTS, available: https://diplomatie.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/cap2_anexo-07.pdf

⁹⁷ As of 2019, the Project joined the portfolio of the World Bank's Forest Investment Program (FIP), which provided co-financing of US\$ 21 million, expanding the program to the Cerrado, for a period of 5 years. See: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/74553.html>

According to academic research⁹⁸ and denunciations from civil society⁹⁹, land grabbers have been using the registration in the CAR as a tool to claim of certain public land in the Amazon. The Forest Code provides that landowners in the Amazon can deforest up to 20% of the private area, generating the risk that, if the shackled lands are legalized, carbon emissions due to deforestation can reach 1.2 gigatons of CO₂. Although a significant number of programs aimed at land regularization in the Amazon region have been observed, studies show that land regularization in Brazil has implied an increase in deforestation due to the absence of state control¹⁰⁰.

Also noteworthy is what happened with the Amazon Fund. Constituted in 2008, it was the first cooperation instrument established by the Brazilian government from a financing mechanism for results of reduction of pollutant emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation - REDD). The Fund is formed by the German (US 1.28 billion) and Norwegian (US 1.21 billion) cooperation and is managed by BNDES, which allocates the donated resources in several projects aimed at reducing deforestation in the Amazon. Governmental institutions and NGOs participate. In 2019, Norway and Germany discontinued the transfers to the Amazon Fund, after the Minister of Environment, Ricardo Salles, tried to change the fund management mechanisms, and accused alleged financial irregularities in fund projects linked to NGOs, without, however, providing evidence.¹⁰¹

It is also worth mentioning the REDD+ Program for Early Movers (REM) in Mato Grosso, approved in view of the expressive results in the reduction of illegal deforestation between 2005 and 2010 in the state. In the decree that institutes the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Forest Fires in the State of Mato Grosso (PPCDIF/MT), the state government assumed the challenge of zeroing illegal deforestation by 2020¹⁰².

⁹⁸ AZEVEDO-RAMOS, Claudia; MOUTINHO, Paulo. No man's land in the Brazilian Amazon: Could undesignated public forests slow Amazon deforestation?, *Land Use Policy*, Volume 73, 2018, Pages 125-127, ISSN 0264-8377, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.01.005>

⁹⁹ <https://fase.org.br/pt/informe-se/noticias/car-e-usado-na-legalizacao-da-grilagem/>

¹⁰⁰ Probst, B., BenYishay, A., Kontoleon, A., Tiago Reis. Impacts of a large-scale titling initiative on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. *Nat Sustain* (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-0537-2>; Fonseca, A., Cardoso, D., Ribeiro, J., Ferreira, R., Kirchhoff, F., Amorim, L., Monteiro, A., Santos, B., Ferreira, B., Souza Jr., C., & Veríssimo, A. 2020. Boletim do desmatamento da Amazônia Legal (August 2020) SAD (p. 1). Belém: Imazon.

¹⁰¹ https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Evaluierung/Ergebnisse-und-Publikationen/PDF-Dokumente-A-D_EN/Brasilien_Amazonienfonds_2016_E.pdf; <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2019/08/apos-fundo-amazonia-pais-pode-perder-bilhoes-sem-acao-ambiental.shtml>

¹⁰² Available at http://www.mt.gov.br/rss/-/asset_publisher/Hf4xlehM0lwr/content/id/9777197

According to the Centro de Vida Institute (ICV), between August 2019 and July 2020, the state's deforestation alerts increased by 31% compared to the same period between 2018 and 2019. The study also showed that 95% of the burning was native vegetation, with great impact on local biodiversity.¹⁰³ Despite the context, in October 2020, CONSERV was launched, a voluntary adherence mechanism that provides financial compensation to medium and large producers in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes for preserving areas of native vegetation within their property that could be legally suppressed. Conserv was launched by the *Amazon Institute of Environmental Research* (IPAM), in partnership with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the *Woodwell Climate Research Center*, with support from the governments of Norway and the Netherlands¹⁰⁴.

Through the decree 9759/2019¹⁰⁵, signed in April 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has extinguished several Councils, including the National REDD+ Council (CONAREDD). Established in 2015, CONAREDD is the national governance space responsible for coordinating, monitoring and monitoring the implementation of Brazil's National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+). The existence of this Council is a prerequisite for the country to receive any resource from the Green Climate Fund. In December of the same year, on before the COP-25, CONAREDD was recreated. However, by redesigning it, the Minister of the Environment reduced the number of seats originally occupied by civil society.

