


ATLAS

OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Carlos R. S. Milani | Enara Echart Muñoz
Rubens de S. Duarte | Magno Klein



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Translated by Maria Priscilla Kreitlon

Images translated by Niury Novacek, Rubens de S. Duarte and Carlos R. S. Milani

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**Consejo Latinoamericano
de Ciencias Sociales**



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This project was developed by the following team of the World Political Analysis Laboratory (Labmundo) participation: Tássia Camila de Oliveira Carvalho (Graduate Research Assistant); Allan Medeiros Pessôa (Cartographer); Isabela Ribeiro Nascimento Silva (Cartographer); Niury Novacek Gonçalves de Faria (Undergraduate Research Assistant); and Rafael Fidalgo Carneiro (Undergraduate Research Assistant).

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The cartography of Brazil in the world

Preface by Maria Regina Soares de Lima

Due to its continental dimensions, Brazil tends to be an inward looking country. As a result of its great territorial extension, the country presents a remarkable diversity among its regions, which makes the study of regional differences, in several matters, an object of investigation altogether more attractive since the country is a world in itself. The *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* removes Brazil from self-contemplation and projects it into the world in two ways. Firstly, it does so by choosing thematic cartography to graphically represent the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an impressive amount of data using, as a parameter, the visual representations of the same indicators across several other national territories. Because of the centrality given to territorial space, thematic cartography practically demands the use of a comparative perspective. Secondly, by choosing a specific cartographic projection, one that places the country at the centre of the globe, it reminds us that all cartographic projections are arbitrary and reflect each researcher's subjective preferences. The Atlas situates Brazil at the centre of the planet in regard to other national realities, but it also relativises our alleged national specificities and avoids taking the Brazilian case as unique.

Its pioneering spirit, in addition to the narrative malleability of the language of maps, is also reflected in what its creators have decided to show and compare. This is not a conventional foreign policy atlas. The five thematic chapters give account of events, processes, and some quantitative and qualitative topics that very often, as in the chapter on the country's formation, can easily encompass a hundred years; however, brevity is achieved by the creative use of timelines

crossing the centuries and locating these Brazilian events in temporal and spatial perspective. At the same time, processes often treated today as constants are put into a historical perspective. This is the case, for example, of trade relations with the United States which since the beginning of the 1950s have systematically declined, in parallel with the diversification of Brazilian foreign trade. The implication is that the old opposition between two models of foreign policy, alignment *versus* diversification, no longer makes sense.

Is Brazil an emerging superpower? Our material and symbolic assets are shown here in a rich variety of images. The resources are many, but each one of them represents a particular challenge not only for international cooperation, but to society, politics and the economy of the country. It is not just a matter of adding up our national capabilities and comparing them with those of other emerging countries. We have resources that, if properly managed, can put us at the frontline of global discussions on issues such as food, water, and megadiversity, as well as on the risks inherent in their predatory exploitation, here and in other countries. Our resources also pose another challenge for us: namely, to set up a domestic agenda and international cooperation committed to the reduction of inequalities, the guarantee of human rights, and democratic participation.

The plurality, diversity and heterogeneity of actors and agendas that directly or indirectly take part in foreign affairs are perhaps the most impressive feature of Brazil's new face to the world. In tandem with the universalisation of foreign policy, evidenced by the significant increase of diplomatic missions

in recent years, Brazilian society has also become internationalised. This is due to: the expansion of its investments abroad; the international presence of some of its organisations, social movements, and religious actors (Brazil is the second largest exporter of missionaries in the world); the growing number of Brazilians living abroad; the new sub-national diplomacy; and the numerous public policies it has exported to countries of the Global South, in particular Latin America and Africa. Within the context of Brazilian democracy's consolidation, the challenge for foreign policy is to open up a dialogue with civil society, to develop a robust public diplomacy, and to coordinate the international negotiation of numerous public policies that make up the Brazilian international cooperation agenda today. In a democratic system, and given civil society's growing demand for consultation and participation, foreign policy leaves its insulation and becomes just another type of public policy.

The portrait of Brazil's place in the world that emerges from this publication is of a diverse and complex country, a mass democracy implementing a many-faceted foreign policy, and having all the credentials to be a model for countries of the South caught in the stormy waters of a globalised and unequal economy. It is also part of a stratified geopolitical order, but with some multilateral spaces; above all, it possesses a huge heterogeneity of culture and values whose management requires international actors that make tolerance, fairness and respect for diversity the core of its international integration.

Congratulations to the Labmundo team at IESP-UERJ, coordinated by my colleague Carlos R. S. Milani and comprising Enara Muñoz Echart, Rubens de S. Duarte and Magno Klein, for regaling us with this splendid Atlas, so necessary in today's turbulent times.

Maria Regina Soares de Lima is Senior Researcher at the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (IESP-UERJ), and Coordinator of the South-American Political Observatory (OPSA).

Trajectory of a partnership

Presentation by Marie-Françoise Durand
and Benoît Martin

It is a great pleasure to see the end product - turned out so quickly and with such remarkable professionalism - of this ambitious *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* project, which began as a fruitful and stimulating collaboration between the Atelier of Cartography of Sciences Po and the Labmundo-Rio, a research group at IESP-UERJ.

History of a collaboration

This collaborative project was developed and refined over the course of several years, and it has included from traditional academic exchanges of lecturers and researchers to networked activities. The Year of France in Brazil, in 2009, was an important step in this process, since it provided institutional and financial support to several publications (mainly the translation of *The Globalisation Atlas* and the organisation of the book *International Relations: French perspectives*, by Carlos Milani), which were widely disseminated in Brazil. Within the framework of this cultural and scientific event, which took place in 2009, the exhibition *The spaces and times of Brazil*, comprising 27 panels, was our first partnership work around maps, charts, photos and short comments. Essentially, the panels presented “scientific images” that were well worth the visit.

The publication of the *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy*, initially in two languages (Portuguese and Spanish), in print version and also available for free download on the internet, thanks to the partnership between the Editors of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), signals a change in current understanding of Brazil's international integration

dynamics. It is, indeed, a very thorough and fluid piece that combines scientific exchanges, training, and implementation, bringing together partners from different disciplines (political science and international relations, geography, history, sociology) and professional traditions (researchers, lecturers, doctoral candidates, cartographers) of two countries, Brazil and France. Thus, the team at Labmundo-Rio has relied on a diversity of individual talents and, at the same time, it has produced a work of considerable consistency, despite the organisational challenges involved in a project of this nature.

Scientific Approach

This work revisits, develops and applies to a new object (i.e. Brazilian foreign policy) the concepts, notions and methods that were already shared by our teams, on both sides of the Atlantic, around the contemporary processes of globalisation. We emphasise, among other things, a methodological approach truly essential to the comprehension of international and intersocial dynamics, which is: to systematically consider changes of scale both in space and time. The first change of scale is to identify and analyse the territorial and reticular dimensions of societies' space at the local, national, regional and global levels (and in the opposite direction too). Therefore, the *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* is, at the same time, a study of Brazil's participation in the world, of its foreign policy in the broad sense of the term, and of the transnational dimension of non-state actors. As general practitioners of international relations and graphic information design who specialise in globalisation processes and their spatial restructuring, we appreciate the fact that the issues dealt with in

this *Atlas* go well beyond what its title suggests (at least according to how foreign policy tends to be understood in the French context).

The second change of scale regards temporalities. Not as in the classical conception of history (i.e. focused on origins, descriptive, and teleological), but as in research that captures the historical elements constitutive of powers, territories, exchanges, and societies and thus allows us to understand the present. This “re-historicising” makes it possible to avoid some current pitfalls, such as the overestimation of economic causes within temporalities that are too short, or culturalist explanations of social phenomena – mistakes often made alternatively or simultaneously. In addition to a methodology that attempts to articulate temporal and spatial scales, and which brings together the partners in this project, a rigorous scientific effort dovetails with an ambitious educational vision aimed at disseminating what has been accumulated in years of research, in order to stimulate public debate. The cartographic representation is the prime tool of this strategy.

Thinking about substance and form

This *Atlas* bears witness to the impressive, quick and thorough assimilation of cartography's graphic language by the Labmundo team. As a result, it offers images that make comprehension easier, but also encourage reflection, debate, and action. It is not, therefore, “classical mapping” in editorial terms, i.e. closely illustrative of an argument. Nor is it that very contemporary and sometimes “spectacular” kind of cartography, made easier by the software available these days - but whose function and results may not differ very much from the first category of cartography. It is not a geopolitical cartography excessively based on conflicts, on culturalist approaches or inter-state relations (as tends to occur in the French context, particularly), but which does not incorporate enough of the actors' diversity. These two ways of seeing and making the world visible, which reduce the field of international relations exclusively to relations between states, are still widely used, in spite of obvious

global changes. One of the great virtues of this *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* is to have managed to dissociate itself both from classical mapping and spectacular cartography.

In practice, this entails a sometimes long task, i.e. the operationalisation of a series of steps: reflecting on the concepts to be explained, researching the information considered to be relevant, processing the data, and in the end being able to represent them graphically. We will not comment on each one of these steps in detail - suffice it to say how resourceful and creative the authors have been in identifying, comparing, criticising and selecting appropriate sources for the arguments they put forward. This confirms that having strong research skills in the social sciences is extremely useful in finding the relevant sources and data, making aesthetic "details" secondary.

The "graphic exercise" (*la graphique*), as reflected upon and developed by Jacques Bertin, had two essential stages: exploring the data, and then a versatile communication of such data. This means that the time spent treating the data relative to the problem that is dealt with in the two pages of each item of the Atlas's chapters, and

in articulating graphic results with texts can, in some cases, lead to abandoning certain lines of inquiry or to producing some apparently simple documents - but they stem, in fact, from many attempts, modifications and substitutions.

Despite this difficulty, the Atlas presents a wide variety of graphical representations, including some original ones (such as the collections of logarithmic curves and the ordered matrices). These types of graphical representation, although very effective, remain little explored because the software currently available does not offer them automatically. It is necessary to use several software packages in order to create these representations, and to work manually on some occasions. At the same time, the authors of the Atlas were inspired (as in the case of flow charts) by some interesting innovations that emanate from the current explosion of *data-minings* and *dataviz*.

The *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* is the innovative outcome of this series of operations which, along with its publication, advance some very useful ways of thinking and *savoir-faire* for research. The collected data has been processed only

partially and new databases remain unexplored awaiting further research. Therefore, this important step taken by the Labmundo team is also just the beginning. We have witnessed Labmundo's researchers' command of graphic methods and maps, for instance during their presentations at the 9th Meeting of the ABCP (Brasilia, 4-7 August 2014). Greatly enriched, thanks to many original graphic documents, these presentations ultimately reinforce each other at the scientific level and in terms of communication. Labmundo thus becomes an important centre of reference regarding the use and dissemination of graphical treatment as "good practice" in research, education, and science popularisation in the field of Political Science and International Relations.

Marie-Françoise Durand is a geographer, and the coordinator of the Atelier of Cartography at Sciences Po.

Benoît Martin is a geographer, cartographer at the Atelier of Cartography of Sciences Po, and a PhD candidate at the Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales de Sciences Po.



List of acronyms and abbreviations

ABC – Brazilian Cooperation Agency	Refuge
AfDB – African Development Bank	COMINA – National Missionary Council
AIDS – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	CONAB – National Food Supply Agency
ALADI – Latin American Integration Association	CONARE – National Committee for Refugees
ALALC – Latin American Free Trade Association	COSIPLAN – South American Infrastructure and Planning Council
ALBA – Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas	COP – Conference of the Parties (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)
ALCA – Free Trade Area of the Americas	CPLP – Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries
ALCSA – South American Free Trade Area	CPS/FGV – Centre for Social Policies / Getúlio Vargas Foundation
ANA – National Water Agency	CSN – South American Community of Nations
ANCINE – National Film Agency	DAC – Development Assistance Committee (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development)
ANTT – National Land Transport Agency	DFID – Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ASA – Africa–South America Summit	DNPM – National Department of Mineral Production
ASPAC – Summit of South American and Arab Countries	EAP – Economically Active Population
ASSI – Advance Sworn Statement on Imports	ECOMOG – Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ASSS – Advance Sworn Statement on Services	ECOSOC – Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
BFP – Brazilian Foreign Policy	EDUERJ – Rio de Janeiro State University Press
BNDES – Brazilian Development Bank	EMBRAER – Brazilian Aeronautics Corporation S/A
BRIC – Group of countries comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China	EMBRAPA – Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
BRICS – Group of countries comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa	EPE – Energy Research Company
C40 – Cities Climate Leadership Group	EU – European Union
CAF – Andean Development Corporation	FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
CAFTA – Central America Free Trade Agreement	FAPERJ – State of Rio de Janeiro Research Foundation
CAN – Andean Community	FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
CAPEX – Brazilian Federal Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education	FGV – Getúlio Vargas Foundation
CARICOM – Caribbean Community	FHC – Fernando Henrique Cardoso
CASA – South American Community of Nations	FIESP – Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo
CBERS – China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite	FIFA – International Federation of Association Football
CBF – Brazilian Football Confederation	FINEP – Financing Agency for Studies and Projects
CDIAC – Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center	FIOCRUZ – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation
CDS – South American Defence Council	FIVB – International Federation of Volleyball
CEED – Centre for Strategic Defence Studies	FOCAL – China-CELAC Cooperation Forum
CELAC – Community of Latin American and Caribbean States	FOCALAL – Latin America-Southeast Asian Cooperation Forum
CELADE – Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre	FOCEM – Structural Convergence Fund of Mercosur
CEPAL – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	FT – Free Trade
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency	FUNAG – Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation
CICA – Central American Indigenous Council	GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
CLACSO – Latin American Council of Social Sciences	GDP – Gross Domestic Product
CNI – National Confederation of Industry	GEF – Global Environment Fund
CNM – National Confederation of Municipalities	GR-RJ – International Relations Think Tank
CNPq – National Council for Scientific and Technological Development	HDI – Human Development Index
CNT – National Transport Confederation	
COB – Brazilian Olympic Committee	
COBRADI – Brazilian Cooperation for International Development	
COMIGRAR – National Conference on Migration and	

HR – Human Rights
 IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
 IBAS – Group of countries comprising India, Brazil and South Africa (also known as IBAS Forum)
 IBGE – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
 IBP – Brazilian Institute of Oil, Gas and Biofuels
 ICC – International Criminal Court
 ICCA – International Congress and Convention Association
 ICD – International Cooperation for Development
 ICJ – International Court of Justice
 IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
 IEA – International Energy Agency
 IEP de Paris – Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po)
 IESP-UERJ – Social and Political Studies Institute – Rio de Janeiro State University
 IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development
 IIRSA – Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
 ILO – International Labour Organisation
 IMF – International Monetary Fund
 INESC – Institute for Systems and Computer Engineering
 INFRAERO – Brazilian Company of Airport Infrastructure
 INPE – National Institute for Space Research
 IOC – International Olympic Committee
 IOF – Financial Operations Tax (Tax on Operations Involving Credit, Exchange and Insurance, or Relative to Equities and Securities)
 IOM – International Organisation for Migration
 IPEA – Institute of Applied Economic Research
 ISARM – Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management (UNESCO)
 JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
 LABMUNDO – Laboratory for World Politics Analysis
 LNA – Non-Automatic Licensing
 LRF – Fiscal Responsibility Law
 MAB – Movement of People Affected by Dams
 MAC – Competitive Adaptation Mechanism
 MAPA – Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply
 MDG – Millenium Development Goals
 MDIC – Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade
 MDS – Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger
 MEC – Ministry of Education
 MERCOSUR – Southern Common Market
 MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
 MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
 MMA – Ministry of the Environment
 MRE – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
 NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
 NDP – National Defence Policy
 NDS – National Defence Strategy
 NGO – Non Governmental Organisation
 NIEO – New International Economic Order
 NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NSA – National Security Agency
 NSP – Nuclear Suppliers Group
 NYC – New York City
 OACI – International Civil Aviation Organisation
 OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
 OCMAL – Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America
 OAS – Organisation of American States
 OECS – Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
 OLCA – Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts
 OMAL – Observatory on Multinationals in Latin America
 OPEC – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
 OSAL – Latin American Social Observatory (Latin-American Council of Social Sciences)
 OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
 ODA – Official Development Assistance
 OTCA – Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation
 PAA – Food Acquisition Programme
 PALOP – Portuguese Speaking African Countries
 PARLASUL – Mercosur Parliament
 PARLATINO – Latin American Parliament
 PCN – Calha Norte Programme
 PDVSA – Venezuelan National Petroleum Company
 PEC-G – Exchange Programme for Undergraduate Students
 PEC-PG – Exchange Programme for Graduate Students
 PNAD – National Household Sample Survey (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)
 QUAD – Group of countries comprising the US, the European Union, Canada and Japan
 REBRIP – Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples
 REDLAR – Latin American Network against Dams and for Indigenous Communities
 RENCITAS – National Report on Wildlife Trafficking
 SC/UN – Security Council / United Nations
 SDP – Secretariat of Production Development
 SDR – Special Drawing Right
 SECEX – Foreign Trade Secretariat
 SEGIB – Iberian-American Secretariat General
 SEM – Educational Sector of Mercosur
 SENAI – National Service for Industrial Training
 SERE – State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty)
 SESU – Higher Education Secretariat (Ministry of Education)
 SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 SSC – South-South Cooperation
 TFDD – Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
 TIAR – Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
 UAB – Open University of Brazil
 UAE – United Arab Emirates
 UCKG – Universal Church of the Kingdom of God
 UERJ – Rio de Janeiro State University
 UFFS – Federal University of the Southern Frontier
 UFMG – Federal University of Minas Gerais
 UFRGS – Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
 UFRJ – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
 UFRRJ – Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro
 UFSC – Federal University of Santa Catarina

UN – United Nations
UNAMAZ – Association of Amazonian Universities
UNASUR – Union of South American Nations
UN Comtrade – United Nations International Trade
Statistics Database
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization
UNESP – São Paulo State University “Júlio de Mesquita
Filho”
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNIAM – University of Amazonian Integration
UNICA – Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association
UNICAMP – Campinas State University
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDIR – United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research
UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNILA – Federal University of Latin American
Integration
UNILAB – University of International Integration of
the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony
UNIRIO – Federal University of the State of Rio de
Janeiro
UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for
Abyei
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI – United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNWTO – United Nations World Tourism
Organisation
US – United States of America
USAID – United States Agency for International
Development
USP – University of São Paulo
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP – World Food Programme
WTO – World Trade Organisation
ZOPACAS – South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation
Zone

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Introduction:

The use of thematic cartography





Theoretical and methodological choices

This is the first *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy*. Begun in 2012, it is the fruit of a partnership between the Atelier of Cartography of Sciences Po and Labmundo-Rio, a CNPq research group at IESP-UERJ; the project also had the participation of Unirio's School of Political Science. The elaboration of the Atlas was inspired by some previous initiatives between Sciences Po and Labmundo, such as the translation into Portuguese of the *Globalisation Atlas* and its publication in Brazil in 2009. Thanks to an institutional cooperation with the Atelier of Cartography of the IEP in Paris, and our academic partnership with colleagues Marie-Françoise Durand and Benoît Martin, this project has been successful in reaching its goals. To both dear colleagues we extend our most sincere thanks.