¹⁰³ <https://www.icv.org.br/desmatamento/>


¹⁰⁴ In this initial phase, Conserv operates only in some municipalities of Mato Grosso, and approximately R\$ 24 million will be paid to producers during this stage. Once the model is approved, the project will be transformed into a system that can contemplate different sources of resources, including private contributions. See: <https://ipam.org.br/produtores-rurais-recebem-por-mata-conservada-na-amazonia/>

¹⁰⁵ Available at https://www.in.gov.br/materia/-/asset_publisher/Kujrw0TZC2Mb/content/id/71137350

Chapter



**Arguments from International Cooperation institutions
and academic studies that highlight the importance and effectiveness
of CSO participation for development objectives**



Arguments from International Cooperation institutions and academic studies that highlight the importance and effectiveness of CSO participation for development objectives

The *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* recommends partnerships between OECD members, donors and CSOs to implement and monitor achievement of the objectives agreed. The summary of the guidance presented here is organized from three documents originally from the OECD: *Accra Agenda for Action*, final document of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness - 2008; *Putting the last first? Civil society's role in leaving no one behind* (2018) and *Development Assistance Committee Members and Civil Society* (2020). The latter is the OECD's most comprehensive recent publication on the DAC Members' view of relations with CSOs.


There is convergence between OECD documents on the characteristics of CSOs and the role they can play in the success of programs and projects. As for the challenges, DAC members agree on the following points:

1. CSOs engage in development and humanitarian action, influence policy through dialogue and advocacy, which can enhance the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda;
2. CSOs have accumulated experience in actions among poorer and unprotected people, making them holders of information often not captured by official statistical reports, which enables better design and implementation of intervention in this segment of the population;
3. CSOs promote the participation of excluded groups, giving them a voice and providing means for the expression and assurance of their rights;
4. CSOs oversee development and provide complementary services to those provided by governments;
5. CSOs reach out to people in situations of vulnerability or facing high risk of marginalization and therefore develop capacity to deliver services to these groups;
6. CSOs have thematic flexibility and adequate methodologies to work on varied themes such as education, health, environment, among others;
7. CSOs have flexibility that allows them to respond more promptly to changes in the face of new needs and contexts.

However, according to OECD documents, there are challenges to overcome the difficulties of relationship and improvement of partnerships with CSOs. The relationship between DAC members and donors has been closer with CSOs in donor and international countries, given the common cultural background and legal apparatuses that contribute to a reduction in transaction costs. Additionally, member country partners have been able to engage citizens with issues related to the development and international cooperation agenda. According to OECD documents, the challenges ahead are the following:

1. Recognize the importance of strengthening partnerships with CSOs in partner countries, including recognizing the relevance of strengthening civil society in developing countries. This recommendation stems from the understanding that a strong civil society is important for economic development and democracy. It also warns that, in many parts of the world today, civil society is narrowing its scope for political issues that go beyond the economy and security;
2. Define procedures for transparency and alignment among members, donors and CSOs. Partnerships should range from foreign policy and diplomatic issues to trade policy, often unknown to partners. The provision of a complete and consistent picture of the political and economic environment of both the donor and recipient country;
3. Define a common vocabulary and management tools that best integrate objectives, target groups, modus operandi and their working methods. Procedures in this direction help to reduce asymmetries in transaction costs between partners, a matter in which CSOs in donor countries have an advantage, as well as better align day-to-day decisions with the objectives of the program and project under implementation;
4. Increase financial support provided directly to CSOs in partner countries, as well as expand support to more informal association organizations such as business and traditional civic actors, such as professional associations, faith-based organizations and trade unions;
5. making dialogue and consultation with CSOs and civil society more systematic with partner country CSOs, while also maintaining opportunities for strategic and less formal ad hoc dialogue with other members of local civil society. Partnerships and exchanges with partner countries are more focused on higher-profile organizations, and are often unaware of other civil society actors organized from faith, trade unions, professional associations and hybrid forms of association and entrepreneurship.