The work done through this international network was as important as the collective action planned at the local level, which mobilised lecturers, researchers, doctoral candidates, master's students and undergraduates from two higher education institutions based in Rio de Janeiro, in addition to the two geographers and cartographers who joined the project on a fellowship. Teamwork, frequent face-to-face and virtual training, the interdisciplinary dialogue of Political Science and International Relations with Geography, the appreciation of ongoing research, and the opportunity to carry out new studies are some of the major factors that explain the unfolding of this project up to its most anticipated outcome: the Atlas's publication.

The main objective of the Atlas is to share some new readings on international politics and Brazilian foreign policy with researchers and students interested in the many forms of integration that Brazil exhibits on the world stage - whether from the

economic, political, social, cultural, or environmental point of view. It can be extremely useful to lecturers and students (in postgraduate, undergraduate, and secondary education), as well as journalists and other media professionals, diplomats, international cooperation managers working in the public or private sectors, civil society leaders and foreign policy activists. The images (i.e. maps, graphs, matrices, and timelines) and the texts (i.e. a brief overview of each theme) constitute an ensemble: always presented in two pages, they cover various topics, agencies, and dimensions of Brazil's international integration. By having the contents organised in this manner, readers who tend not to follow international debates too closely can have an introduction to foreign policy issues without risking superficiality; those who are better informed, or who already work in the field, will be inspired to ask some new questions and to update their perspectives. Each item of the chapters has been designed so that text is used to accompany and complement the images, in what can be considered as an invitation to the reader to examine the semiology and aesthetics more carefully, establishing a dialogue with the different ways of expressing the content and the message that the authors have chosen.

The use of images to illustrate arguments within written texts or in presentations is not new. Visual resources are widely relied upon nowadays: in presentations done with overhead projectors, in journalistic writing (e.g. infographics), in textbooks, and academic papers. The employment of images to convey data is very useful to facilitate access to information, to clarify ideas and concepts, to illustrate historical facts, geographical realities, and statistics. Images, just like text, send out messages, and reflect world visions and interpretations. The choice of classification and the

establishment of cut-off points, as in the case of a map of South America, or the Gini index in Brazil, demonstrate this statement very clearly.

Within the field of Political Science and International Relations in Brazil, this Atlas innovates in terms of graphical representation, semiology and aesthetics, especially when we consider Brazilian foreign policy studies. The Atlas makes it possible to visualise more clearly the internationalisation of public policies; the comparison of one or more variables in different situations; the sometimes complementary, but sometimes contradictory presence of various national and international actors in foreign policy agendas; and the complexity of overlapping data on different spatial scales: from local to national, from regional to global. Viewing international politics phenomena through the lenses of thematic cartography reiterates the notion that national state borders have become quite diluted in contemporary international relations - diluted but not erased. The persistence of national borders actually underscores the economic asymmetries and political inequalities among states and societies in the region and in the international system.

The use of images in the cartography of Brazilian foreign policy brings us to a second major transformation. Changes in society and culture have left readers with less time to focus on written texts. Increasingly, it is necessary for authors to find ways of communication that make their messages more clear, dynamic, that engage the public's attention and are, therefore, more easily understood and remembered by readers. The amount of data available grows daily, thanks to new technologies, to academic dynamism, and the efforts towards transparency made by many public and private institutions. Greater data availability does not, however, automatically imply improvement in the quality, or understanding of information. Thematic cartography plays, therefore, the social function of translation and of a bridge between different worlds.

This does not mean, of course, that texts should be abandoned or always passed over in favour of images. Nothing of the sort! The Atlas was conceived by researchers who built it upon numerous critical readings and

interpretations about the role of Brazil in the world. We have predicated its design on the scientific and academic use of maps, graphs, and matrices, all from internationally respected and well-published sources. In the same way that visual tools are being used more in newspapers and magazines in print, and in other types of media and social network documents, we believe that academia too can take ownership of this kind of language and develop semiology based on its own content, often emanating from researches developed over the years.

Thematic cartography can thus be converted into another instrument aimed at the continuous process of updating and democratising scientific knowledge, in this case in the area of foreign policy. In societies that become gradually more familiarised with internet technologies, thematic cartography opens the way for a more modern, dynamic and interactive language, easily adaptable for e-books, portals, and web sites by using colours, geometric objects, and other sorts of visual appeal.

Democratising knowledge on foreign policy is essential; especially if we start from the premise that foreign policy is a *sui generis* kind of public policy. Its uniqueness derives from two main aspects: (i) its dual insertion: systemic (i.e. international, regional, “outside” of the border) and domestic (i.e. relative to the interests and preferences at stake in a democracy); (ii) its simultaneous concern with issues on the international agenda (e.g. territorial integrity of the state, sovereignty, and the protection of national interests), which impart a “state policy” character to it, but also with strategic guidelines, political options, and development models that may vary in the course of history and in accordance with the situation (i.e. its government policy side).

The chapters of this Atlas were organized according to these premises, but there is no pretension to be exhaustive in the coverage of themes. We have tried to put forward the historical and formative dimensions of Brazilian foreign policy, although the focus of the Atlas is on contemporary politics as they take place around Brazil’s power resources (hard and soft), foreign policy’s actors and agendas, regional integration

TYPES OF CLASSIFICATION IN MAPS

Hypothetical data used in the maps

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Guyana	Paraguay	Peru	Suriname	Uruguay	Venezuela
Index	0,46	0,93	0,53	0,49	0,31	0,21	0,11	0,40	0,56	0,13	0,42	0,24

Classification based on data mean

Maximum - 0,93 (Bolivia)


Minimum - 0,11 (Guyana)

$0,93 - 0,11 = 0,82$

$0,82 \div 4 = 0,205$

0,93
+ 0,205
0,725
+ 0,205
0,52
+ 0,205
0,315
+ 0,205
0,11

Bolivia	0,93
Peru	0,56
Brazil	0,53
Chile	0,49
Argentina	0,46
Uruguay	0,42
Paraguay	0,40
Colombia	0,31
Venezuela	0,24
Ecuador	0,21
Suriname	0,13
Guyana	0,11




Classification based on units mean

Quantity of countries = 12

Quantity of classes = 4

$12 \div 4 = 3$

Bolivia	0,93
Peru	0,56
Brazil	0,53
Chile	0,49
Argentina	0,46
Uruguay	0,42
Paraguay	0,40
Colombia	0,31
Venezuela	0,24
Ecuador	0,21
Suriname	0,13
Guyana	0,11





Source: Own elaboration.

Concrete example of the Gini index in Brazilian municipalities in 2010

Classification by quantity of municipalities

Classification by variable factor mean



Source: IBGE, 2010b.

Labmundo, 2014

and, finally, multilateral relations, new coalitions, and South-South cooperation.

In the next two sections of this Introduction we will present some technical and methodological notes on thematic cartography that may be of help to our readers. We hope you enjoy the

reading and make productive and fruitful use of the maps, images, and texts. More information on the project and additional data about the *Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy* may be obtained at www.labmundo.org/atlas, where the reader will also find a glossary to facilitate understanding of some topics discussed here.


How are the images to be interpreted?

Thematic cartography consists of techniques of georeferencing and of transformation of data into maps, graphs, and matrices which can be used for the representation of various social, political, historical, economic and international issues, many of which are difficult to measure. This requires techniques capable of dealing with qualitative and quantitative data. For the purpose of clarification, the main tools of thematic cartography used in this Atlas will be presented in what follows.


VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS

Representation of a variable on the plane


Variation in one dimension representing absolute quantities



Variation in two dimensions representing absolute quantities



Value scale variation for relative amounts



Representation of more than one variable in the plane

In colours to show differences



In texture to show differences



In geometric shapes to show differences



Source: Durand et al., 2009

Labundo, 2014

The images featured in the Atlas arise from extensive research work, data collection and processing, choice of projections, semiological and aesthetic definitions. The entire process has to be conducted with the utmost rigour, because it directly impacts on the interpretation of maps, graphs, and matrices. Different types of scale (arithmetic and logarithmic) are used according to what needs to be compared or demonstrated: arithmetic scales permit the comparison of values, while logarithmic scales permit each curve's evolution to be compared. In the hypothetical case illustrated on this page, the logarithmic scale clearly allows us to see a growth rate of Country "C" not evidenced by arithmetic scales.


Visual representations (the maps, graphs, and matrices) affect the reader's perceptions, and may be influenced by variables related to absolute quantities (shown in one or two dimensions) and relative quantities (i.e. greater or lesser value, depicted by different colours and visual representations). There may be relations of proportionality, order, and difference among the data. In the case of proportionality and of order by hierarchies, usually points, dashes, squares or circles of different sizes are chosen: the larger one represents a higher value, but the caption should explain what the graphic relationship to the quantitative data is. When it comes to representing the same variable on a plane, the use of bars, columns, and the thickness of arrows is necessary to indicate variations in the quantity of this single variable. Difference, in turn, is expressed by the use of colours, fills, or distinct geometric formats. In order to demonstrate different variables, it is necessary to change the colour or the texture used, showing the existence of two or more variables, which can also have scales of value in them. Different shades of the same colour family

TYPES OF SCALE IN GRAPHICS


Data used in the graphs

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
State A	9 000	7 000	9 000	11 000	13 000	16 000
State B	10 000	8 000	6 000	9 000	12 000	10 000
State C	10	40	100	140	200	300


Graphic arithmetic scale



Using the logarithmic scale



Graphic logarithmic scale



Source: Own elaboration.

Labundo, 2014

are then applied, from darker tones to lighter ones.

The choice of how to demarcate classes is also important. There is no single method for creating classes; these can be divided according to the number of units, to the mean of a variable, or in a discretionary manner. Each one of these methods results in a different image, which may suggest different conclusions. The cut-off point of classes can lead the reader into error, if the caption does not explain it properly. Reading the maps' captions attentively is therefore highly advisable in order to better understand what phenomenon is being represented, and how.

In the field of foreign policy specifically, the use of thematic cartography has several advantages. When an image is shown, the territory becomes that much clearer to the reader, particularly in subjects under the direct influence of political geography. In addition to borders (which indicate states' territories), flows can be visualised too (e.g. economic, social, cultural, and environmental). For example, in a display about migration, territorial proximity exerts great influence on the movement of people; the arrows' thickness and orientation indicate departing and arrival points, thus helping to visualise and quickly understand the major worldwide migration flows. Through cartographic representation it is possible to identify the main routes chosen by migrants and how geography facilitates, or creates obstacles to (e.g. mountains and seas) the movement of people.


It can be argued that images work well to illustrate numbers, and to facilitate the comparison of one or more variables among a variety of cases. When comparing the energy matrix of several countries, for instance, in order to show how the Brazilian energy matrix is mostly clean, a long text with lots of figures might actually hinder a quick grasp of the comparison the author is trying to make. In addition, an excess of information in the same paragraph can make reading very time-consuming, truncated and tedious, eventually causing the reader to become uninterested. Through the use of images (whether graphs with circles, bars, or maps), the comparison becomes much more evident. Reading and understanding are immediate, "noise" in communication is avoided, and

INTERPRETATION OF TABLES WITH PROPORTIONAL CIRCLES

Data used in the table

	Sarney	Collor	Itamar	FHC	Lula	Dilma**	TOTAL
South Am.	13	7	14	53	88	18	193
Cent. Am. & C.	0	0	0	5	22	1	28
North Am.	5	3	1	14	19	5	47
Europe	3	9	0	31	54	10	107
Africa	2	4	1	4	34	7	52
Middle East	0	0	0	0	10	0	10
Asia	2	1	0	8	16	4	31
Oceania*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	10	40	100	140	200	300	

Absolute amount of presidential trips



Source: Planalto, 2014

*Oceania was not visited in the period

**Dilma Rousseff's trips until December 2013

Labundo, 2014

comprehension of the message that the sender wishes to transmit is greatly facilitated.

Finally, the sources used when collecting data are very important in the process of producing images such as the ones gathered here. Some difficulties may arise along the way. The quality of each nation state's statistics bureau varies considerably; in the case of Brazil, data production and access has much improved since the mid-1980s. The data put out by international bodies (UN agencies, World Bank, OECD, etc), as well as by civil society organisations and large corporations (an increasingly important trend nowadays), can help in the construction of meanings about the world's reality. Data may reveal realities that do not, however, always coincide with each other, depending on their sources.

In many cases, triangulation of data turns out to be crucial, as is the diversification of sources, and making sure

that selections are made according to the type of message the author intends to create. Visualising and comparing maps and matrices on the basis of different data was also a constant exercise when developing this Atlas. For example, the topic on energy uses data from the Central Intelligence Agency in the US, because the most complete source - apart from the CIA - would be the World Bank. But the Bank does not break down data according to types of energy sources, including the hydropower sector, which we wanted to present separately. In the end, we opted for the CIA data because it is internationally trusted, having been previously used in the production of other Atlases in Europe, the US, and Latin America. It is important to emphasise that data collection was conducted between 2013 and 2014. Standardisation of usage and references is also essential. For instance, the term "dollars" has been adopted as a standard and indicates US dollars.


The choice of a projection

DISCONTINUOUS GOODE PROJECTION

Goode projection unchanged



Areas removed to create the Atlas's standard projection



The Atlas's standard projection



Projection provided by the Cartographic Studio of Sciences Po

Maps are never exhaustive or complete, nor totally objective. Should it be North-oriented? Show Europe at the centre? Reduce the size of the Pacific region and Africa? One of the most important decisions in designing a map regards the choice of projection. Cartographic projections can be understood as an instrument of representation of the world by means of a drawing. It is an exercise in transformation of a three-dimensional object into a flat representation, which is why projections are the object of frequent questioning, criticism, and debate. Projections always generate distortions, more or less pronounced, of parts of the planet's territory.

Distortions can be observed more easily as we approach the poles. In some cases, such as in the Mercator projection, the American state of Alaska is made to look larger than the Brazilian territory. Another example of the distortions embedded in the projection developed by Gerard de Kremer is Greenland, represented by a territory equivalent in size to that of the African continent, whereas in fact it is 50 times smaller. In addition to image distortions, there are other issues often associated to the design and use of cartographic projections. The first concerns the disposition of content on the plane: traditionally, because of the influence of European cartographers, Europe is represented in the centre of the projection. Also due to the influence of the main schools of cartography in Europe and in the US, the geographic North is usually represented at the top of the Southern hemisphere. It is worth pointing out that, since planet Earth is a geoid, there is no need to represent the North at the top; the South, the East or the West can equally be at the top.

In other words, the choice of projection is not neutral, it arises from decisions made by the cartographer, and it is up to the researcher to decide which model is best suited to their goals. If the event being studied occurs mainly in the Northern hemisphere, it is natural that they should give preference to projections highlighting this region of the globe to make the image clearer to the reader. Similarly, if the purpose of the image is to represent some event by arrows, preference should be given to projections that depict the continents further apart (such as the Fuller projection), so that the arrow does not

pass “on top of” key territories, hiding them or polluting the image.

The Labmundo Atelier of Cartography believes that the choice of projection should also take into consideration the political nature of representations. We avoid projections that overestimate the Northern hemisphere at the expense of the Southern hemisphere. We prefer using the Fuller, Bertin, and Goode projections. In addition, we also declare a preference for projections that are not Eurocentric but rather put Brazil at their centre.

The projections used in this Atlas focus, for the most part, on the American continent and do not contain any relevant distortion regarding the size of the Northern hemisphere. We chose to keep representing the North at the top – and this was due to the perhaps excessive novelty that might constitute, to the eyes of Brazilian readers still unaccustomed to it, the use of projections with the geopolitical South at the top of a world map. On the Atlas’s website readers may find examples of maps using that kind of projection, which also illustrates our cover.

This project was only made possible because it has counted with institutional support and the partnership of researchers, colleagues, and friends. Financial support obtained from Faperj, Finep, CNPq was decisive. We thank IESP-UERJ for its institutional support and for the physical space allocated to the Labmundo-Rio research group. Our thanks go also to the colleagues and researchers who have helped us in the collection of data, the production of analysis, in drafting or reviewing the items of each chapter. In particular, we would like to thank Breno Marques Bringel, Henrique Sartori, Cristiano A. Lopes, Bernabé Malacalza, Rafael C. Fidalgo, Renata Albuquerque Ribeiro, Danielle Costa da Silva and Wallace da Silva Melo. We also thank the colleagues Daniel Jatobá, Elsa Sousa Kraychete, Leticia Pinheiro, Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Miriam Gomes Saraiva for their comments, criticisms, and the suggestions made during the academic seminar that we organised at IESP-UERJ in September 2014. Finally, it is important to note that all the photos illustrating the chapters were taken by Enara Echart Muñoz, who kindly assigned their rights to the publication of this Atlas

DIFFERENT PROJECTIONS AND THEIR DISTORTIONS


Bertin Projection



Fuller Projection



Gall-Peters Projection



Mercator Projection



Miller Cylindrical Projection



Robinson Projection




Projection	Brazil	Alaska	India
Mercator			
Miller Cylindrical			
Fuller			
Bertin			
Goode			


Projection provided by the Cartographic Studio of Sciences Po

Labmundo, 2014

World Political Map




Source: Own elaboration.



Chapter 1:

THE FORMATION OF BRAZIL





Brazil's historical formation and development process as a nation-state have imbued its international integration strategies with certain specific traits and structural constraints. For the analyst of international relations and of Brazilian foreign policy (BFP), it is necessary to understand how the territorial consolidation of the country took place, the economic cycles it went through, and the importance of international migration flows. Brazil's more than five centuries of international integration - first as a colony of the Portuguese Empire, then as a Kingdom united with Portugal, and finally as an independent state - were marked mainly by the agrarian exporter paradigm, which would only be modified in the mid-20th century. Sugarcane, coffee, and rubber monocultures, along with the exploitation of minerals such as gold and diamonds, played a decisive role in Brazil's foreign affairs, and also underpinned the historical characteristics of its social, political and productive makeup. In this chapter, we will present the historical roots of BFP, as they are essential for the temporal comprehension of several issues which, in the next chapters, will have their current dynamics analyzed. Themes such as migration, multilateralism and economics are connected to subsequent units and the text clearly indicates these complements (in the "See also" sections), thus suggesting a non-linear reading of the contents that is a feature of the Atlas as a whole. The last items of this chapter will present, in historical perspective, the great changes that have come to mark Brazil's international integration today, such as its recent activism on global issues or, in the domestic context, the demand for greater social participation in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.

The conquest and formation of colonial Brazil

The arrival of the Europeans in the Americas resulted from a process of maritime and commercial expansion at the beginning of the internationalisation of capitalism. A combination

of cultural, political and economic factors led to Europe's projection on the world stage. The first Europeans to arrive in the region found indigenous peoples divided into more than 2,000

nations and tribes. The interaction between the two sides was beset by conflict rather than friendship, with the brunt being borne by the indigenous peoples. It was marked by capture, acculturation, fostering of tribal rivalries, and the spread of European diseases for which individuals had no immunity. Apart from extractivism, the colonisation project in Brazil did not start until 1530. The territory was divided into captaincies and sugarcane monoculture was implanted. Initially, labour was provided by captured indigenous people, and later on by African slaves.