Academic studies also corroborate the arguments of the importance and effectiveness of CSOs in the execution of programs aimed at international development, such as EPSTEIN, Gil S. and GANG. Ira N. (2006) and MARTENS, Bertin (2005)¹⁰⁶. When analyzing the transaction costs of the execution of Aid for Development by different categories of institutions, Martens (2005) affirms that the CSOs constitute a first step towards a more complete response to the problem of a more effective intermediation of International Cooperation for Development resources between donors and beneficiaries. According to their study, CSOs implementing International Development Assistance programs can generate savings in transaction costs. The cost savings occur both in the area of information and assessment of the recipients' situation; and in ensuring the alignment of preferences between donor-recipient CSOs that apply common values; and because of the vigorous commitment and maximization of the actions of these organizations according to "the cause" until the budget is exhausted (MARTENS, 2005)¹⁰⁶



¹⁰⁶ MARTENS, Bertin. Why do aid agencies exist?. Development policy review, v. 23, n. 6, p. 643-663, 2005 e EPSTEIN, Gil S.; GANG, Ira N. Contests, NGOs, and decentralizing aid. Review of Development Economics, v. 10, n. 2, p. 285-296, 2006

Chapter IV

International Cooperation for Development via Brazilian CSOs



International Cooperation for Development via Brazilian CSOs

Brazilian Civil Society Organizations have large and successful experiences of partnerships with international organizations, especially with European non-governmental agencies. Some, especially those articulated in networks, also articulate with Multilateral International Organizations. In this case, partnerships are more punctual and related to specific projects and, often, with the intermediation of Brazilian governmental entities. The following are two examples of successful experiences of Brazilian CSOs, articulated with local movements, national networks, governments, international non-governmental agencies, and international multilateral agencies.

Articulation of the Brazilian Semi-Arid (ASA)

The Articulation of the Brazilian Semi-arid (ASA) is a network formed by more than three thousand different civil society organizations - farmers' organizations, unions, NGOs, cooperatives, among others - whose motto is *coexistence with the semi-arid*. According to this Network, life in the semi-arid region presupposes a stock culture for water for various uses, food for consumption by families and animals and seeds to ensure continued production. ASA develops a range of actions and technologies in the construction of water cisterns in different modalities.

In 2000, ASA started the implementation of their first program to meet a basic need: drinking water. The program intends to build 1 million cement plate cisterns next to the houses to capture and store rainwater. By October 2020, 626,355 cisterns had been built to store water for human consumption, 104,101 cisterns to store water for production and 7,186 cisterns for human consumption built in public schools¹⁰⁷.

ASA has been articulated as a network in 1999, based on several NGO initiatives supported by International Non-Governmental Agencies, such as MISEREOR and OXFAM (which has articulated contact with the UK Lottery), with a more continuous presence. The agenda of the ASA's participants already included the coexistence with the semi-arid, and the construction of cisterns as the most visible activity. This networking is the result of a decision of the NGOs to act politically, to intervene in the construction and implementation of public policies¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.asabrasil.org.br/>

¹⁰⁸ Quintela, Nadison. ASA Coordination. Interview conducted on October 13, 2020.

At this time, the network received support from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), allowing organizations to exchange experiences in technology and organization. On a continuous or occasional basis, many other International Agencies approached: *Caritas*, *Comité Catholique*, *Misión Kids*, *Heinrich Böll Istiftung*, *Brot Für Die Welt*, *Fundación Avina*, *Instituto de Estudos Políticos para América Latina e África (IEPALA)*, *OIKOS - Cooperação e Desenvolvimento/Portugal*. With the exception of UNICEF, the articulation with International Interstate Organizations was predominantly focused on specific activities. Examples of partnerships with these organizations are the proposals to systematize the experience with support from the *International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)* and the *United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)*.

Nationally, ASA is articulated in several jurisdictions, both in the civil society and governmental spheres. Government entities include partnerships with the *Ministry of Social Development (MDS)*, the *National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA)*, the *National Water Agency*, and a large number of agencies within states and municipalities.

The accomplishment of ASA's purposes is due, to a great extent, to its capacity of articulation with all these organizations, detecting, in each situation and temporal space, alignments between the mission of the Network and the mission of each partner organization. To do so, it was necessary to prepare the coordination and management teams to deal with various organizational and political cultures and meet the demands in the use of resources, accountability of activities developed and financial aspects¹⁰⁹.

ASA learned a great deal from dealing with government entities with very defined rules of partnership, from the moment it decided to contribute to the formulation and implementation of public policies. It became urgent to attend to notices, to account for activities and the use of public resources, respecting the rules defined by administrative law.

¹⁰⁹ Idem.

ASA's success in fulfilling its mission is justified by:

- 1. its strong capacity to elaborate and propose policies with a well-defined conception – a clear objective with implementation methodology and quantifiable goals, place of intervention based on objective criteria, precise definition of costs, among other aspects;*
- 2. its capacity to listen to partner organizations, their political objectives and mode of operation, the basis for building mutual respect;*
- 3. its clarity of objectives and independence from partners, in particular governmental ones, understanding the convergences, tensions and means of confrontation¹¹⁰.*

In addition to the objective of providing water populations, the implementation of the program mobilized many elements in the local economy, particularly materials supplies and labor (qualified by ASA). The political effects are also very relevant and range from the methodology used to always choose the communities to be served in a collective way, exchange of experiences, management and monitoring of activities and political relationship with public power. Over the centuries, water has become a trade currency in the elections in which the mandataries are chosen: only those who vote for the local political leader have a water supply, distributed in tank trucks. In the context of the semi-arid, access to water is a factor of liberation.

The work developed by ASA has national and international recognition, with 13 awards granted by Brazilian organizations and one international. In 2017, the World Future Council (WFC), in cooperation with the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), recognized ASA's work by awarding it the Silver Political Award for the Future, which awards laws and practices that successfully combat desertification and land degradation.

The work developed by ASA transversally corroborates many of the Sustainable Development Objectives, particularly objective 6 in terms of mitigating water scarcity, a problem likely to worsen in regions less developed by 2050 due to climate change.

¹¹⁰ Idem

National Articulation of Agroecology (ANA)

The National Articulation of Agroecology (ANA) has its origins in the 1990s, through convergence of organizations working in agroecology in specific territories that decided to exchange experiences and act politically in the formulation of public policies.

Along this journey, it became clear that acting on agroecological issues was not limited to executing projects – it was crucial to articulate projects to processes. That means that the focus should not be restricted to increasing income, as guided by the traditional way of conceiving rural development from a productivist standpoint, but rather improving the quality of life. It means integrating the perspectives of the countryside and the city, producers and consumers, in a chain for healthy life.

ANA works in the following areas: *biodiversity, food sovereignty and security, agroecological knowledge building, public policies with an agroecological approach, agroenergy and agroecology, women and agroecology, and financing.*¹¹¹

ANA's articulation with international non-governmental organizations has been in place for a long time and covers several scales, from local organizations to state level to national articulation. ANA articulates with international cooperation agencies through this network. The following are some of the longstanding partnerships: MISEREOR, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Brot Für Die Welt, Comité Catholique. More recently, the Pórticos Foundation was also included among the organizations supporting the network, as well as HEKS, which supports ANA's Biodiversity WG. The partnerships with these organizations are distinguished, besides the financing of specific projects, by the institutional support, which guarantees the maintenance of each organization in its territories and the structure of their network. The restricted support to the implementation of projects leaves a big gap: it hardly strengthens the institution and may compromise the continuity of the work after the conclusion of the financed project. When managed competently and responsibly, partnerships that strengthen CSOs institutionally reduce transaction costs for both parties¹¹².

¹¹¹ PETERSEN, Paulo Frederico. Coordenação da Articulação Nacional de Agroecologia. Entrevista realizada em 16 de outubro de 2020.

¹¹² Idem.

The difficulties of partnerships with multilateral and national government organizations, with rare exceptions, are in conception as well as in management. What is a successful project? From a production perspective, the answer would be a project focused on the production of a certain item that, in turn, would be integrated into productive chains of agrifood outside the domain of the producer. The evaluation methodology is limited to costs and benefits in the productivist logic, guided by mercantile entrepreneurship, with no space for productive diversity and no relevance for the dynamics of local markets.

We highlight some positive examples. The EcoForte Project, a partnership between ANA (the articulator of 25 territorial networks in the first round and another 15 in the renewal of the project) in partnership with the Banco do Brasil Foundation and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and in association with 12 Ministries, conceived with flexibility to support the networks in their main needs. That flexibility allowed for the emergence of other actors, usually invisible in productive projects: women and young people - out of 25 member networks, in 21 had specific actions with women and 23 included actions for youth.

It also allowed the strengthening of EcoForte's actions with other public policy agents: *Technical Assistance and Agroecological Rural Extension (Ater)*, the *National School Feeding Program (Pnae)*, the *Food Acquisition Program (PAA)*, the *National Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture (Pronaf)*, *organic certification*, the *Bolsa-Família*, *rural welfare*, the *One Million Rural Cisterns Program*, the *One Land and Two Waters Program*, the latter two being proposed and executed by another civil society network, the *Brazilian Semi-Arid Articulation (ASA)*¹¹³.