Demarcation of the territory was established by the Treaty of Tordesillas, but its terms were neither clear nor adhered to rigorously. The union of the Iberian royal courts contributed to increase Portuguese presence in the Spanish colonial territories. The Treaty of Madrid in 1750 consolidated the new spatial division between the Portuguese and the Spanish. But the sovereignty of Portuguese America was threatened by other kingdoms, such as France and England. The Dutch occupied the Northeast for a long period of time, creating an influential political and economic system of lasting impact. Their expulsion was a milestone in the formation of Brazilian

AMERICAN CONTINENT AT THE EVE OF THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST

Main indigenous groups and cultural areas



Sources: L'Histoire, 2012; Barraclough, 1991.


COLONIAL EXPORTS

In millions of British pounds, between 1500 and 1822




Source: Simonsen, 2005.

COLONIAL BRAZIL, 1500 - 1808



EUROPE CONQUERS THE WORLD

Main expeditions between the 15th and 16th centuries

national identity.

The international integration of colonial Brazil was based on direct dependence on the metropolis (and on England, more indirectly), and on an economic activity characterized by monoculture exports (agricultural produce, sugarcane). The discovery of gold contributed to the urbanisation process, the expansion towards the hinterlands, and the diversification of the

professions, in addition to the emergence of a middle class. Because of mining, the country's economic and political axis shifted from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro. The invasion of Portugal by Napoleon Bonaparte put an end to the colonial period. The arrival of the Portuguese royal family, the elevation of Brazil to the status of a Kingdom united with that of Portugal, and the choice of one of the latter's members to govern Brazil after

its independence help to explain the maintenance of the country's territorial integrity and its relatively peaceful process of independence.

SEE ALSO:

Brazilian Empire p. 16
 Cultural diversity p. 24
 South-American integration p. 86
 North-South relations p. 100



From seat of the colonial Empire to imperial Brazil

TRIPLE ALLIANCE WAR, 1864-1870




After the Court's arrival, Brazil became the centre of the Portuguese Empire, although the opening of its ports to friendly nations in 1808 confirmed a submissive stance towards England. Not even independence changed the unequal character and hierarchical relations between Brazil and England - the first foreign debt incurred by Brazil, in order to pay compensation to its former metropolis, was contracted from the British Crown.

The newly independent Brazil was in sharp contrast with the rest of Latin America: it was the only monarchy among the republics of the region. This fact, compounded by the elites' homogeneity and the political and social stability of the Brazilian Empire, created in the local political imaginary of the time a vision of a civilized country in the midst of caudillo-run republics. As for regional relations, the rivalry with Argentina was evident, as was the effort to make sure the region of the La Plata River basin did not threaten Brazil's borders and interests, in a regional balance of power system. Throughout the 19th century the country strove to maintain its hegemony in the region. Between 1821 and 1828 it kept possession of the Cisplatina province. After Uruguay became independent, Brazil tried to influence the political life of the new country, an upshot of its rivalry with Buenos Aires.

Brazilian interventions in the area, and the economic expansion of Paraguay, altered the regional balance of power and resulted in the largest armed conflict in the history of South America, involving Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. The War of the Triple Alliance had significant consequences for Brazil, such as the consolidation of its army, the increase of its debt with England, and indirectly contributing

FORMATION OF THE BRAZILIAN STATE, 1808 - 1889



to the abolition of slavery. National borders were also redrawn: Paraguay, for example, lost about 40% of its territory.

Over half of the Brazilian borders were defined during the 19th century. Making use of *uti possidetis*, Brazil held several negotiations with its neighbours. The Southern region proved to be the most difficult, due to neighbouring countries' concerns and the extension of the borders under dispute. There was a succession of international agreements from the second half of the 19th century onwards, but also several armed conflicts that aimed to ensure national sovereignty over the territory. In general, the use by the Brazilian government of diplomatic solutions to territorial disputes was prevalent.

Border consolidation was completed at the beginning of the 20th century,


thanks to the leadership of the Baron of Rio Branco, both before and during his term as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Baron participated in the agreements that ensured Brazilian sovereignty over the territories of Acre, Palmas and Amapá.

The extension and the unity of Brazilian territory were achieved also at the expense of internal separatist movements, such as the Confederation of the Equator, the Cabanagem, the Farroupilha Revolution, the Juliana Republic, and the Inconfidência Mineira, which were all ruthlessly suppressed.

As regards the economy, commodities such as coffee, sugar, rubber and cotton were produced for export. In the case of coffee, the technology evolved slowly, but by the end of the 19th century new techniques were

BRAZILIAN EXPORTS


Sum in each decade as a percentage of the total, between 1821 and 1890



increasing farm productivity and a new form of labour began to be employed: the African slaves were gradually replaced by European immigrants. Between 1819 and 1883, around 540,000 immigrants landed on Brazilian shores, out of which 220,000 were Portuguese, 96,000 Italian, 70,000 German and 15,000 Spanish. The international consumer market for Brazilian coffee expanded, as new urban centres sprung up and a new middle class emerged in the US and in Europe.


In the run-up to the Republic, Brazil had a population of little more than 14 million, already highly mixed and mostly of low-level education. The country was essentially rural; it was sparsely integrated in economic and territorial terms, and Rio de Janeiro (500,000 inhabitants) was its only large urban centre.

BRAZILIAN BORDERS IN HISTORY



SEE ALSO:

South-American integration p. 86
Argentina p. 88
Global governance p. 108
South-South Cooperation p. 112



The Republic and the United States' hegemony

The Empire of Brazil (1822-1889) kept ties of loyalty with European royal families and monarchies, while it watched from a critical distance the unravelling of the Monroe Doctrine. But relations between Brazil and the United States changed with the advent of the Republic, not just because of the ideological proximity of both political regimes and their affirmation of republican ideals in the American continent, but also due to the coffee barons' export-related economic interests. Relations between Brazil and the United States would, in the course of the 20th century, become the most important systemic element of Brazilian foreign policy (BFP).

RIO TREATY

Participation in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, between 1947 and 2014




In the early 20th century, the strengthening of Brazil-US relations aimed to “republicanize” BFP. The 1870 Republican Manifesto stated: “we are Americans and we want to be Americans”. As a result, BFP’s positions were less favourable towards Europe, while there was a rapprochement with the United States and the Hispanic neighbours. Some examples of this approach: the Customs Cooperation Agreement signed in 1891 with the United States; the support given by the US – along with the English, Portuguese, French and Italian – to military republicans under the leadership of Floriano Peixoto in 1893; and the Treaty of Cooperation signed with Argentina in 1896.


During the transition to the 20th century, the economic and political relations between Brazil and the United States became crucial in defining BFP’s priorities and strategic guidelines, and gave birth to different visions of Brazilian diplomacy. Two main positions can be identified as interpretative frameworks developed inside the Itamaraty on Brazil-US relations: one of alliance with the US; the other, a universalist and diversified diplomacy (trade with Western and Eastern Europe, with the Asian and African continents, with Latin America and the Middle East). Much about 20th century republican BFP

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Brazilian trade, between 1901 and 2010 (in million dollars)*




Trade share of trade with the US, between 1901 and 2010 (% of total)



can be explained in the light of conflicts between these two positions. In the first thirty years of the 20th century, Brazil remained aligned with the United States’ interests, aiming at the advantages in conditions of continental security guaranteed in Latin America by the international prestige of the new power. In this manner, the relative autonomy of “an unwritten covenant” with the United States (according to the expression coined by Bradford Burns in 1966), and the domestic strengthening of BFP under the leadership of Baron of Rio Branco (1902-1912), were able to guarantee good results to Brazil in its territorial negotiations with neighbouring countries in South America.

OLIGARCHIC REPUBLIC, 1889 - 1930




Brazil accepted the Roosevelt Corollary and did not support the Drago Doctrine announced by the Argentinian government in 1902. This doctrine stated that no foreign power should be allowed to use force against an American nation in order to compel it to pay its debts. Argentina was perceived by Brazilian elites as the main rival in the Southern Cone, and relations between Brazil and the US during this period also served to undermine Argentina's project of regional leadership. In 1905, Rio de Janeiro and Washington agreed to raise their diplomatic representations to the category of embassy, and the US retained the same ambassador (Edwin Morgan) in Rio de Janeiro between 1912 and 1933, a fact that strengthened even more the rapprochement between the two countries. In 1914, Ambassador Cardoso de Oliveira, Brazilian representative in Mexico, acted as a mediator of American interests in that country.

But the Great Depression of 1929, the instability in Europe, and the dissatisfaction of Latin American countries with US policy in the region, among other factors, brought about changes in the United States' stance towards Latin America from 1930 onwards. Despite Franklin D. Roosevelt's rhetorical promises of economic cooperation, the actual content of US policy did not change, and it continued to base its leadership on the Monroe Doctrine. The cooperation discourse did, however, help the US to secure its sphere of influence at two key moments of the 20th century: the Second World War and the Cold War. Brazil remained neutral in the conflict until 1942, when it sided with the United States. This alignment was facilitated by concessions made by the Americans to Vargas. The US sought to involve Brazil in its power system

USA AND BRAZIL IN THE INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Intervention in the Dominican Republic, in 1965




in order to neutralise German influence. It should be noted that Germany, in 1930, was responsible for 25% of Brazilian imports, slightly above the US. There were cooperation initiatives in the military (especially as regards the modernisation of airports in the Northeast of Brazil) and in the industrial field (the steel sector, for instance, saw US financing of the Volta Redonda plant construction), although the Armed Forces were divided: while the Navy leaned towards the United Kingdom, the Army was split between Germany and the US. Vargas' "double game" between Germany and the US (1935-1941), known as the political strategy of Pragmatic Equidistance, clearly linked BFP to the challenges of national development, but placed it in an area under patent American influence after 1945. The balance between a preferential option for the US and the diversification of partnerships is considered an explanatory variable of BFP throughout the 20th century.

At times, BFP leaned heavily towards association or almost automatic alignment with the US (during the Dutra government, the first years of the authoritarian regime, or the military intervention in the Dominican Republic). Juraci Magalhães, an

ambassador to the US who became chancellor later on, declared that "what is good for the US is good for Brazil". At other times (those of the Independent Foreign Policy, or the Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism), BFP broke with its usual continuity, daring to come out from the Northern hegemon's shadow and autonomously devising its own strategies of international inclusion.

SEE ALSO:

- Security and defence p. 46
- New coalitions p. 106
- Global governance p. 108
- South-South Cooperation p. 112



Development and industrialisation


The period between 1930 and 1980 saw the outline of some important economic strategies which were to influence Brazil's economic and industrial growth in the 20th century, as well as its international integration. These five decades were also the scene of great social, demographic and political changes, in a world that witnessed the Second World War and the Cold War. The 1930s were very important in ensuring that the industrial surges Brazil was going through actually became a government project of lasting impact. The year of 1930 marked the rise to the Presidency of a government less committed to the rural oligarchy that had been in power for more than 30 years. This political change was accompanied by the aftershocks of the 1929 international crisis, which meant a

decrease in the market demand for Brazil's main commodity export: coffee. Getúlio Vargas attempted to build a compromise government capable of balancing the interests of several political groups influential in Brazil (except during the Estado Novo). This led to the concentration of power in the Office of the Presidency (whereas before it was much more fragmented among the federated units), which permitted an industrialisation project guided and protected by the State.

There were industries in Brazil before the 1930s, usually associated with capital surplus from the coffee economy. However, the industrialisation project that started in 1930 and was then followed up - to a greater or lesser degree - by successive governments was decisive, and became known as the "import substitution industrialisation" model. In spite of what the expression might suggest, the goal was not immediate reduction of import flows. From the outset, imports were encouraged in order to increase the productive capacity of the Brazilian economy. The development plan envisaged various industrialisation stages, covering basic industry as well as the industries of durable and non-durable goods. In this manner, national production would gradually


BRAZILIAN POPULATION

Evolution of the urban population share, between 1940 and 2010 (in %)



Sources: ONU, 2013a; IBGE, 2013a.

Population growth between 1940 and 2010




Source: ONU, 2013a.

Labmundo, 2014

add value to its outputs. The investments that enabled industrialisation were based on an "economic tripod" formed by government capital, domestic private capital and international private capital, which varied in degree and importance over time. The dynamic centre of the Brazilian economy was thus displaced from the foreign sector to the domestic one. As an agro-exporting country, the greater part of its wealth, jobs and income was linked to the production for foreign markets. Brazilian industrial development changed the country's economy, as it became based on the internal consumer

EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRY


Share of the Brazilian GNP, between 1945 and 1995



Sources: IBGE, 2013a; Ipeadata website, 2013 and Bonelli et al., 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE NATIONAL PROJECT, 1930 - 1989



market. Many social factors played a role in this shift: among them, demographic growth accompanied by strong urbanisation and regional integration schemes.

In this period, a guided process of Brazilian migration to the hinterlands – which peaked by the end of the 1950s – was taken further, and linkages among regions increased. Since Brazil was an export-orientated country, integration between its regions was fragile. The Targets Plan opted to build numerous roads interconnecting the national territory, as a means to overcome lack of infrastructure in a short time, and to attract the automobile industry to Brazil. Energy and telecommunications were structural bottlenecks that became the focus of state intervention too. As the project aimed at reorientating the productive sector towards the domestic market, there was a clear need for international funding to facilitate industrialisation and this brought external debt in its wake. In addition, this development model was incapable of overcoming problems such as the economic disparity between regions, social inequality, poverty and other imbalances. In fact, strong economic growth was accompanied by a deepening of income concentration.


Brazil gravitated even more towards the US area of influence, joined the Allies' war effort and became part of the western bloc in the context of the Cold War. This alignment was very seldom automatic or ideological, but sought instead to bargain for economic or political advantages. Although Brazil's geographical location restricted its autonomy because South America was considered to be in the US's area of influence, foreign policy was used as an

COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

G77 members, in 2014



The Non-Aligned Movement at its foundation




instrument of the development project. Getting closer to the American superpower was understood as a means to guarantee diffuse returns in other areas. Brazilian political elites did not question the government's allegiance to the capitalist bloc, but saw Brazil as a peripheral country in need of growth and development. That is why some Brazilian initiatives displayed some degree of autonomy, demanding more fairness and justice in the international scenario and seeking greater diversification of partners, including in the communist world. This pragmatism of Brazilian diplomacy was all the more evident when domestic economic performance increased and

systemic restrictions decreased (e.g., the NIEO proposal). Due to its high external debt – the result of an industrialisation model too reliant on foreign liquidity – Brazil faced macroeconomic imbalances, which finally exhausted the model devised in 1930. Consequently, the quest for autonomy in foreign policy also suffered a major setback at the end of the 20th century.

SEE ALSO:

Brazilian multinationals p. 70
North-South relations p. 100
Industrial complex p. 30
Logistics p. 32



Globalisation and the new order


At first, the end of the military regime and the country's democratization did not bring any radical changes in foreign policy. The Itamaraty continued to be the chief foreign policy maker and its focus remained on the promotion of national development, despite the growing importance of emerging actors in the international agenda. The Sarney government was primarily concerned with internal affairs, as it was marked by strong economic instability, high inflation rates (they quadrupled between 1985 and 1988), low economic growth, a debt crisis (suspension of interest

payments in 1987, followed by commercial sanctions from the US), and successive macroeconomic stabilization programs (the Cruzado Plan in 1986, the Bresser Plan in 1987, and the Summer Plan in 1989). As for the Latin American context, a closer relationship was developed with neighbouring Argentina (kick-starting an integration process that would lead to the creation of Mercosur a few years later), and diplomatic relations with Cuba were restored. Thus the regional dimension of BFP gained greater relevance, in comparison with previous decades.

Collor's foreign policy promoted a rapprochement with the US (seen as an indispensable ally for domestic economic reforms) and adopted the neo-liberal economic model, based on free trade and competitive insertion in the international market ("modernisation by internationalisation"). Looking to improve its own image and credibility (a necessity, in order to renegotiate the foreign debt), Brazil began to adhere to international regimes and signed some major declarations and treaties: on trade, the environment (resulting from Rio-92), and nuclear non-proliferation. In this context, the Itamaraty lost power to a presidential diplomacy that was made stronger in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC) and Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva's governments. There was greater participation of a wider range of actors: the business sector at first, but also social organisations, sub national bodies, academia, etc. The pressure mounted for the formulation of BFP to be more pluralistic and, in some cases, more democratic. At the regional level, the signing of the Treaty of Asunción, in 1991, led to the creation of Mercosur – a regional integration process that contributed to open the economy but also strengthened the position of its members (especially Brazil) in international negotiations.

After Collor's impeachment, the Itamar Franco government maintained the same foreign policy agenda: economic liberalization, development, and greater autonomy. There were two important chancellors: FHC (1992-1993) and Celso Amorim (1993-1994), who sought to participate in the drawing up of international regimes (for example, the UN's development or human rights agenda) and in the numerous conferences of the 1990s. Brazil began to insist on reform of the

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRADE



GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION, 1990 - 2003



Security Council (demanding a permanent seat in it) and to take part in UN peace operations. On the multilateral level, South American regional integration was expanded, in order to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In 1994, the Real Plan was implemented by the Brazilian government, who hoped to increase its economic and political credibility, take control of runaway inflation and improve the country's indicators, as well as its external image.


In the growing interdependence scenario brought about by globalisation

and by worldwide economic instability (the Mexican, East Asian and Russian crises all affected the Brazilian economy), Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government put great emphasis on liberal reforms: macroeconomic stabilization policies, open and flexible trading rules, privatisation and fiscal responsibility. It also increased Brazilian participation in forums about the new Post-Cold War international order. In debates about the Third Way, FHC stressed the importance of cooperation and of multilateral mechanisms for collective action to guarantee Brazilian

interests. At the regional level, the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) gave legal structure to Mercosur, while the first steps were taken to build the South American Community of Nations (CASA); both processes helped to promote Brazil's leadership role in South America. Lusophony acquired a new political and multilateral dimension with the creation of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996. The major characteristic of post-democratization governments, and a constant feature of BFP, was the aspiration to turn Brazil into a global actor. To achieve this goal, democratic Brazil has been trying to balance the search for international credibility and the development of autonomy (while maintaining flexibility, greater freedom and diversification of partners) in the field of BFP


IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Evolution of Brazilian international trade by origin and destination, between 1980 and 2006 (in billion dollars)




TOP 10 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL

in million dollars, between 1980 and 1990



SEE ALSO:

- Global and transnational threats p. 48
- Presidential diplomacy p. 62
- Regional integration p. 82
- North-South relations p. 100



Cultural diversity and ethnic pluralism

Brazilian society was born from the encounter between its numerous native populations and the people who came later on to establish themselves in the territory. Indigenous Brazilians (the original inhabitants, estimated at


several million when the first Europeans arrived) were joined by groups from Europe, Africa and Asia, throughout a five hundred year process still under way. Although immigration flows are currently not significant, particularly in

comparison with other South American and European countries, the history of migration to Brazil is crucial in order to understand its social landscape and the international dynamics within which the country is situated.