Partnerships with multilateral organizations, in general, are intermediated by some instance of national government. In such cases, the participation of CSOs with influence in the creation of programs, instead of simply implementing them, depends not only on international guidelines, but also on the institutional and political environment among the national government entities and CSOs involved.

The work developed by ANA transversally corroborates many of the Sustainable Development Objectives and, directly, objective two, which refers to ending all forms of hunger and malnutrition by 2030, based on sustainable agricultural practices, support for small farmers, and ensuring equal access to land, technology, and markets.

¹¹³ See more : <https://irpaa.org/noticias/1847/ecoforte-uma-politica-publica-para-as-redes-territoriais-de-agroecologia>

Chapter V

Conclusions and recommendations



Brazilian Civil Society Organizations have extensive experience in collaborating with International Cooperation Organizations, especially with Non-Governmental Agencies, as well as Multilateral Agencies. Above all, they have extensive expertise in the agendas that shape the Sustainable Development Goals. This document presents the experiences of the Articulation of the Brazilian Semiarid (ASA) and the National Agroecology Articulation (ANA) that prove that statement. They are not the only CSOs in the country that present trajectories in this direction. Therefore, we can argue that both organizations demonstrate:

1. capacity for horizontal (between coordination and base organizations) and vertical (nationally integrated) articulation;
2. capacity to manage projects and programs in partnership with multilateral or bilateral international organizations and national government entities in federal, state, and municipal instances;
3. political flexibility to deal with governments and divergent political orientations (showing and demanding respect), without giving up their objectives;
4. management competence to meet demands of different funders;
5. political capacity to reach the poorest and bring to light the aspirations and demands of the most invisible sections of society.

The most recent DAC/OECD guidelines and publications recommend that donor countries approach civil society to meet the 2030 Agenda, given the history of their organizations' involvement in humanitarian and development causes with the inclusion of the populations furthest from government action. In this sense, the argument can be reinforced by stating that this is the usual proceeding for CSOs, and it is transversal in any of their actions, whether involved with poverty mitigation, or in the defense of a decent life with adequate food, access to water for drinking and producing, or the right to decent housing, among so many rights to be fulfilled. None of these issues can be solved separately. The complexity of the environmental issue and sustainable development cannot be solved without thinking about the global in harmony with the local and vice versa: the air quality and climate involves everyone, but it also ensures the rights of the original populations who live in the spaces to be preserved. In the Brazilian reality, the resolution of the agrarian question is indispensable. In this last aspect, many Brazilian CSOs have an internationally recognized expertise.

As watchdogs, the CSOs have also demonstrated competence to monitor private actions, as well as state actions regarding sustainable production practices and the incorporation of environmental logic. Particularly in societies with narrow spaces for civil society demonstration, CSOs have been the voice that denounces inconsistencies in public policies and abuses of the private sector, even under the mantle of creditable ideas. The historic contribution of Brazilian CSOs in the struggle for a more sustainable country and social justice calls for the strengthening of their actions at a time when such issues have been defined as urgent by the international community and their actions have been limited by the government.

As for private sector engagement in reaching out to the ODS, given that the largest corporate abuses are in underdeveloped countries, the importance of monitoring Southern CSOs is reinforced. The well-known violation of the nature and livelihoods by Chevron in Ecuador, an example that comes from a southern country, has reached international courts through initiatives of Ecuadorian civil society, especially its indigenous population. In contexts like Brazil, it is not possible to effectively think about fair trade and sustainable productive chains without the strengthening of CSOs that historically monitor and blow the whistle on bad practices of the private sector.

Donor countries, as well as multilateral organizations, have incorporated the importance of civil society in building and strengthening their democracies into their narratives, and consider that such importance needs to be recognized by actors in developing countries. For this announcement to gain momentum, a second step must be taken: the allocation of a greater share of cooperation directly to CSOs in developing countries, not only to implement projects, but also to strengthen organizations institutionally, provide training and exchange moments. Among four of the five donor countries analyzed, the share of international cooperation resources destined to Brazilian CSOs is minimal when compared to those distributed to other sources. Reversing this distribution crucial in the face of the present Brazilian political framework, in which there is restriction of spaces for participation and fierce campaigning to devalue and criminalize the activities of NGOs and social movements.