Indigenous peoples were enslaved at the beginning of the Portuguese occupation, but were soon replaced by African slaves. The enslavement of Africans to work on Brazilian plantations was one of the most pivotal instances of forced migration in history. The slave trade took advantage of flows that already existed on the African continent, and it was an enterprise exploited by Brazilians too. The diverse origins of the captive Africans helps to explain

SLAVE TRADE

Routes used by traffickers between the 15th and 19th centuries




BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY



some cultural differences that exist in the country today. Most of the groups that ended up in Rio and Recife shared a strong cultural identity (they came

SLAVES TO BRAZIL

Amount of slaves by destination, between 1500 and 1859



Source: Eltis et al., 1998.

Labmundo, 2014


from the Angola region), but had quite important differences with the groups that arrived in Salvador. Such distinctions have resulted in specificities that still mark Brazil's religious and linguistic heritage nowadays.

Contemporary Brazilian diplomacy is affected by this historical process. The Lula government declared that Brazilian society has a historical debt to Africa, a fact that would justify such measures as the cancellation of debts, the support of cooperation for development projects, and the establishment of a university in Brazil to contribute towards the training of young Africans: the University of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony International Integration (Unilab). The end of the slave trade and the gradual abolition of slavery changed the profile of the labour force in Brazil. From the end of the 19th century to the early 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Asian and European immigrants came to Brazil, many in search of work on coffee plantations. The number of Europeans who immigrated to Brazil between 1815 and 1930 is estimated at 4.3 million.

The assimilation of such diverse groups contributed to the cultural formation of Brazil and its national identity - but not without conflicts. The current configuration of society is a result of these flows and it influences the country's internationalisation process. Brazil is home to the largest Japanese community outside of Japan, to one of the largest Lebanese communities outside Lebanon, and it has Portuguese, Spanish and Syrian communities of equivalent importance. In 2013, the Italian embassy estimated at 30 million the number of Italian descendants in Brazil. In diplomatic discourse, the country presents itself as the largest black nation outside Africa and as a transatlantic bridge between

MIGRANTS TO BRAZIL

European and Asian migrants between 1819 and 1939



Source: Alvim, 1998.

Labmundo, 2014

cultures. Descendants and immigrants can develop bonds with their countries of origin, participate in local collective actions, and maintain links with their families and communities (via remittances, among other things).

Following this brief historical introduction, the next chapters will focus on contemporary issues related to the country's international integration, its most relevant actors and political agendas.

SEE ALSO:

- Population and diversity [p. 42](#)
- Organisations and social movements [p. 72](#)
- Religious actors [p. 74](#)
- Social networks and regional integration [p. 96](#)



Chapter 2:

BRAZIL, AN EMERGING POWER?





The beginning of the 2000s saw the comeback of a notion that had already circulated among Brazilians and foreigners in the 1970s, i.e. that Brazil is a world power. The terms used in regard to the typology and the concept of power were quite varied, such as: middle power, regional, emerging, or developing power, but the perception that the country had a place among the most important players on the world's chessboard was always present. This image that Brazil has of itself, and that others have of the country, is based on several factors: a) some are economic, such as the increase of absolute GDP in relation to other middle-income countries (e.g. Argentina, Mexico, etc.), and industrialised countries too (e.g. the United Kingdom and France); b) some are political, and can be seen in the domestic public policies that have come to serve as models internationally (e.g. poverty reduction, the environment, nuclear non-proliferation, and financial recovery); c) others have a material basis, since the country has a large territory rich in mineral reserves, water, and biodiversity; and d) some are of a social and cultural nature (e.g. the size, diversity, and racial miscegenation of its population, the organisation of its civil society, the internal consumer market, the musical heritage and its different rhythms, etc.). However, Brazil has some characteristics that make its international integration difficult, and forestall its being perceived as a power by other countries. High rates of illiteracy and infant mortality, social inequality, economic disparities among the regions, the population's high levels of mistrust in their political representatives, lack of infrastructure and logistical capacity, land conflicts, deforestation, arms and drugs trafficking, child prostitution...

Agribusiness: the breadbasket of the world?

Agribusiness encompasses industry and commerce in the rural sector, livestock farming, fishing, and agriculture, all of which is tied in with the production of knowledge and the creation of applied technologies. It has historically been one of the most dynamic sectors of the Brazilian economy, accounting for around one-third of its gross domestic product. Brazil is one of the leading exporters of a number of products, such as soybeans, grains, fruit, and beef. The strength of the sector becomes evident when compared to traditional large exporters of food (e.g. Canada, Argentina, Australia, the United States, and the

European Union). The search for expertise (and here the work done by Embrapa must be emphasised) has helped Brazil overcome the idea that temperate climates would be more suitable for food production, and it has placed an essentially tropical country among the world's major producers. There is no denying the sector's importance for the good performance of the Brazilian trade balance and for increasing its foreign currency reserves.

The country exhibits a steady, long-term rise in its rates of productivity per hectare, and it also boasts a vast


expanse of arable land which has not yet been exploited. These two facts, combined with government incentive policies for the sector (e.g. research support, the opening of new markets, etc.) suggest a strong potential for agribusiness in Brazil.

From 1976 to 2010, Brazilian productivity grew 2.5 times, thus allowing production to increase 213% in a grain and oilseed planted area that is only 27% bigger. Some estimates suggest that the sector's exports crossed the \$100 billion dollars mark in 2014, and that its growth between the years 2005 and 2014 may have been 34%.

However, Brazilian agribusiness faces challenges comparable to its potentialities: land reform, deforestation, logistics, support for family farming, rural

BREADBASKET OF THE WORLD


Current and estimated Brazilian participation in world food production between 2010 and 2021



Source: MAPA, 2011.

WORLD FOOD MARKET


Brazil's position in exports and production, in 2010



Source: MAPA, 2010.

MARKETS FOR AGRIBUSINESS

Destination of Brazilian agribusiness exports in 2011



exodus and the financing of production are some of the important challenges that have made the industry a priority theme in the last presidential elections.

Agribusiness has been an important part of Brazilian exports, benefiting from China's growing demand for commodities. Despite its diversified agricultural production, the industry has increasingly specialised in soybeans, mainly geared towards the Chinese market.


China is the destination of a considerable share of Brazilian agricultural production. Some analysts debate a possible dependency and the impacts for Brazil of an eventual Chinese economic crisis. Recent studies attempting to anticipate the future prospects of food consumption in China have suggested that the population's dietary patterns seem to follow more stable trends, when compared to the Chinese model of economic development. The country will probably expand its demand for commodities in which Brazil's production has advanced, as in the case of maize, soybeans, beef, pork, and poultry.

The agribusiness sector holds strategic value for Brazil, but it still has to prove its ability to expand while simultaneously causing low social and environmental impacts, as well as being able to deal with resistance to the opening of new markets, in the European Union and the US in particular.

The Brazilian government has recently taken on a new challenge, i.e. exporting the Brazilian agricultural model to

AGRIBUSINESS

Value of agricultural production and regional distribution, in 2006



Source: IBGE, 2010a.

Labmundo, 2014


other countries, notably Mozambique, in the projects known as Pró-Savana and Pró-Alimentos. In addition, the sector has investments in several neighbouring countries that play an important role in the production of grains and cattle, especially in Paraguay and Bolivia. In these countries the industry is accused of creating large land holdings and engaging in illegal land occupations. The presence of the Brazilian agro-export model in countries involved in cooperation with Brazil, and its encouragement from the federal government, have caused many civil society organisations to rebuke the export of contradictions and failures inherent in the Brazilian model to countries where the concentration of land ownership and the importance of family farming are even more serious.

Despite the fact that there is no real integration among the productive chains of agribusiness in the region, Latin America is now considered the world's largest exporter of food (in net terms). According to an IDB report released in 2014, the region provides approximately 11% of the value of the world's food production, but has about 24% of all cultivable land. In the case of Brazil,

and taking into consideration the challenges mentioned above, the country might be able to realise its moniker - "breadbasket of the world" - created in the Vargas government, and contribute to feed a world population estimated at 9 billion in 2050, which will have higher incomes and higher consumption patterns than the current ones. According to forecasts published by FAO in 2014, grain production will have to increase by half by the mid-21st century, while that of beef will have to double. These are ambitious targets in a world that faces difficulties in expanding its arable land, solving the water supply problem, grappling with the ecological crisis, and ensuring the right to food. In this scenario, Brazil shows great potential in responding to the challenges put to the international community, and it could strengthen even more its position on the international food market.

SOY COMPLEX

Data between 1983 and 2012



Source: CONAB, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014

SEE ALSO:

- Logistics p. 32
- Brazilian multinationals p. 70
- Organisations and social movements p. 72
- Energy and infrastructure p. 92

The industrial complex

Development by means of industrialisation has been one of the major objectives of Brazilian political leaders since the 1930s. The Brazilian government has since promoted a series of developmentalist policies, and has invested in infrastructure and technology. It has also offered tax incentives to industries willing to establish themselves within the national territory, and has guaranteed trade tariffs as a way to protect the country's budding industries. It was due to this development through import substitution process that Brazil saw strong industrial growth in the second half of the 20th century. One of the characteristics of this process is the central role played by the state in the economy, outlining strategies and priorities as well as providing lines of credit.

This development model is based on three economic pillars (public, domestic private and foreign private investment), and it has created a correlation between industrial growth and the increase in government spending. Political representatives of the industrial sector usually go public to demand free trade agreements,


arguing how important these are in order to further improve their international sales. However, some politicians and academics contend that although the industrial sector publicly requests policies of a liberal nature from government, it also benefits from the protective measures awarded by the state (e.g. exchange rate and pricing policies, granting of special lines of credit, or government procurement). This model has allowed Brazil to greatly develop its industrial complex, rising above those that exist in Latin America and in other peripheral countries, but it also has contributed to the emergence of a certain type of capitalism relatively averse to risks without the protection of the state.

As the international price of commodities began to go up at the beginning of the 2000s, the export of agricultural products has intensified. This has raised concern among some economists and policy makers that a process of regressive specialisation of Brazilian exports might be underway. This phenomenon refers to the relative decline of industrial products

in total foreign trade volume, but should it be categorised as de-industrialisation? There is no consensus on the issue in academic circles, but if the concept of de-industrialisation is understood as a loss of industry participation in the economy of a country, the "Brazilian Miracle" of the 1970s also exhibited this characteristic, according to World Bank data. On the other hand, in the 1980s and 1990s - which were marked by a number of crises and by retraction of the national economy - the participation of industrial production in total GDP actually increased.

INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL ECONOMIES


Per decade between 1970 and 2010 (in %)




INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE WORLD

Evolution of gross value added between 2001 and 2011 (in trillion dollars, current prices)

Brazil (—), Western countries and China




Brasil (—) and emerging countries





INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION

Industry distribution by type and by federated unit, in 2013



The map represents the total amount of industries by Brazilian federated unit, in billion reais.



* Only values above R\$ 0.01 billion are represented.



Source: IBGE, 2013a

Labmundo, 2014


Despite economic and political worries regarding a supposed de-industrialisation, the industrial sector's loss of participation in total GDP is a trend in many countries of the Americas, Africa, and Europe. The exceptions to this trend are - besides China - some African and Asian countries that have started their industrialisation process more recently. In absolute terms, it is quite clear that Brazil continues to increase its industrial capacity. The value added of its industry overall is higher than most emerging countries' and also comparable to that of European countries. The production in some sectors stands out, such as in machinery and electrical equipment, pharmaceutical, and automotive industries.

The disadvantage confronting Brazilian industrial production is its limited development of high-end products. Only 10% of total industrial value added comes from high-tech components

- for example, aircraft production by Embraer. A large number of Brazilian industries are assemblers who import high-tech parts instead of developing these technologies domestically. That is why - although there is no firm consensus on this - economists have been increasingly pressing for policies that promote industrial specialisation and, in some cases, require national components in the supply chain. Since most investments rely on state

LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION

Evolution of the participation of industry in GDP, between 1975 and 2010



Sources: IBGE, 2013th; Ipeadata website, 2013; Bonelli et al., 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

participation, it is argued that resources (scarce by definition) should be focused on those industrial niches that are most competitive, over the less efficient areas.

Industrial production concentrates in the more dynamic regions of the national territory, thus aggravating spatial economic inequalities. In spite of efforts made by the federal government and by some states, industry is localised mostly in the South and Southeast regions, as then it can be closer to consumer markets that have higher purchasing power (including the Mercosur), and a better quality infrastructure in place.

SEE ALSO:

Logistics p. 32
Brazilian multinationals p. 70
Energy and infrastructure p. 92
North-South relations p. 100

Logistics and its challenges to development

A country in search of international projection must have material capabilities and know how to use them rationally. For example, production in mining or in manufactured goods is an important indicator of a state's economy, but the ability to sell this production (for export or in the internal market) directly affects competitiveness and service quality. Having an infrastructure for transportation, telecommunications (telephone and internet), and energy, for instance, can make it easier to manage state bureaucracy, create conditions for new economic ventures, promote regional integration, and ensure control over all regions of the national territory. In the case of Brazil, given the continental dimensions of its territory and a historical investment deficit, infrastructure is still a challenge.


The economic model that was imposed on Brazil by the metropolis - based on the export of primary goods which were essential or complementary to the development of the European powers - prevailed up until the end of the 19th century. According to this model, the industrialisation of the colonies was thwarted by European countries in order to create a consumer market for the latter's products. It was the colonies' duty, in turn, to export their primary commodities. As a result of this colonial

economy controlled by foreign interests, the spatial organisation of the territory that came to belong to Brazil was very similar to an economic archipelago: the regions of the territory hardly communicated with each other, because the most important political and economic relationship was with Europe. Therefore, the dynamic niches of the economy were linked to the coast to sell their products but remained unconnected among each other. This pattern of integration into the world economy did not change quickly, not even after independence, and has contributed to perpetuate the legacy of a certain physical arrangement: of roads and ports that favoured almost exclusively the export of primary goods.

At the beginning of the 20th century, railways were very important in the process of national integration. Although most railways ran along the coast and in the South of the territory, they represented a significant means of moving people and products around. Gradually, they lost their importance in Brazilian history in comparison to other modes of transportation (e.g. by air and sea). The rail model's diminishing relevance was a consequence of the Brazilian government's decision (encouraged by other international actors) to prioritise highways. A state-guided process of migration towards the hinterlands began in the 1930s under Getúlio Vargas, but it reached its peak in the 1950s as a result of the Targets Plan during Juscelino Kubitschek's government. There was a common view then that the transportation network had to be substantially expanded in a short period of time. In comparison with rail, the road model was deemed to accomplish the goal of connecting Brazilian regions much faster, making quick industrialisation possible and thus reaching the same industrialisation levels as European countries. In this sense, the choice of

TRANSPORTATION IN BRAZIL

Roads, in 2013




Sources: Ministry of Transport, 2014; ANTT, 2012

Railways, in 2013




Source: Ministry of Transport, 2014

Airports, in 2013, in million passengers



Source: Infraero website, 2012


Ports, in 2013, by cargo value, in billion dollars



Source: MDIC's AliceWeb website, 2013


CARGO TRANSPORT IN BRAZIL

Distribution by transport mode, in 2013



Source: CNT, 2013.

ROADS




the road model was also an act of rational calculation that sought to industrialise the country. Along with protectionist trade tariffs, the guarantee of a consumer market for motor vehicles attracted multinationals from the automotive sector, which have installed assembler industries in Brazil.

The original project was meant to connect several regions of Brazil by means of highways that would crisscross the country in multiple directions, linking these regions to the new capital, Brasília. Despite the plan, many of these roads are in poor condition or have not yet been built. The heaviest investments continued to be made in the most economically productive region: the country's Centre-south. Means of transportation there are of higher quality and quantity, especially when compared to those of other Brazilian regions. The concession of highways to private companies is also more

INTERNET USERS IN THE WORLD

In percentage of the population, in 2012



common in the Centre-south. Brazil still needs significant investments in order to expand and improve the quality of its transport network (not just its roads).


High maintenance costs are another negative consequence of the road option. Compared to railways, roads have lower construction costs and demand less time to be built, but they need high and constant investments on maintenance, as tarmac degrades more quickly. Together, these factors constitute some of the main causes of what is conventionally called "Brazil cost". The phenomenon refers to the high transportation costs inherent in production and distribution in Brazil. Investors in the country have to deal with slow, inefficient, and expensive transport services. As road maintenance is not always carried out properly, accidents are common and vehicles break down, which further aggravates the costs and delays the delivery of goods. In addition, Brazil has become very dependent on imported diesel, one of the most common types of fuel used in the transportation of cargo in the country. Diesel fuel has to be imported because national refineries lack the capacity to produce it in large enough quantities from the oil produced in Brazil. Moreover it is not a source of clean energy, and the use of biodiesel is encouraged.

The road option was accompanied by the progressive abandonment of other means of transportation - a policy which showed signs of being reverted only towards the end of the 20th century, thanks to investment in waterways and railways. Most investments in logistics are made by the state or by public-private partnerships. The government's policy of leasing roads to private companies, which was very frequent in the 1990s and 2000s, is also worthy of note. The policy is often challenged because private investment in logistics does not seem to follow Brazil's needs. Almost all the railways, for instance, are under concession to the private sector, and yet users complain about inefficiency and lack of investment.

The investment deficit in Brazil also affects those areas where technology is concerned. Services such as telephony and internet access are rather expensive, inefficient, and the object of numerous consumer complaints. In a globalised economy these services are crucial for production networks and chains, but also for the success of several other economic activities. Despite the high cost and low quality of these services, some Brazilian niches continue to stand out. The use of mobile telephony and internet are growing at a very fast pace, making Brazil one of the largest consumer markets for telecommunication services and internet shopping.

INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORTATION


Between 2011 and 2014, in billion reais



PRIVATISATION OF THE SYSTEM

Roads, in 2013

Railways, in 2013



SEE ALSO:

Brazilian multinationals p. 70
Integration projects p. 82
Energy and infrastructure p. 92
North-South relations p. 100

The energy matrix and the environment

Energy is one of the most strategic issues in international politics. Tensions due to the geopolitics of oil have been the source of many conflicts among countries (e.g. in the Middle East), and have also had an influence on a number of major international economic crises (such as the oil crisis of the early 1970s). Some energy resources are fixed and physically located within the territory of sovereign states. This does not mean that transnational interests and flows are absent from the debate, but it implies that large corporations have to negotiate with states in order to have access to oil, gas and, more recently, fuels having lower environmental impact (e.g. hydropower, biofuels, etc.). These days, because of concerns with environmental sustainability, renewable energies have acquired a strategic dimension. Diversification of the energy matrix has become for states an answer to society's demands, and a competitive advantage in the international energy market.


In addition, there is a clear relationship between energy consumption and economic growth: the more developed countries consume far more energy than the less developed ones. Energy consumption is essential for industry, for transportation development, for food production, as well as for household use. There are, nevertheless, national and local variations regarding more or less judicious patterns of energy consumption. Energy production and consumption are

both closely related to development models, which can be more or less destructive of ecological systems and environmental resources. Energy can be seen as a fundamental variable in the development equation.

On the global and regional levels, energy resources are part of economic relations and international politics. Mindful of the volatility of oil prices and the uncertainty of supply, many countries have tried to attain energy security by making sure they have access to the energy resources necessary for national development. They attempt, for example, to reduce the margins of uncertainty and dependence by trying to ensure greater production at the national level, and greater energy integration at the regional level. Not by coincidence, one of the origins of the integration process in Europe can be found in the European Coal and Steel Community. Similarly, in the case of Unasur, integration of the energy infrastructure is considered strategic for the future of the region.

In the case of Brazil, security has been sought through a process of diversification of the energy matrix, thanks to the various natural resources available in the country. The Brazilian energy matrix is composed of 42.4% renewable energy while the world average is 13.2 %, according to the International Energy Agency. In comparative terms, Brazil has the cleanest electricity matrix in the world: hydroelectric

TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Per sector, in 2012



Source: Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2012

Labmundo, 2014


power corresponds to approximately 84.5% of the matrix. The industry sector is the most energy-intensive, followed by transport, and household consumption.

A 2013 report by the International Energy Agency - an autonomous intergovernmental organisation established within the framework of the OECD - pointed out that fossil fuels will continue to dominate the global energy matrix at least until 2040. In addition, the demand for energy will increase by 56% over the next 30 years because of China's and other emerging countries' growth. According to the report, renewable energy sources will have an increasingly important role, rising 2.5% per year thanks to ecological awareness and the numerous environmental crises that the world is going through (e.g. climate change and sea level rise).

In this scenario, Brazil would have some advantages, and might emerge in the near future as a strong leader in renewable energy resources. As a result of investment in research and technology started during the Vargas government in the 1930s, Brazil has expertise in renewable energy. The share of renewable sources in its energy matrix has only increased since then. The construction of large hydroelectric power stations undoubtedly brings about social and environmental impacts, but they also

ELECTRIC MATRIX DIVERSIFICATION

Breakdown by country and by source, in 2012, in %




Source: CIA, 2013

Labmundo, 2014

ETHANOL AND SUGARCANE MARKET

Data between 2010 and 2012



Sources: FAO, 2012; SECEX, 2011

generate lower emissions of harmful gases into the atmosphere. It should be remembered that all forms of energy production cause some negative impact (e.g. environmental, social, etc.). The key would be to find a balance between the gains and losses incurred.


According to the IEA, Brazil is gaining prominence in the production of biofuels. Together with the US, it will be responsible for more than half of the supply of biofuels by 2040. Their production in Brazil is divided in two segments: ethanol and biodiesel. Ethanol is a highly flammable biofuel that can be obtained from sugarcane, maize, sugar beet, cassava, potato, among other sources. As for biodiesel, it can be defined as a renewable fuel derived from vegetable oils (sunflower, castor bean, soybean, babassu and other oilseeds), in addition to alternative raw materials such as animal fat or waste frying oils. The production,

marketing, and consumption of biofuels raise a series of debates about the real sustainability associated with their use. However, the Brazilian government's official position is that this production, particularly of sugarcane, does not cause deforestation in the Amazon. Critical researchers argue that the production of biofuels could lead producers to plant food crops further inland or in the Amazon, leaving the land situated along the coast preferably for the production of biofuels. This would contribute to an increase in food prices.

Brazil's wager on biofuels and hydroelectric power can guarantee self-sufficiency to the country's consumption needs. Since the discovery of pre-salt oil reserves in 2007, however, the national strategy has aimed at transforming Brazil into an important actor in the global energy market. Assuming that negotiations about oil are fundamentally political

SUGARCANE PRODUCTION


Amount and variation of crops by federated states



and economic, in order to become a strong exporter in the energy sector Brazil needs to be prepared to meet the challenges of the world's geopolitics of energy. In addition, it needs to solve internal problems of infrastructure, such as storage and stockpiling, to invest in research and technology, and – this is a very important and sensitive point – in skilled labour.

ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Per capita energy use in kg of oil or equivalent, in 2011




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Water: a vital and strategic resource

WATER DISTRIBUTION IN THE WORLD

Per capita drinking water availability, in thousands of cubic meters in 2013



Source: World Bank Data website, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

By proclaiming the International Decade for Action “Water for Life” (2005-2015), the United Nations has demonstrated the political and strategic importance of this resource. Water is vital for the survival of living organisms, to ensure decent living conditions, for the economy, and for the functioning of ecosystems. Many fields are directly or indirectly linked to water (e.g. health, sanitation, the environment, biological diversity, food and agriculture, contamination, energy, and the prevention of ecological disasters); this is why coordinated action

aiming towards better management, more sustainable use, and more equal access to water resources is essential.

Given the transnational nature of a large number of river basins - 19 countries depend on the Danube, 13 on the Congo, 11 on the Nile, and 9 on the Amazon, Brazil among them - the issue not only gives rise to some major conflicts, but it also offers unique opportunities and has seen some interesting cooperation experiences. Due to its characteristics and diplomatic negotiation skills in multilateral bodies, Brazil could play a very important role within this agenda.

The main conflicts are motivated by access to and control of water resources, thus proving that in this arena too, there is an overlap between power relations and the unequal distribution of resources. Many countries have a strong dependence on external water, importing more than half of their domestic consumption (as is the case of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay in Latin America). Against this background, Brazil is a water superpower, given its large reserves of underground water (almost 13% of all the planet's fresh water), the heavy rainfalls that hit large parts of its territory, and the fact that it is one of the world's major exporters - the fourth, behind the US, China, and India - of what is known as “virtual water”, or water footprint, as it exports products that require a lot of water for their production, such as beef (in order to produce one kilo, 15,500 litres are required), rice (3,000 litres per kilo), or coffee (140 litres per cup). According to Unesco, Brazil indirectly exports about 112 trillion gallons of fresh water per year through its commodities. In the context of large global scarcity, Brazil occupies a prominent position thanks to its water resources, but this requires prudent policies from the state, both internally and externally. While the use of water is essential in the production of commodities (and for exports), its relevance to food sovereignty and environmental sustainability must not be forgotten.

Excessive and unregulated water usage, well above the supplying source's replenishing capabilities, affects many of the large international basins in all continents, with particular impact in North Africa and the Middle East. In the US and in Europe - the world's major water consumers in non-agricultural

HYDROGRAPHY AND BORDERS

Main Brazilian river basins, in 2014



Sources: ANA, 2010; ISARM website, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014

MAIN TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS

Distribution in the world, in 2014




Source: Oregon State University, 2014

Labmundo, 2014

WATER USE IN BRAZIL

Non-renewable use, breakdown by sector, in %, in 2012




Source: ANA, 2012

sectors - growing urbanisation and industrialisation have had a strong negative impact. In addition, the consequences of climate change and pollution cause a significant decline of water levels in arid and semi-arid regions (e.g. the Northeast of Brazil), and have repercussions for harvests, food supply, and poverty. Several studies and international meetings have drawn attention to the increasing number of people that live in and depend on basins improperly operated.

POLLUTED WATER WORLDWIDE

Trade flows of polluted water in million litres, in 2011




Source: Water Footprint Network, 2014.

Water represents an essential dimension of human security. However, despite important advances, a billion people still do not have access to sufficient water. Inefficiency in water usage, water pollution, or overuse of underground reserves tend to coexist. Diseases due to the lack of clean drinking water and basic sanitation

lead to 2 million deaths per year, i.e. more than in armed conflicts, in addition to causing hunger and malnutrition, thus putting food security at risk. Moreover, floods are responsible for 15% of the deaths from natural disasters. Clean water is essential for the survival of human beings and the planet, and preserving it is one of Rio+20's Sustainable Development Objectives.

ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION

People with inadequate access to water supply and sewage, in %, between 1991 and 2010




SITUATION OF WATER RESOURCES IN BRAZIL

Demand in June 2010 (in m³/s)

Planned investment on water supply between 2010 and 2015 (in millions reais)

Total waste of drinking water in 2010 (in%)




SEE ALSO:

Minerals and mining p. 38
Brazilian multinationals p. 70
Organisations and social movements p. 72
Research centres p. 78

Mining and extractive industries


EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

Production in the main federated states, in 2013



The map represents the total amount of extractive activities by federated state.

R\$ 50 bi
R\$ 25 bi
R\$ 10 bi
R\$ 1 bi




Source: IBGE, 2013b.

Mineral resources are classic material elements of state power. They are also strategic for national economies around the world. Countries rich in important minerals have their economic and political possibilities increased on the world chessboard. Self-sufficiency in energy and raw materials, for instance, reduces the dependence of a country and makes it freer to act internationally. In the case of countries that are major exporters of strategic products, there is a political element in addition to the economic factor. Control over these materials can ultimately influence the viability and the cost of other states' development projects, which become vulnerable to the exporter's political decisions. As shown by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s, concentration of a product

BRAZILIAN EXPORTS

In billion dollars per year between 2007 and 2012



essential to development in the hands of a few countries can become a means of obtaining political goals.

Brazil is in a comfortable situation as regards mineral reserves. Due to its position in Pangaea and to major morphological changes throughout geological eras, the structure of the Brazilian territory can be considered highly diversified. The Brazilian Shield and the Guiana Shield are the two oldest geological formations in the national territory and represent 36% of its land mass. It is in these regions that most of Brazil's mineral resources are concentrated. This is the case, for example, of iron ore, which can be found mainly in Carajás (Pará), in the Iron Quadrangle (Minas Gerais), and in the Urucum Massif (Mato Grosso do Sul). Brazil is a major exporter of iron ore, while China, Japan, South Korea and some European countries are its main consumer markets.

In addition to iron ore, Brazil also stands out in the extraction of manganese, tin, bauxite and other metals, such as niobium. The Brazilian production of niobium is concentrated in two deposits (one in Minas Gerais, the other in Goiás), which represent approximately 75% of the world production of this ore; according to estimates, Brazil holds more than 95% of its world reserves. Niobium is widely used in the production of lighter and more resistant metals. Metal alloys containing niobium are usually used in the construction industry, in automotive vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, etc. Despite the importance of this ore for the development of various products, and Brazil's near monopoly on it, its international price is considered low. This upsets some specialists, whereas others claim that an increase in the international price would encourage the production of rival alloys, because niobium can be replaced by other metals.

Back to the geological formation of the Brazilian territory: in addition to the shields, there are also sedimentary basins, both continental and marine. With great public effort and investment from the 1930s onwards, Brazil became a major producer of hydrocarbons. In spite of this, a large share of the natural gas consumed in the country is imported, mainly from Bolivia. The main areas of oil exploration are in sedimentary marine basins, which

has led Brazil to develop cutting-edge technology in deep water oil drilling.

This technology has also contributed to the discovery and, more recently, production of oil in deposits located in the pre-salt layer. Although its prospection is quite difficult (because it is located in ultra-deep waters, below various layers of rock and petrified salt), the oil from the basins of Tupi, Iara, and surroundings areas is considered of good quality, and its reserves exceed 33 billion barrels. The discovery of these oil fields has significantly increased Brazilian reserves of hydrocarbons.

The Brazilian territory is also rich in other strategic materials such as monazite sands, which are an essential mineral for the production of nuclear energy. That is why Brazil is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of countries that are major exporters of materials used for nuclear purposes. Due to the strategic importance of these materials, there is a great deal of control on the part of this group of countries with regard to commercialisation of their products. Being a member of the NSG means taking part in decisions related to this issue on the international agenda, thus also defining norms and priorities.


On the other hand, the economic exploitation of mineral resources offers ecological risks and potential environmental degradation effects. The Serra do Navio, in Amapá, is a remarkable example of the harm which may be caused by extractive activities. The site, which was known for its production of manganese, has been abandoned because the company that operated the deposit decided that the activity was no longer economically attractive. The legacy left for the community is a huge crater, and other after-effects that jeopardise its future sustainable development. In the case of oil, overdependence can create economic problems (e.g. the “Dutch disease”), while deep water production also poses human, environmental and ecological risks.

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28
Research centres p. 78
Security and defence p. 90
Global economic agencies p. 104


BRAZILIAN EXPORTS OF IRON AND OIL

In billion dollars, per country, in 2012



KNOWN MINERAL SITES


In 2014



MAIN OIL PRODUCERS AND MAIN HOLDERS OF OIL RESERVES

Production, in 2013 (in million barrels/day)


Reserves, in 2013 (in billion tons)



Genetic wealth and biodiversity

BIODIVERSITY IN THE WORLD

Biodiversity indicator, in 2002



Brazil is a country of continental dimensions with a great diversity of climate zones and biomes. As a result, it has an enormous wealth of fauna and flora, which makes the country the most biodiverse in the world. Biodiversity plays a key role in the national economy: agricultural exports make up more than 30% of total exports; activities such as forestry and fisheries employ more than 3 million people; and plant biomass accounts for

30% of energy production in the country. There is an expectation of obtaining greater economic benefits from patents and new technologies based on the study of biodiversity. However, conservation and sustainable exploitation of this potential do face major challenges, such as advancing the knowledge about Brazil's fauna and flora. The current panorama is one of underuse of this genetic wealth, but also underprotection of native species

(and of the community knowledge associated with its use).

Brazil suffers from biopiracy practices and wild animal trafficking. Biopiracy refers to the illegal exploitation, manipulation, export, or marketing of biological resources or the appropriation of traditional knowledge derived from indigenous and local communities. The concept was developed in the Convention on Biological Diversity during the Rio Summit (in 1992), which established the sovereignty of countries over their territories' biodiversity. This problem affects Brazil in various spheres, including in its sovereignty. In order to address the issue, a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee fully dedicated to the theme was created in 2003. Its final report indicated that the country lost over 5.7 billion dollars per year due to illegal animal trafficking of its fauna, and traditional cultural knowledge and medicines taken from its forests.

Trafficking of wild animals is a very serious problem. Some species may be worth more than 60 thousand dollars on the international market. The UN has defined it as the third most profitable criminal activity in the world, just behind drugs and arms trafficking. The impact on biomes can be quite serious: of every 10 birds caught in the country for the purposes of illegal commerce, only one or two survive and arrive at their destination.

The appropriation of traditional cultural knowledge, or the pharmaceutical industry's discovery of therapeutic substances by irregular means, has caused the country to lose the right to patents of elements originating in its own biodiversity. For example, Merck laboratories hold the patent to the active ingredient of jab- orandi, an Amazonian plant, used to

MEGADIVERSE COUNTRY

Data from 2002

Amphibian species

Brazil	798
Colombia	714
Ecuador	467
Peru	461

Mammal species

Mexico	491
DR Congo	450
Cameroon	409
Brazil	394
China	394

Birds species

Colombia	1,695
Peru	1,538
Indonesia	1,519
Brazil	1,492

Vascular plants species


Brazil	56,215
Colombia	51,220
China	32,220
Indonesia	29,375
Mexico	26,071



Source: Groombridge & Jenkins, 2002.

DEFORESTATION IN THE LEGAL AMAZON

Deforestation, in thousands of km² per year, between 1988 and 2012




fight baldness and glaucoma. The US lab Squibb took advantage of public knowledge disseminated by Brazilian scientist Sergio Henrique Ferreira, in the 1960s, about the jararaca snake venom to create a drug against hypertension that is marketed to this day. The Brazilian researcher has since publicly denied that this was a case of biopiracy, but the example highlights the country's inability to take advantage of its biological wealth.

Many patents of Brazilian species have been registered abroad in an irregular manner. In addition, they do not always benefit the indigenous communities possessing that traditional knowledge. At the Convention on Biological Diversity, Brazil made a commitment to put 10% of its ecosystems under protection, but by 2010 it had only reached the 1.5% mark. Still, the goal of putting 30% of the Amazon under some sort of legal protection has been surpassed, having reached a total of 40% of the region. One of the biomes least protected by law and least known by scientists is the sea, which has been defined by the Ministry of the Environment as "the great gap" in the National System of Conservation


BIOPIRACY AND WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING

Value by species in the international market, in thousands of dollars, in 2003


Private collectors and zoos




Scientific purposes



Pets



Brazilian species patented by other countries*



*Some of these patents have already been reversed

Sources: Sarney Filho, 2003; RENCITAS, 2001.

Labmundo, 2014

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE LAND

Origin of plant species and animals that are economically relevant to Brazil (selected cases)



Fonte: MMA, 2006.

Labmundo, 2014

Units. The Brazilian marine biodiversity is not as varied as those of other countries, but even so it has been estimated that Brazil holds around 6% of the existing "non-insect" species of invertebrates, the majority of which live in the sea.

Another of the country's unexplored potentials is fish consumption. It stands below the amount suggested by FAO (12kg). The annual per capita consumption was 11.17 kg in 2011, a historical record, which meant an increase of 23.7% compared with the previous two years. Part of this progress is credited to actions taken by the Ministry of Fisheries - a special secretariat created in 2003 that became a ministry in 2009. Despite such modest consumption, a survey carried out by the federal government between 1995 and 2006 indicated that approximately 80% of the species commercially fished were already fully exploited or overexploited, putting long term consumption at risk.


On the multilateral scene, the importance of Brazil's genetic and environmental wealth to the world and its activism in environmental diplomacy make the country a key actor in debates and negotiations. The Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Environment participate in multilateral forums on biodiversity, such as the Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries group, which is organised as a mechanism for consultation and cooperation around the interests and priorities of member states in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.

One of the gravest environmental problems faced by Brazil is deforestation. As a result of land conversion

for agriculture, livestock breeding, logging, Illegal occupation, runaway urbanisation growth, or even the construction of infrastructure such as dams and roads, deforestation results in forced population displacements, generates pollution, allows native flora invasion by exotic species and contributes to global warming. Brazil has managed to keep a downward trend in deforestation rates in the Amazon (the most watched over area) since 2004. At the end of 2013 there was a reversal of this trend, which saw a 28% rate increase, although it was still the second lowest annual average since 1993. Domestically, Brazil has confronted the challenges of deforestation and environmental degradation while seeking to contribute, at the international level, to negotiations on climate change (based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities).

FORESTS

Countries with the largest forest areas, in million hectares, in 2010



Source: FAO, 2010.

Labmundo, 2014

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28
Research centres p. 78
UN system p. 102
South-South Cooperation p. 112

Population and diversity

With a population of more than 200 million inhabitants according to the IBGE, Brazil is the fifth most populous country in the world. As population density is relatively low (22.4


inhabitants per km²), the geographic distribution of this population is very uneven. It is heavily concentrated in the Southeast, where density reaches 87 inhabitants per km²: São Paulo is the

most populous state (with almost 44 million inhabitants), followed by Minas Gerais (20 million) and Rio de Janeiro (16 million). At the other extreme, the North has a density of 4.12 inhabitants per km², and Roraima is the least populated state, with only 500,000 inhabitants. Urban concentration is also growing, and urban population already represents 84.9% of the total. This urbanisation is associated, among other things, to the emergence of megacities such as São Paulo (more than 23 million inhabitants - it is the seventh most populous city in the world) and Rio de Janeiro (13.6 million).


Regarding the composition of the population, the improvements in average life expectancy (from 69.8 years in 2000 to 74.8 in 2013) and a drop in

BRAZILIAN DEMOGRAPHICS


Population density in 2010




Urban population in 2010 (in million persons)




Rural population in 2010 (in million persons)



Rural population, in 2010 (in %)




Population by gender and age group, in 2010 (in million persons)



Source: IBGE, 2010b.

LARGE URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS

Evolution of large conurbations, between 1950 and 2050



*For the 2050 data, the UN average projections were considered.