Based on these findings, two main advocacy strategies can be outlined:

1. Critical advocacy against the allocation of ODA resources to leverage private sector investments in the SDG agenda.

The last OECD report (2020) showed that, even in financial crises and global recessions, ODA follows a constant curve, whereas private flows and donations from private entities, such as philanthropic foundations, show a strong decline. The organized civil society should alert to the volatility and unreliability of SDG financing strategies combined with private investment. Instead of directing ODA resources to leverage private investment for sustainable development, the international community should demand the restoration of accountability and the democratic service of finance to the real economy, limiting speculative operations. It must also regulate the activities of transnational corporations, by legally demanding their responsibilities for human rights violations and environmental disasters.

2. Advocacy for greater participation of civil society, both in the execution of ODA programs and in monitoring the actions of the state and private companies.

Most of the programs of the analyzed countries focus on sustainable business and production chains and opportunities for exploitation via the standing forest market, including the development of mechanisms that subsidize the growth of sustainable finances in Brazil. There is concern about safeguarding the rights of traditional peoples and the relationship of private initiative with these peoples and with the environment, and ensure that investments in impact and sustainable finance do not represent just a revamped discourse of the same actors and practices.

The UN and the OECD recognize that “short-term political and economic interests and pressures are inconsistent with sustainable development” . International organizations and their representatives repeatedly refer to concerns about the clear incompatibility of interests between the private sector and ODS, which implies the importance of strengthening the participation of CSOs from the perspective of monitoring the actions of private companies and governments. Such a recommendation is even more important in a context of government that aligns itself with the market, denies climate change and opposes CSOs.

Recommendations

Donors say that, in order to reflect the new challenges and realities, it is necessary to work with diverse actors, in reference to CSOs, philanthropic foundations and the private sector. For this purpose, the OECD encourages new actors to highlight their work. It was noted that the donor countries analyzed cooperate substantially with CSOs based in their countries because of familiarity with procedures, among other reasons. Brazilian CSOs should seek to be part of the two main CSO networks operating within the DAC/OECD framework, appropriating the debates on international aid effectiveness while looking at possible changes in their management and accountability mechanisms.


Both the OECD and the Martens study (2005) reinforce that the transaction costs of international cooperation among CSOs are lower, because there is an alignment of objectives and values to a much greater degree than among other actors. This reinforces the call for Northern countries to significantly increase development cooperation via CSOs based in their countries that already have a historical relationship with grassroots CSOs in developing countries.

With the exception of Norway, the analyzed countries cooperate with Brazilian CSOs exclusively via cooperation with CSOs based in their countries or as stakeholders of cooperation programs with the Brazilian government. In the case of Germany, advocacy through direct cooperation with Brazilian CSOs is not recommended, as the country does not have this practice. The United Kingdom and Switzerland, however, cooperate with CSOs located in developing countries, but do not cooperate with Brazilian CSOs, and advocacy actions in favor of more cooperation with these actors are appropriate.

As for Norway, it is recommended to follow NORAD's notices and send direct proposals through the website of its grants programs made available in the section dealing with the country, the only one to accept this type of approach. In relation to Germany, it is recommended that German-based CSOs involved in international cooperation for the protection of climate and biodiversity be approached, thus being able to apply for the IKI Medium Grants, linked to its Ministry of the Environment.

It is also possible to demand the implementation of the Reformkonzept BMZ 2030, pointing out the ineffectiveness of the Brazilian government on crucial issues to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, and justify that the programs have the maximum participation of civil society in its implementation, since the strengthening of cooperation via CSOs is also announced in this program.

The year 2020 marks the first five years of Agenda 2030 and inaugurates the Decade of Action, as declared by the UN, which aims to accelerate the attainment of the SDGs around the world. Such a context would suggest an increase in ODA flows in the coming years, were it not for the crisis scenario caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The maintenance of ODA commitments to developing countries, despite the context of the economic crisis that should mark the next few years, also in donor countries, should not be left out of the advocacy agenda of Brazilian CSOs. In other words, the maintenance of ODA flows, even in the face of the global recession, due to the expected increase in poverty in the least developed areas. Furthermore, the international financing that developing countries have resorted to during the pandemic will imply future payment difficulties in the face of the ongoing devaluation of recipient countries' currencies. This is a concern for many developing countries that are already suffering from rising debt levels.



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