Source: ONU, 2013a


the fertility rate (from 2.4 children per woman in 2000 to 1.8 in 2013) anticipate a scenario of ageing population, which today is still relatively young (the “demographic bonus”). As for skin colour, 47% define themselves as whites, mostly in the South and South-east regions (55% and 78% of the population, respectively), 43% mixed race (who are the majority in the North and Northeast), 7% blacks, and 0.4% native Indians (concentrated in the North).

This composition has its roots in the migratory flows which have constituted the Brazilian population throughout history. For a long time Brazil was considered a country of immigrants: the Portuguese colonists, African victims of the slave trade, migrants from the Old World at the end of the 19th century (mainly Portuguese and Italian workers, followed by Spanish, Germans, Japanese and Syrian-Lebanese, among others), thus changing the appearance of several regions, which today exhibit the cultural heritage of these flows. In comparison with these trends of the past, the data today shows only 0.4% of immigrants (versus 0.7% of emigrants), in spite of relatively increasing flows more recently.

The Brazilian population still suffers from several problems caused by social inequality (such as access to education, decent work, and health care) and by various forms of discrimination, which are being gradually tackled. The distribution of social classes is changing: the C class underwent a major expansion, as it has incorporated almost 30 million people from the D class in a decade. According to data from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, the C class represents 52% of the population (against 28% belonging to the lower classes).

SOCIAL CLASSES IN BRAZILIAN REGIONS

People by class and region, in 2009




Source: CPS/FGV, 2014.

However, this new C class face challenges - such as high levels of debt and problems in access to basic services, thus laying bare the limits of a conception of citizenship based only on income and consumption patterns. Data from UNDP shows a low

level of citizen satisfaction with health care (only 44% of Brazilians said they were satisfied), education (53.7%), or citizen security (40%). Demonstrations calling for the expansion of various rights have occupied the streets since June 2013, demanding improvements in transportation, housing (7% of the urban population live in precarious settlements, which defies the right to housing), health care (there are only 1.7 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants, and the situation is even worse in rural areas), and education (despite advances in school enrolment, much still needs to be done to improve quality).

IMMIGRANTS IN BRAZIL

Immigrants living in Brazil, in 2010 (in thousand persons)



SEE ALSO:

Cultural diversity p. 24
 Poverty and inequality p. 44
 Social networks and regional integration p. 96
 South-South Cooperation p. 112

Poverty and inequality

The fight against poverty has been at the centre of the cooperation for development agenda since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000. This agenda has enabled substantial advances in poverty alleviation, but the data is still worrying, with 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty (i.e. with less than \$1.25 dollars per day) in developing regions, the majority of them in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Hunger continues to be a global problem, especially in these regions, and it has worsened in recent times due to the impact of the financial crisis and the increase of food prices: 850 million people still suffer from inadequate nutrition, which proves the limits of a market dominated by agribusiness guidelines at the expense of food sovereignty. In the other areas covered by the MDG (education, health, gender equality, etc.) there have also been some improvements, but they are still insufficient, as advancements were affected by the crisis, unevenly distributed among regions and countries, and within them too (with strong differences according to gender, race, region, and between urban and rural areas).

As for Brazil, its progress in achieving the MDG has been publicised all over the world, especially with regard to extreme poverty (the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty dropped from 25.6% in 1990 to 4.8% in 2008) and the fight against hunger (the percentage of children considered underweight for their age went from 4.2% in 1996 to 1.8 % in 2006). The results obtained by government programmes such as Bolsa Família and Fome Zero have turned them into international references as well as the focal point of Brazilian South-South cooperation. As an institutional practice, they inspire other income transfer programmes (including in cities of the Global North, such as New York – see Opportunity NYC:


Family Rewards), and serve as models for international bodies like FAO and UNDP. The latter actually highlighted the rise of the Global South in its 2013 report, pointing out the importance that emerging powers such as Brazil, China, South Africa, and India, among others, are taking in the reconfiguration of the world's development

landscape through policies that combine economic growth and human development (which includes education, health care, income, and employment).

Despite these advances, 8.9 million Brazilians still suffer from extreme poverty, and internal inequalities still remain very important among regions (the poor are five times more numerous in the Northeast than in the South), between urban and rural areas (rural poverty is three times higher than poverty in urban areas), and racial groups (68% of the people living in extreme poverty are black or mixed race, against 28% white). One of the greatest challenges faced by the country continues to be the reduction of these multiple inequalities and ensuring a decent standard of living for all.


HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY

Gini values of 2010 and HDI values of 2013




POVERTY AND "BOLSA FAMÍLIA"

Families receiving the "Bolsa Família", in millions, per region, between 2004 and 2014



Source: MDS, 2014

Poverty evolution, in million persons, between 2001 and 2011




Household income per capita:
— R\$ 0 to 70 — R\$ 70.01 to 140 — R\$ 0 to 140

Source: MDS, 2014

This is a small sample of the limitations of an international agenda almost exclusively focused on poverty reduction programmes and economic growth. Such a view not only tends to disregard the contradictory and complex nature of processes of development, but excludes from the debate some issues that are crucial for the improvement of citizens' lives. Aspects such as the systemic reproduction of inequalities, the universal guarantee of human rights, the socially inclusive participation in democratic deliberations, or even the structural dimension of common but differentiated responsibilities for the construction of more equitable relations among nations, are often absent from this agenda. To understand development as the realisation of human rights - transcending the limits of a narrow vision associated to basic needs, and


SOCIAL INDICATORS IN BRAZIL AND IN THE WORLD

HDI in the world, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013a.

HDI in Brazilian municipalities, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013b.

Life expectancy in the world, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013a.

Life expectancy in Brazilian municipalities, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013b.

Gini in the world, in 2013




Source: CIA, 2013.

Gini in Brazilian municipalities, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013b.

Education in the world, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013a.

Education in Brazilian municipalities, in 2013




Source: PNUD, 2013b.

Homicides in the world, in 2013



Source: UNODC, 2013.

Homicides in Brazilian municipalities, in 2013



Source: Waiselfisz, 2014.

emphasising a global vision of shared responsibilities among North and South countries - is one of the strongest recommendations of international networks and movements regarding a post-2015 development agenda.


SEE ALSO:

Population and diversity p. 42
International action of federated states p. 66
Brazilian multinationals p. 70
South-South Cooperation p. 112

Security and defence policy

BRAZIL IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Brazilian personnel in all peacekeeping missions, July 2013



Defence policy refers to the protection of sovereignty and of territorial integrity, but also to the projection of national interests on the field of regional and collective security. In the case of Brazil - as the Table summarising the main official documents indicates - national defence is defined as the set of measures and actions taken by the state, with emphasis on the military field, for the protection of the territory, of sovereignty, and of national interests against mainly external threats, whether

potential or manifest. The diagnosis of those threats is also contained in the same official documents.


Defending sovereignty in the international sphere implies the use of military equipment when necessary, which explains the current drive for investment in newer technologies and the modernisation of human resources. In Brazil, the military's presence in political life has a long history, as for the example in the Proclamation of the Republic in

1889, the coups of 1930 and 1937, and the one that established the dictatorship in 1964. And yet, due to some internal and external circumstances, Brazil consolidated an image of itself as a peaceful country, which uses diplomacy as a strategy of international negotiation and conflict resolution. Especially after the coup of 1964, the notion that the Armed Forces would respond to internal problems, rather than external ones, became widespread. The Cold War order added an external factor to this interpretative framework, associating it with the communist threat and security on the American continent. The outer and inner contexts thus converged in a combined movement, thanks to the Cold War doctrine drawn up by the US strategic milieu. It was only in the period of state re-democratisation that defence as national policy was reborn, and has since acquired more relevance in Brazil.

At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, some changes have occurred in the political and institutional field of national defence. With the political transition in the 1980s, which put an end to the military regime and saw the elaboration of a new Constitution in 1988, and particularly with the creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1999, the role of the Armed Forces has changed: international and regional issues have gained attention and Brazil's prominence in peace missions has been strengthened. If Brazil aspired to positions of political coordination at the systemic level, then it should demonstrate commitment to regional and international stability. Brazil began to mobilise more resources (human, financial, and political) within the UN peacekeeping missions. Since then, the country's defence budget has seen a steady growth. This can be observed, for instance, in the Chart showing some military budgets around the world, in which the increase of the Brazilian government's defence spending is clear. Some innovative partnerships with the private sector (e.g. Embraer, Odebrecht) have also taken place, as it has begun to invest in military and defence technology.

WORLD'S LARGEST ARMS EXPORTERS

Absolute figures in billions of dollars and per capita values, in 2012



The publication of the National Defence Policy (NDP) in 1996 and of the National Defence Strategy (NDS) in 2008 should also be highlighted. These two documents, especially the second one, lay down some important definitions about the role of the Armed

BRAZIL'S DOCUMENTS ON DEFENCE

Document	Year	Main goals	Implementation means	Main concepts
National Defence Policy	1996 to 2005	Ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity	Intensification of regionalisation processes and cooperation with the countries of South America and the African Coast	Security: condition in which the state, society or individuals feel free of risks, pressures or external threats Defence: the set of the country's actions and the military's function aimed at the defence of the territory, sovereignty and national interests International environment: complex, post-bipolar, globalised, characterised by new threats (terrorism, cross-border crime)
		Contribute to regional stability	Creation of regional and multilateral organisations for dispute resolution	
National Defence Strategy	2008 to 2012	Contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security	Integration of the Industrial Bases of Defence	Brazil as a peaceful country by tradition and conviction Brazil's project is to rise in the international arena without seeking hegemony There is an inextricable link between defence and development
		Strengthen Brazil's integration in the world	Reforms in international organisations aiming at their greater legitimacy	
National Defence Strategy	2008 to 2012	Keep the Armed Forces modern and well-integrated	Deter hostile forces	
		Develop the national defence industry, aiming for the sector's autonomy	Organise the armed forces on the tripod of monitoring, mobility and presence	
National Defence Strategy	2008 to 2012	Aims at the reorganisation and reorientation of the Armed Forces, and the organisation of the Industrial Bases of Defence. It also sets the policy for the Navy, Army and Air Force personnel, contributing to strengthen Brazil's growing international role	Strengthen strategic sectors: cybernetics, nuclear and space	
			Increase the presence at the borders and give priority to the Amazon region	
National Defence Strategy	2008 to 2012		Encourage the integration of South America and the training of the Armed Forces to act on UN missions	
			Empower the Industrial Bases of Defence to develop technological autonomy	

Labundo, 2014

Source: Ministério da Defesa, 2012.

Forces, and present a new understanding of the international system, which requires a different attitude from Brazil in the preparation of its Armed Forces. The NDP describes, for example, an international system permeated by “new threats”, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, biopiracy, and others.


The Armed Forces have taken on a new role, which looks outwards to the external scene. Increasingly, military deployment to help in humanitarian actions organised and managed by

the United Nations is advocated. The UN peace-keeping missions are even championed by Brazil's NDS. In other words, one of the functions of the Armed Forces became to take part in or lead these UN actions as a means to intensify Brazilian participation at the international level, contributing to raise the country's influence externally. Defence has changed its political status in the 21st century, to the extent that it has started a closer dialogue with the emerging superpower's foreign policy.

Hurdles and difficulties in national and regional military industrial development policy, a low share of the world's military market, deterioration of the troops and of military resources (i. e. arms, aircraft, ships, artillery, and other items), low interest levels from the public and Congress (“Defence issues do not bring votes in”) – these are some of the problems that Brazil needs to address if it wants to become a relevant player in this area. Clearly there are signs of modernisation, such as the nuclear submarine (in partnership with France) and the Swedish fighter planes. How to build a powerful Brazil, in ideational and material terms, if defence issues do not occupy an important space in public debate? Would soft power alone be able to guarantee regional political stability, as well as decision-making and deterrence powers at the international level? Everything seems to indicate that Brazil's official discourse in the field of defence is changing. The Minister of Defence, Ambassador Celso Amorim, has admitted that Brazil needs to have clout and deterrent capabilities, and therefore it would not be possible to imagine the country as a world power without seriously considering the national defence.

BRAZIL AND MILITARY BUDGETS

Evolution in billion dollars between 1988 and 2012



Source: SIPRI, 2014b.

SEE ALSO:

Global threats p. 48
 Security and defence p. 90
 Energy and infrastructure p. 92
 New coalitions p. 106

Global and transnational threats

In a world conceived in terms of anarchy, asymmetric relations and strategic interests, the defence and security of states have always been at the centre of international relations and foreign policy discussions. However, the nature of security and defence has changed with the advent of nuclear bombs, the acceleration of economic interdependence, the technological advances of globalisation, the maintenance of centre-periphery relations, the increase of transnational problems connected to the environmental crisis, drug trafficking, global health problems, terrorism and cybernetic wars, for example. From the moment that threats have become diversified, so have the content, the scope, and the scale of national defence policies too. In some cases, defence-related issues have even become part of states' cooperation agenda, as in the case of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Council for the Defence of Unasur.

Traditionally, the main threat to the territorial integrity of states came from other states' military action, invasions and wars. Foreign armies constituted an impending risk to the sovereignty of states and their national societies. The most cited metaphors about the actors of international relations revolved around the soldier and the diplomat: one to go to war, and the

other to conclude agreements. Today, this is still the nature of many threats to the territory of states, since conflicts and interference continue to occur, as in the case of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, or the crisis in the Crimea in 2014. Since the end of the Cold War, states have not reduced their investments in armaments and warfare. As for Brazil, the majority of its territorial conflicts happened in the 19th century. In the 20th century, the country took part in the two World Wars, but the threat of territorial invasion was remote and did not provoke much concern among members of the ruling elite.


However, after the end of the Cold War the meanings and the material expressions of threat have been multiplied. Also, threats can be transnational in nature, related to different forms of organised crime (e.g. drug trafficking, trafficking of human beings), to the ecological crisis (e.g. climate change, ocean levels rise), and to global health problems or epidemic crises, for example. In regard to the environmental crisis, the transnational dimension is even more obvious: acid rain, greenhouse gas emissions, pollution of rivers, contamination of the oceans, among others, are problems that cross national borders and produce impact in the medium and long term. Since

the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (1972) up to the Rio Conference on Environment and Development (1992), ecological awareness has increased, but the range of crises produced by human action on nature has also widened. Sea level rise can compromise the territoriality of some States. Other types of environmental threats are related to resource scarcity (e.g. water, arable land), and an increase in the number of environmental refugees.

Brazil is not immune to these transnational threats, as its large territory is rich in ecological diversity, minerals, sea resources (including oil), forests, and fresh water. Control over access to these resources has become, increasingly, a security issue. From the "green Amazon" to the "blue Amazon", the Armed forces have been mobilised and demand to be modernised - so as to be able to respond adequately to eventual challenges to the territory or the national interests. Threats have also evolved with the very idea of potential wealth in states' territories: not only is it necessary to protect


CYBERSECURITY

Fight against cybercrimes, in 2013




CYBERSECURITY

Top 10 sources of attacks via internet or via HTTP in 2013 (in % of world total)



Source: Symantec, 2014.

Top 10 sources of attacks via Bot, in 2013 (in % of the world total)*




*Attacks through malicious programs that invade computers and allow the attacker to control the infected system from a remote base.

Source: Symantec, 2014.


CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS

In billion tons of m³, between 1992 and 2010



CO₂ EMISSIONS

In tons per capita, in 2009



citizens, and the classic mineral resources fixed in the national territory (e.g. oil, gas, gold, diamonds, iron ore, etc.), but also those natural resources that have accrued in value due to the expansion of the boundaries of the “green economy” (e.g. biogenetic resources, forests, seas). Biopiracy, and the overtaking of intellectual property licenses (as in the case of Basmati rice by Ricetec, or of cupuassu by the Japanese company Asahi Food) are some typical examples of these “new threats” to the interests and potential economic gains of states.

The agents of transnational threats are increasingly diversified; very often they are from the marketplace and the corporate world, and their actions can result in very negative impacts on the environment. However, they can also be groups and individuals affiliated to different forms of terrorism, piracy or – for completely different reasons – to NGOs and libertarian social movements that oppose the non-democratic control exerted by the state on people's lives. The case of Edward Snowden illustrates this dimension of risk which springs from the acts of an individual – a former CIA employee, in this occasion.

The multiplication of agents makes the concept of security more and more all-embracing: from national security (a concept that evokes sad memories in South America, in view of military dictatorships past) to regional security, from collective security to human security. Debates around these concepts are far from reaching a consensus, but they tend to agree that the agents creating insecurity for other states can still be other states. However, threats nowadays can also come in the form of natural disasters, of climate change

caused by CO₂ emissions, of different types of piracy, of virtual invasions (via the internet), of diseases, and transnational trafficking. The enlargement of the concept of security and of its meaning is accompanied by the need to take into consideration both the objective dimension of threats (e.g. the size of enemy armies, number of nuclear warheads, etc) and the subjective dimension of threat, i.e. how existing threats and risks are perceived by society and decision-makers.

Another important challenge put to the Brazilian state is the domestic dimension of security: threats can arise from within its own national territory. Even if Brazil is not a country wherein terrorist attacks constitute an issue, in situations like these, abusive behaviours of state control over society may take place, escalating to the point of human rights violations, in some cases. A security policy intent on attaining full control of risks and threats may incur in abuses and rights violations. The state's national defence policy must consider the potential tensions ensuing from the need for security, on the one hand, and respect for individual freedoms and human rights, on the other. This is a dilemma in the state's domestic and external actions. The institutional response to the terrorist threat that has been adopted in some Western countries (e.g. the Patriot Act in the US) illustrates these tensions and should not serve as a model of security policy to Brazil.

SEE ALSO:

Energy sources and environment p. 34
 Biodiversity p. 40
 Security and defence p. 90
 Global governance p. 108


Culture as soft power

NATIONAL AND FOREIGN CINEMA IN BRAZIL

Audience between 2009 and 2012, in million viewers

Titles released between 2009 and 2012

Income (in million reais)



Source: Ancine, 2013.

Labundo, 2014

The concept of soft power can be defined as the ability to attract or seduce individuals and groups to the side that one is defending, without the use of coercion. In the case of foreign policy, it means convincing other countries to want what one's own country is looking for, but with no need to issue orders or to coerce via military or economic means. Bargaining and negotiation are the main constituent elements of soft power, which is considered to be the other face of hard power. It seems to have three main sources: culture (as it may appeal to and captivate individuals and groups from other countries), political values (e.g. democracy, human rights, good neighbourliness, social justice, etc.), and diplomacy (provided that it is considered legitimate, and the bearer of some form of respectability and moral authority).

Of these three sources, culture is perhaps the most decentralised and has wide circulation in societies. In addition, its sources and productive competences lie in various agents, in markets, in society, and even in public policies. States project their identities

on the external level and thus can turn cultural diplomacy into a tool for communication and foreign policy. In the case of Brazil, literature, Brazilian popular music, bossa nova, samba, carnival, soap operas, sports (football in particular), capoeira and Brazilian jiu-jitsu, film, or even the organisation of cultural events are - among other things - all part of the array of cultural artifacts that project Brazil's image on the international scene. Some of these images can become clichés.

At the federal level, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Culture are the main promoters of Brazilian cultural diplomacy. The Ministry of Culture acts through its International Relations Board of Directors. The Board of Directors and the Itamaraty's Cultural Department work together in promoting Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language internationally. The Itamaraty also negotiates agreements, organises, and establishes contacts with a view to carrying out cultural events. The Itamaraty's Cultural Department is responsible for overseeing and providing guidance to the network of Cultural Institutes and

Centres of Brazilian Studies abroad, as well as allocating the necessary resources for cultural promotion activities. In the multilateral context, both ministries are fundamental in Brazil's liaison with Unesco. At the state and municipality level, some secretariats may enjoy a more prominent role in the cultural field (such as those of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bahia).

Some examples of initiatives organised by Brazil are: the Portuguese language film festival, the Itamaraty short film festival, the showcases of Brazilian cinema (organised by the Itamaraty and Embracine), the Year of Brazil in France in 2005, the support of capoeira in Latin America, the promotion of culture within the CPLP, visual arts exhibitions, the edition of *Cultura Brasileira* and *Brasil Cultura* magazines (by the Embassies in Madrid and Buenos Aires, respectively), etc. Brazilian cultural policy abroad is prolific in its projects, but equally beset by scarcity of resources and an excessive fragmentation of initiatives. Cultural diplomacy is an instrument for the external integration of Brazil, and as such it should contribute to consolidating the national identity, strengthen the approximation of people around a common heritage and, at the same time, prevent its cultural programmes from simply becoming work tools. Cultural diplomacy ought to constitute a political priority and, therefore, receive human and financial resources that are compatible with its function.


The diplomatic use of culture is built upon official views regarding a national society's identity. Cultural diplomacy thus reflects the specific use of a cultural relationship for purposes not simply cultural in nature, but also political, commercial, or economic. Furthermore, there tends to be a very close relationship between diplomacy and high culture, even if it is implicit and tacit. In this process, what the Brazilian state tries to project, ultimately, are its values - according to the interpretation given by those who design and implement the policies. The existence of a democratic regime, and the domestic variable that represents the political coalition in power, both influence the decision-making process in regard to what kind of culture and of cultural identity should be promoted on the international level. Besides, depending on the political weight of

BRAZILIAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD

Cultural manifestations supported by the Itamaraty, in 2013



Cultural manifestations supported by the Itamaraty, by type of event, in 2013



Source: Itamaraty, 2013c.

Labmundo, 2014

a given state, and on its global and regional historical importance, these values will show a greater or lesser capacity to exert influence and to spread widely.

Through its cultural diplomacy, the Brazilian government tries to disseminate cultural values that defy the stereotypes often associated with the

country's identity - many of which are sexist and discriminatory, conveying as they do little more than images of a nation made up of beaches, beautiful women, sexual freedom, samba and carnival. It is true that when cultural diplomacy and market interests are combined the distinction between values and stereotypes becomes less clear. For this reason, it should be

part of Brazilian cultural diplomacy not only to fight against these clichés, but above all to publicise historical facts and cultural phenomena that are unknown to the wider public, or are of limited access abroad. During the Year of Brazil in France, for instance, seminars and exhibitions were organised about Brazil's African heritage, as well as about cutting-edge technologies linked to aviation, cultural diversity, modernist art, contemporary ballet, public policies and international integration.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the media occupy a privileged position as instruments of global influence. During the Cold War, international radio broadcasting had become an integral part of the US's foreign policy agenda. Control over radio waves, for example, was the object of intense East-West disputes.


Today, because of the globalisation of television and of telecommunications in general, the deregulation and digitalisation of communications, and large-scale private service providers entering the market, the landscape has thoroughly changed. There are many new types of communication technology and media; some European ones are based on old colonial patterns, and coexist with others that make use of the latest content from countries of the South, as in the case of Telesur and the soap opera TV industry that has spread to the majority of Latin American and African (PALOP) countries, as well as Asia and Europe.

SEE ALSO:

Ethnic pluralism p. 24
Population and diversity p. 42
Futebol and sports p. 52
Religion p. 56


WORLD DISSEMINATION OF CAPOEIRA AND JIU-JITSU

Brazilian capoeira groups abroad, in 2013



Source: Itamaraty, 2013d.

Brazilian jiu-jitsu centres abroad, in 2013



Source: Centres' websites, 2014

Labmundo, 2014

Collective sports and individual talents

Since the second half of the 20th century Brazil has become recognised by its sports performance, mainly due to the men's national football team. The country's five world titles, the 1970 and 1982 national teams, as well as some of its football stars could all be evoked in order to explain this image of Brazil abroad – despite the recent defeat to Germany in the 2014 World Cup. It is not unusual for Brazilian football players to enjoy international recognition. Edson Arantes do Nascimento (Pelé) is considered by several experts as one of the best football players of all times; there are statues of Arthur Antunes Coimbra (Zico) in Brazil, in the Arab world and in Japan, while the national team's yellow jerseys are sold around the world as a symbol of “art football”.

But it is not only football stars who enhance the country's image. Brazilian players have become a service product exported to various African, Asian, European, and American countries. Even though Brazilian football has lost its hegemony in the international scene, many new players continue to emerge and are remembered


with affection by club fans from different countries. This positive image can create some intangible capabilities for Brazil, facilitating interactions between people and institutions. Sports may therefore be used as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, in order to make up for (to a very limited extent, of course) the lack of material capability in other areas. This was the case, for example, of the “Peace Game”, when the Brazilian team played Haiti in 2004, in Port-au-Prince. Brazilian football clubs are less well known worldwide, although there are signs that this is changing too (with the opening of Brazilian clubs' training schools in South American countries, and the inclusion of clauses guaranteeing worldwide sales and advertising in contracts with sporting goods suppliers).

Although Brazil stands out as the “football nation”, other sports besides men's football have added to its positive image too. Such is the case of Marta Vieira da Silva, five times elected best player by FIFA; Ayrton Senna, in motorsport; Gustavo Kuerten, in tennis; Oscar Schmidt, in basketball;


BRAZIL AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Brazil's evolution in the rankings, between 1984 and 2012

Olympic Games



Paralympic Games




*The 1984 Paralympic Games were held in New York

10 Brazilian position in the world ranking
8 Quantity of gold medals
6 Quantity of gold, silver and bronze medals

Source: COI's website, 2013.

Sports that have given the most medals to Brazil up to 2014




Source: COI's website, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

LARGE SPORTING EVENTS


Concentration of large sporting events between 1900 and 2014



bmundo, 2014

BRAZILIAN SCHOOL FOOTBALL IN THE WORLD

Players in foreign clubs from first division, on May 2013



Anderson Silva and José Aldo, in martial arts; Gilberto Amaury Godoy Filho (Giba), in volleyball, etc. However, football still tends to concentrate the attention of and investment by most Brazilians. The population's preference for football, associated with a lack of political efficiency that afflicts other sports federations and various levels of government, can partially explain the absence of significant investment in other sports. Sports are often seen by the poor as a pathway towards economic stability. Consequently, Brazil relies on individual talents that manage to overcome the dearth of infrastructure investment and support for the country's athletes.

This factor might explain why Brazil is not an Olympic power. Although the country's demographic and economic numbers are quite impressive, they do not translate into better sports performance. In spite of having a large population, and being one of the 10 largest GDPs in the world, Brazil's performance at the Olympic Games is often worse in comparison to countries that have lower demographics and less dynamic economies

(Hungary, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Jamaica, etc.). It is also worth noting that Brazil has never won a medal at the Winter Olympic Games, in which it traditionally participates with a reduced delegation despite its geographical disadvantage.

Brazil depends mainly on the results of individual sports such as swimming, sailing, judo, and athletics to ensure a better position in the Olympic Games' table of medals. The sports that have won the most medals for Brazil are judo and sailing, surpassed only by volleyball (if both categories – court and beach volleyball – are considered together). On an upward curve since the generation that won the Olympic silver medal in 1984 (men's), volleyball has conquered some important titles for Brazil, both in the men's and women's categories. The Brazilian teams of court volleyball are the biggest winners of international tournaments, and were present in five of the last six Olympic finals (in Athens, Beijing, and London). Brazil also stands out in beach volleyball since the sport's first inclusion at the Olympic Games, in Atlanta, when the women's final was disputed by two Brazilian teams.


Another great achievement of Brazilian sports can be seen in the results obtained at the Paralympic Games. Despite the lack of visibility and of substantial financial support, the Brazilian Paralympic athletes have brought home some encouraging results, placing the country among the top 10 in the table of medals. Much of this was due to Daniel Dias, who won a total of 10 gold medals for swimming, four silver ones, and one bronze at London and Beijing.

The image projected by Brazil abroad


through sports has contributed to its choice to host FIFA's World Cup for the second time around, in 2014. In addition, the choice of Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Olympic Games was met with strong popular support, at least at the moment of the announcement of the final decision by the Olympic Committee. Apart from helping it gain more visibility, Brazil hopes that these sports events will boost the country's economy – not just in terms of investment, but also in the tourism and commerce sectors, among others. Despite these expectations, large swathes of the population were dissatisfied with the initial outcomes of the investment, and used the media visibility awarded them by these large events to go out on the streets and protest. They questioned whether people would actually benefit from holding these competitions in the country. Among the major complaints, the lack of investment in education, transportation, and health (in contrast to the impressive amounts spent on new football stadiums), and the large-scale removal of communities because of infrastructure works should be underlined.

BRAZILIAN VOLLEYBALL

Medals at the FIVB World Grand Prix (women), in 2014



Medals at the FIVB World League (men), in 2014



Source: FIVB's website, 2013.

FOREIGN FOOTBALL PLAYERS

Players in teams from top leagues, in 2013



SEE ALSO:

Tourism p. 54
Religion p. 56
Cooperation p. 110
Cooperation in education p. 114

Tourism and the national image

Tourism is one of the economic sectors that have gained great importance in recent decades. A study conducted by the World Economic Forum in 2007 indicates that between 1950 and 2004, international tourism revenues increased from \$2.1 billion to \$723 billion dollars. In 2006, the sector was responsible for 10.3% of world GDP and 8.2% of the total number of employees in the world. Tourism is seen as a possible instrument of economic and social development in developing countries, and as a facilitator of cultural exchanges and local community empowerment.


Brazil's national identity is strongly associated with the idea of a paradise, very appealing to foreigners, and culturally open to novelties. The international press and social media routinely rank the country or some of its cities and tourist attractions among the best in the world, or as "the place of the moment to visit". And yet Brazil is only peripherally integrated to the flows of international tourism. The reception of foreign tourists is relatively modest, and it has seen just a slight increase in the last decade. According to data from the Ministry of Tourism, the number of foreign tourists in the country since 2000 has oscillated

between 5 and 6 million visitors per year. With figures like these, the country receives fewer tourists than destinations such as Catalonia, Tunisia and Vietnam.

The possible explanation for this fact rests in great part on Brazil's distance from the main tourist emitting markets (international tourism is mainly cross-border), and the high cost of hotels and domestic tickets. In addition, the country has insufficient tourist connections externally, whereas internally these are very concentrated in just a few cities, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.


TOURISM ACCOUNT

In billion dollars, between 2000 and 2012




INTERNATIONAL TOURISM


International tourist arrivals in 2012 (in million persons)




Total of international tourists between 1950 and 2020 (in million)



International tourism receipts in 2012 (in billion dollars)



Foreign currency receipts between 1999 and 2012 (in billion dollars)



Sources: UNWTO, 2013; Ministry of Tourism, 2013b.


Because of the distance from Europe, the US and Asia, tourists from these countries prefer longer stays, where they can visit several Brazilian cities. But since Brazil has problems of infrastructure and long distances, other South American countries become more competitive, because their tourist attractions are closer to each other.

By law, Brazil adopts a reciprocity policy which requires visas of citizens from those countries which impose the same obligation to Brazilians. Therefore US tourists have to go through more formalities to come to Brazil, which reduces the flow from one of the world's major tourist emitting poles. If people from the US are in search of a beach destination, they might find in the Caribbean, not in Brazil, better tourism infrastructure, less travel time, less bureaucracy, at equivalent prices.


In addition, policies for the promotion of Brazil abroad characteristically show low interest in attracting Asian groups, especially Chinese, who are an emerging force in the industry and well known as high spenders abroad.

BRAZILIAN TOURISTS

Domestic travels (in million)




Brazilians travelling abroad, estimated in million



Sources: Ministry of Tourism, 2013b; Canadian Tourism Commission, 2012.


OUTBOUND TRAVEL FROM BRAZIL

International travels by Brazilians, per country, in 2012 (in thousand people)



INTERNATIONAL TOURISTS IN BRAZIL

Countries that sent over 100,000 tourists to Brazil, in 2011



Tourism carried out by foreigners in Brazil also contributes to some of the country's problems, such as prostitution (especially involving children), the loss of traditional communities' customs, and its use as an excuse for public investment to be made preferably in the best neighbourhoods of Brazilian municipalities.


Recent economic and social changes have transformed the country into a region that sends out more tourists than it receives. The sector is highly dependent on the domestic market. When travelling abroad, Brazilians stand out for their high spending habits in cities like Paris and New York. Domestic tourism in Brazil has had high growth rates, following the integration of large parts of the population into new consumption patterns. In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Tourism at the end of 2013, the number of people who intended to travel within Brazil (72.7%) was three times higher than of those who preferred a foreign destination (24.7%). Of those who contemplated domestic tourism, more than half (53.7%) chose the Northeast region, which has been gaining more and more importance in Brazilian tourist flows.

According to Euromonitor International, the number of Brazilian tourists abroad has increased exponentially in the last decade. This phenomenon is reflected in the escalation of their expenses which, in parallel with the stagnation of foreign tourists' spending in Brazil, explains the ever-growing deficit in the country's tourism accounts balance. Recent measures taken by the Brazilian government, such as the increment of taxes on credit card transactions done abroad and in IOF tax, have been attempts to control this rising consumption beyond borders.

Brazilians' preferred destinations are concentrated in a few regions, mainly in North America, Western Europe, and in the Southern Cone. The US and Argentina are, respectively, the two main international destinations. The cities that stand out as favourite choices are New York and Miami, Paris and Rome, as well as Buenos Aires and Santiago in Chile.

LARGEST TOURISM EXPENDITURES

In billion dollars, in 2013



SEE ALSO:

Globalisation and the new order p. 22
Logistics p. 32
International action of federated states p. 68
Brazilians abroad p. 76

Religious pluralism

The configuration of Brazilian religiosity is an element that contributes to the current internationalisation process of its society. Brazilian religious movements are part of an international dynamic that favours external influences in everyday domestic matters, as well as the impact of national elements abroad. Even though public opinion polls indicate a slightly downward trend in the importance of the spiritual realm for the population as a whole (with an increase in the number of atheists in the most recent statistics), this dimension is still essential to understanding the country's social dynamics.

Brazil has historically been a Catholic stronghold, but this identity is in relative decline these days particularly because of the growing presence of Evangelical and neo-Pentecostal religious groups. The country is today the largest national Catholic community in the world, and yet it holds limited power in the high circles of the Vatican. For example, the country only had its first Brazil-born saint (Friar Galvão) recognised in 2007. The Catholic Church increasingly keeps its share of followers in the developing countries, and seems to be trying to strengthen the youth presence within its largest communities. The visit of Pope Francis to Brazil in 2013 (his first trip outside Italy after his election) for World Youth Day - one of the most important Catholic events - in Rio de Janeiro, could be interpreted according to this perspective.


If a hundred years ago the world's major Catholic communities were generally found in Europe, current trends point towards the diminishing importance of the religious sphere in developed countries. This alters the group profile of Catholic Church followers, as it increases the relevance of some of the South's largest countries, such

as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines. Despite contextual differences, Catholicism in these developing countries usually maintains its hegemony, but with a significant share of other religious groups, so that in the world's major Catholic countries Catholics do not represent more than 90% of the population. Because of the importance of religiosity among countries of the South, and the expansion of their populations, the current global religious scene is characterised by a slightly upward trend in the number of individuals who consider themselves religious.


In the case of Brazil, the Catholic religion has been falling into relative decline. Catholic groups have one of the highest age averages. The most recent papacies promoted policies that hardly encourage followers to participate in religious communities, especially if Catholicism is compared with other denominations. Catholics are also the group that least contributes financially to their institution. These factors, coupled with the emergence of Evangelical faiths, are an important trait of the Brazilian religious context.

FAITH IN BRAZIL

Evolution of religion among Brazilians, between 1870 and 2010



Followers by total population, in %, in 2010




CHRISTIANITY

	Largest Catholic communities	% of national population	% of Catholic population in the world
1910	France 40,510,000	98.4	13.9
	Italy 35,270,000	99.9	12.1
	Brazil 21,430,000	95.6	7.4
	Spain 20,350,000	99.9	7.0
	Poland 18,750,000	72.1	6.4
2010	Brazil 126,750,000	65.0	11.7
	Mexico 96,450,000	85.0	8.9
	Philippines 75,570,000	81.0	7.0
	USA 75,380,000	24.8	7.0
	Italy 49,170,000	81.2	4.6
2010	USA 159,850,000	51.4	20.0
	Nigeria 59,680,000	87.7	7.5
	China 53,040,000	4.3	7.2
	Brazil 40,550,000	20.8	5.1
	South Africa 33,550,000	72.9	4.6

Source: Pew Research Center, 2011.

POPEMOBILE

Popes' pastoral visits outside Italy, per year, between 1963 and 2014



In fact, the most remarkable phenomenon of the Brazilian religious dynamic nowadays is the rise of Protestant churches. According to data from the IBGE census, between 2000 and 2010 there was a 61% hike in their followers' numbers. They are heterogeneous groups that do not necessarily share a common identity. Followers of these denominations are the most actively engaged in their religious communities. They are very influenced by the US evangelical experience, as can be seen in the prevalence of gospel music. Also noteworthy is the missionary character of many of these groups, which places the country among the world's major emitters of religious personnel.

The demographic dynamic of these religious groups is very distinctive: the Evangelical churches (such as the Assembly of the Kingdom of God, the Universal, or the Church of the Quadrangular Gospel) have the highest proportion of followers with per capita income below the minimum wage (63.7% of the total) and are predominantly urban, where they reach 13.9% of the total population (compared with 12.2% of those who identify with these faiths in the country as a whole). Evangelical Christians are not evenly distributed across the Brazilian territory – they concentrate in the Southeast region, especially in capital cities and in the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, as well as in Goiânia and along the Southern coast (Paraná and Santa Catarina in particular).

As for Spiritism and the African-based religions (e.g. umbanda and candomblé), it is possible to discern some relevant international dynamics in their origin and formation, as well as in their more recent developments.


These are Brazilian religions, in the sense that they were born in the country, but they are also involved in internationalisation processes. Spiritism, for instance, had its origin in the book published by Allan Kardec in France, in the 19th century, and widely circulated in Brazil.

The African-based religions are a result of the religious syncretism prompted by the cultural resistance of Africans of the diaspora. They do not have institutional unity and present, therefore, great variety in their practices and even in their definitions, some of which are mostly regional, as Candomblé in Bahia, or Macumba in Rio de Janeiro. In the case of the Candomblé practiced in the state of Bahia, the yalorixás and babalorixás (female and male priest figures, respectively) are internationally recognised, acting as cultural and spiritual bridges between Brazil and Africa.


The importance of the regional dimension is quite clear in some religions practiced by groups in the Amazon, Piauí and Maranhão, where in addition to Catholic and African syncretism there are elements from the Indigenous Peoples' cultures. Umbanda, which was born in Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of the 20th century, is an example of this rich complexity, as it brings together elements from Indigenous Peoples, African, and Catholic cultures, associated with the teachings of French Spiritism. Followers of Candomblé can be found mainly in the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and in the Recôncavo Baiano region. The adepts of Umbanda have a larger presence in the country's Centre-south, especially in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul.

RELIGIONS OF AFRICAN ORIGIN

Followers of Umbanda, in 2010



Followers of Candomblé, in 2010



Brazil is home to very diverse and dynamic religious experiences, which help to shape different cultural groups and social classes. The religious context cannot be ignored by foreign policy although it may produce contradictions in the future. The Brazilian state is constitutionally secular, but the influence of some religious groups in domestic policy cannot be denied (religious freedom, religious education in public schools, abortion, and homosexual marriage). Is it possible to imagine that Brazilian foreign policy might be influenced by religious actors, e.g. in supporting moral values in the multilateral context, or in looking for greater freedom for the religious activity of Brazilians abroad?


SEE ALSO:

Cultural diversity p. 24
Itamaraty p. 60
Religious actors p. 74
South-South Cooperation: Africa p. 116

Chapter 3:

ACTORS

AND AGENDAS





Many analysts believe that Brazil's foreign policy is a policy of state, marked by continuity, linked to permanent national interests and thus protected from political and ideological influences, thanks mainly to the Ministry of External Relations' action. In this chapter, the argument goes in the opposite direction - that is, we assume that the formulation and implementation of BFP fall within the political dynamics of government choices (coalitions, bargaining, disputes, etc.). BFP is the result of state and government action on the international sphere; it reacts to changes in the international system, is directly related to the evolution of multi-lateral organisations, and responds to regional challenges. But BFP does not simply begin where domestic politics ends. National actors and agendas are fundamental to interpret the new configuration of foreign policy, especially in the wake of economic globalisation processes and the democratisation of the Brazilian state. Hence the need to analyse these actors and agendas in order to get a better grasp of current changes and, at the same time, endorse the premise that we put forward here, i.e. that foreign policy should also be analytically and politically treated as public policy.

The Itamaraty and public diplomacy

According to the 1988 Constitution, foreign policy is the responsibility of the President of the Republic, who delegates it to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The Itamaraty's main areas of activity are: the implementation of international policy strategies according to the President's directives; the conduct of diplomatic relations and the provision of consular

services; participation in trade, economic, technical, and cultural negotiations with foreign governments and other bodies; designing and structuring programs of international cooperation, as well as coordinating or offering support to Brazilian delegations, entourages, and representations in international and multilateral agencies and organisations. The Itamaraty

and the diplomatic corps constitute, along with the Armed Forces, the oldest and most traditional bureaucracy of the Brazilian state. Bureaucracy implies rigour in the selection process, merit-based rules for the promotion of staff, continuous training and skills development throughout their careers, but also hierarchical norms that guide the agents' learning and socialisation, thus creating the social and cultural bases for mutual recognition within the organisation. The Rio Branco Institute, founded in 1945, is a pivotal component of this architecture, as it picks and qualifies Brazilian diplomats, and defines the criteria for career progression from the third secretary level up.

The diplomatic bureaucracy tradition has also tended, throughout the Republic in the 20th century, to give priority to certain individuals (especially men) from certain families and social classes - to the detriment of a more plural representation, commensurate with the social and demographic national reality. Although the country's competence in the conduct of foreign relations and in the negotiation of its national interests is internationally recognised, it has been almost exclusively built upon the representation of social, economic and cultural white elites. This situation began to change gradually after the re-democratisation of the state thanks to social and political pressure, especially since 2002 when the Scholarship Prize Vocation for Diplomacy was created to provide equal opportunities in the access to the diplomatic career, and to increase the ethnic diversity of the Itamaraty's staff. This policy is still at its beginnings, and has yet to prove its.


At the international level, it was around this time that Brazil built up a true world diplomacy with numerous representations (embassies, consulates, and offices), which in 2014 totalled 896 diplomats abroad (526 in the State Secretariat in Brasília), 448 Chancellery officials abroad (305 in the SERE), and 344 Chancellery assistants abroad (209 in the SERE).

At the domestic level, re-democratisation presented the Itamaraty with a new challenge: to gradually build a public policy dimension for foreign policy, not without some tensions and contradictions. Outside the institution's walls, this process led the


PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON THE INTERNET

Facebook and official pages of ministries, in 2014

Users' "likes" of official pages, in million users




Users talking about official pages, in thousands



*Foreign Affairs Ministries of China and Turkey do not have official pages on Facebook.
Source: Official pages of Ministries on Facebook.

YouTube and official channels of ministries, in 2014


Subscribers, in thousands



Videos, in thousands




Views, in millions




*The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an official YouTube channel.
**The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has more than one official YouTube channel.
Source: Official channels of Ministries on YouTube.

Ministries' official Twitter accounts in 2014

Followers, in millions




Tweets, in thousands



*The Chinese and South African Ministries of Foreign Affairs do not have official accounts on Twitter.
**The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has more than one official Twitter account.
Source: Official pages of Ministries on Twitter, 2014.


DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

Location of Brazilian diplomatic representations, and amount of officials and diplomats** on 35 main representations in 2014



INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

Events per city, between 2004 and 2012



world also became more diversified and has engaged in discussions with the Itamaraty more regularly. As a civil society initiative, the GR-RI has taken on the challenge of creating the National Council on Foreign Policy, which proposes to institutionalise these processes of democratic and pluralistic dialogue about the future of BFP.

These factors have also resulted in the public diplomacy through which the Itamaraty responds to requests for information – though not always as quickly or transparently as required of a democratic regime. That is why their press liaison offices have been expanded and some public relations-like services have been developed. A “Brazil brand” has been devised together with the Ministry of Tourism, aiming to attract foreign investment and the organisation of international events in the country. The promotion of the national interest has thus come to enjoy a vast supply of public funds and technological resources. Acting as an instrument of BFP’s soft power, public diplomacy acknowledges the growing importance of today’s media and communication tools in an increasingly digitally connected and globalised world.

SEE ALSO:

Culture and soft-power p. 50
 Presidential diplomacy p. 62
 Organisations and social movements p. 72
 Social networks and regional integration p. 96

Itamaraty to initiate a dialogue with other ministries (many of which have international advisory departments),

federal agencies, states and municipalities, industry associations, and civil society organisations. The academic

Presidential diplomacy

Reciprocal visits between heads of state and heads of government are not a novelty on the international political scene. After the birth of the nation state according to the Westphalian model, visiting exchanges among European monarchs became common and were treated as very important events among the nobility. Brazil joined in the practice at the time of the Empire, as D. Pedro II's travels to Europe, North America, and Africa well attest. The visits of high-level national authorities are generally used to strengthen commercial, cultural,

strategic, and political relations between countries. In addition to the clear prestige attached to receiving these representatives, the direct dialogue among heads of government tends to facilitate and speed up negotiations in several areas, from politics and defence to business and scientific development.


The travels undertaken by political authorities served to speed up negotiations, to develop closer political relations between countries, and to engage in some prestige diplomacy. However, this

practice also gave rise to challenges in the domestic sphere, because it entailed the leaders' absence from their respective jobs. At the beginning of the 20th century, and in a country of continental dimensions such as Brazil, this was particularly problematic because the existing means of transportation made short presidential trips to other countries impossible. Trips were quite time-consuming, thus increasing the period during which the head of state had to be replaced by the vice-president or other authorities. In some cases, these leaders' absence made the domestic environment conducive to political manoeuvres, and often to coups. When Jânio Quadros resigned, Vice President João Goulart was on an official visit to China and was prevented at first from returning to the country to assume the presidency.


Technological advances over the 20th and 21st centuries have made travelling faster and cheaper, creating the opportunity for heads of state and government to travel more often without leaving

BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTS' TRIPS PER ANNUAL AVERAGE AND DESTINATION


José Sarney (March 1985 to March 1990)



Fernando Collor (March 1990 to October 1992)




Itamar Franco (October 1992 to January 1995)



Fernando Henrique Cardoso (January 1995 to January 2003)



Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (January 2003 to January 2011)



Dilma Rousseff (January 2011 to January 2015)



Sources: Planalto, 2014; Itamaraty, 2013b.

*All presidential trips were taken into account, whether of a bilateral or multilateral nature.

Labmundo, 2015


their jobs for lengthy periods. Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century a trip between the capital (Rio de Janeiro) and Europe took weeks by sea, already in the 1950s the same trip took a few days by air. Today, modern aircraft allow a trip between Brasília and the European capitals to take just a few hours.

Presidential diplomacy had in the American President Theodore Roosevelt one of its forerunners. In Brazil, Campos Sales was the first president to make an official visit to another country: Argentina, in 1899. Although it is an old practice, presidential visits gained new momentum in the 1980s, when the new 1988 Federal Constitution decreed that it was within the Presidency of the Republic's exclusive remit to entertain relations with foreign states. Today in Brazil presidential visits and travels are part of the head of state's normal obligations.

Since its inception, the Itamaraty was known as a politically independent institution with professional staff. Chancellors and diplomats were those majorly responsible for foreign policy formulation throughout the end of the 19th century, and a good part of the 20th century. Re-democratisation had an impact in the conducting of Brazilian foreign policy in the sense that it decreased the Ministry of Foreign Relations' insulation. Gradually, the Brazilian heads of state began to act directly and personally in international affairs. Although every foreign policy has its own preferences and distinct discourses, diplomats tend to avoid radical changes because stability

OFFICIAL VISITS TO BRAZIL

Missions by head of state and government representatives to Brazil, between 2003 and 2010



Sources: Planalto, 2014; Itamaraty, 2013b.

Labmundo, 2014

and consistency are critical factors to secure credibility in international relations.

That is why presidential trips are used by political scientists and IR scholars as an indicator of a particular government's political preferences. A high annual average of presidential trips abroad may indicate the politician's view of foreign policy as an important aspect of their government, as they actively participate in its guidance by visiting other countries, international organisations and events. On the other hand, a low annual average of presidential trips may indicate that the president has a preference for home affairs.

The growing number of international visits is also an indicator of a new reality in international relations and of Brazil's role in it. It should be noted that since the 1980s Brazilian presidents have, with some variations, gradually increased their amount of official travelling. This increase in presidential diplomacy is not only due to technological developments in means of transportation, as mentioned earlier, but also to an increase in Brazil's prominence in the international political scene. Brazil's goal to become a global player means that Brazilian politicians need to attend international events, summit meetings, and communicate directly with leaders of other countries (i.e. to seek prestige). This is illustrated by President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's high number of official trips in his eight years of office, as well as the fact that President Dilma Rousseff, during the first three years of her first term, had already surpassed (in absolute terms) the amount


of presidential travel that José Sarney engaged in during his whole five years of government.

The destination of these trips is also an object of academic scrutiny, because it indicates the preference given to one group of countries over another. Comparing Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government with that of his successor shows that there was a growth of approximately 110% in presidential travel. All regions showed a rising trend, including South America (59%), North America (71%), and Europe (74%), but some regions had a more marked growth, such as Central America and the Caribbean (480%), Africa (750%) and the Middle East (not visited previously). The data reveals that Brazil became more involved in other regions of the world without neglecting its traditional relationships.

In the same manner, the heads of state and government of other countries also visit Brazil. This indicator is quite important as it demonstrates that not only is the world on Brazil's agenda, but that Brazil is on many countries' economic, cultural, scientific, educational and political agenda too. In addition, it is also possible to check whether or not there is reciprocity in the choices of presidential visits.

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVELS ABROAD

Presidential travels, between 1985 and January 2015



Sources: Planalto, 2014; Itamaraty, 2013b.

Labmundo, 2013


SEE ALSO:

Tourism p. 54
Itamaraty p. 60
Integration projects p. 82
South-South Cooperation p. 112

Congress, ministries and agencies

ITAMARATY IN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEES

Creation of interministerial committees by year, between 1968 and 2007




Source: Figueira, 2010.

The re-democratisation of the state gradually pushed the Itamaraty towards greater dialogue with other governmental bodies. There was an increase in the number of interministerial commissions created to deal with cross-cutting themes. Many ministries and agencies have been involved in international projects through their international

advisory offices, or services geared towards international action. Each advisory office coordinates its ministry's projects and international partnerships. In 2009, only the Ministries of Communications, of National Integration, and of Welfare did not have a department of this kind. Public policies are undergoing a clear internationalisation process.

FOREIGN POLICY AND HORIZONTALITY

International competence in the Executive, according to Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and complementary laws



Type of international projection of agencies with international competence



Source: França & Badin, 2010.


Congress has been increasingly called to fulfil a role that requires not only the ratification of international agreements, but also enabling public debate on key issues of BFP. This scenario has produced a certain "bureaucratic politics" in the relations among different actors.

BFP and the other public policies (e.g. education, integration and borders, culture, health, etc.) started to interact more actively with each other, which has resulted in cooperation but also in conflict in regard to the place that Brazil should occupy (or claim) in the international system. The ever more diversified nature of BFP's actors and agendas tends to contribute to the slow democratisation of the decision-making process involving the country's foreign policy. The horizontalisation of foreign policy within the Executive Branch poses challenges to the Itamaraty, as it seeks to formulate and manage public policies on international issues through practices that are not only consistent among themselves, but also consistent with the overarching strategies defined by the Presidency. Stepping up communication with other ministries is also changing the way that foreign policy is done in Brazil, which previously was defined as insulated and centred on the MRE.

The Ministry of Education has a strong international presence. It participates in educational agreements

BRAZILIAN CONTINENTAL BORDERS

Borderlands and Twin-cities, in 2014




Source: Ministry of National Integration website, 2014.

Labundo, 2014.

in the regional context, such as the Mercosur's Educational Sector (since 1991). Another example of its activities is the project known as Intercultural Frontier Schools, a partnership between Brazilian public schools situated in towns alongside its borders and the schools of neighbouring countries, involving teacher exchanges in particular. Higher education is also an area of considerable activity in Brazilian educational diplomacy. During President Lula's two terms in office, the Ministry of Education created four universities that aim to foster the presence of foreign lecturers and students in Brazil: UNIAM, UFFS, UNILAB, and UNILA. The Ministry of National Integration also acts on international issues, such as Brazilian twin-towns and the country's border strip. Brazilian twin-towns are those cut by border lines, exhibiting urban integration with neighbouring countries, and where there is a high potential for economic and cultural integration. In 2014, at the request of the Ministry of Integration, the Ministry of Finance regulated the set up of duty-free shops on land borders; currently these shops are in 26 Brazilian twin-towns. In terms of public health, another state body whose international operations are expanding is Fiocruz, dedicated to research on health issues and the sale of pharmaceutical products. The institution gives priority to developing countries, contributes to shape Brazilian positions on health in the international system, and strengthens national ties with other countries of the South. Fiocruz is an essential link of what came to be known as "health diplomacy". The

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Main international human rights agreements signed by the Executive and ratified by Congress between 1980 e 2014




same internationalisation pattern can be seen in Embrapa's case.

The National Congress is another key actor of BFP. The responsibilities assigned to it by the 1988 Constitution are: the ratification of treaties, conventions, and international acts; the supervision of governmental policies through its committees (for example, the Senate's Foreign Relations and National Defence Committee); to authorise the President to declare war, conclude peace, as well as to approve the movement or permanence of foreign troops inside the country. By analysing the time required for Congress's approval of international agreements, it becomes clear that votes sometimes are hard fought over, and negotiations are necessary between the Legislative and the Executive for some of the propositions to pass, as was the case of Venezuela's joining the Mercosur at the end of 2009. In addition, it is the Senate's responsibility to approve the heads of diplomatic missions, and it has to be consulted on external transactions

of a financial nature. Despite the Brazilian political system's profile, and the Legislature's relatively low level of interest on the subject of foreign policy, the Congress has an opportunity to influence it when the Union's annual budget is voted on. "Parliamentary diplomacy" is also expanding: Congress has been developing relations with other national parliaments, and with international organisations representing those institutions (such as the Mercosur Parliament). Some visits by foreign authorities and the presence of parliamentary delegations abroad in a wide range of events, usually accompanying the Executive Branch's delegations, also fit within this framework.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

International operations by the Ministry of Education, 2014



SEE ALSO:

Presidential diplomacy p. 62
 Integration projects p. 82
 Asymmetries and inequalities p. 94
 South-South Cooperation in education p. 114

The international action of federated states

According to the Brazilian Federal Constitution, providing guidance to BFP is the President of the Republic's exclusive responsibility. For over a century, this responsibility had been delegated to the MRE; however, towards the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the Itamaraty's insulation gradually began to subside, allowing subnational actors to operate internationally too. Both the re-democratisation of Brazil from the 1980s onwards and globalisation have helped to bring about this change. Technological advances and the

internationalisation of the economy have made it much easier for subnational actors to play a role on the international scene, looking to their own interests with some autonomy from the federal government.

Brazilian states are a good example of these new subnational actors that have gradually come to include international relations and themes in their agendas. In some countries, international action by subnational federated units is not new. In Switzerland, cantons have been allowed to act


internationally by constitutional provision since 1874. The German constitution of 1949 also gives the Länder a certain degree of freedom to interact with other international political actors. In Latin America, Argentina adopted an amendment to the constitution in 1994 which allows subnational actors to cooperate with other foreign actors on issues pertaining to their respective interests. In Brazil, there is no constitutional provision expressly permitting subnational units to operate on the international level. On the contrary, the competences related to international affairs are split between the Houses of Congress, and held mainly by the Executive. Nonetheless, actions by Brazilian subnational actors have become increasingly frequent, even in the absence of a legal and regulatory framework.

Quite often, Brazilian states operate internationally in their federated unit capacity, either by seeking loans or signing cooperation agreements. The choice of Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Olympic Games is a recent example. The City of Rio de Janeiro played a decisive part in the application process, but it was only due to both the state of Rio de Janeiro and the federal government's strong commitment that the project was able to defeat some strong competitors, such as Chicago, Tokyo, and Madrid. The state of Rio de Janeiro is responsible for a large part of the infrastructure in the metropolitan region of the city of Rio de Janeiro, therefore its government had to engage internationally in order to guarantee investment agreements: for construction works, urban mobility programs, and sports parks development, among others.

The fact that states now engage in international activities has also given rise to competition among them. In order to attract foreign investment, many state governments offer fiscal incentive packages to encourage businesses and industries to settle in their territory. The objective is to stimulate the local economy and to create jobs, thus offsetting the government's loss of revenues from tax collection and the tax exemptions granted. However, competition among state governments has become very fierce, and the tax incentives promised to international capital have actually come to exceed their feasibility. In some cases, this was because governors sought to avoid the political

FEDERATED STATES AND EXPORTS

By destination, in billion dollars, in 2013



Source: IBGE, 2013a.

Labundo, 2014

costs associated with losing the competition for foreign investment. To prevent situations like this, a fiscal responsibility law (LRF) has been passed; according to it, each state government is responsible for keeping its balance of payments positive, generating a surplus. This measure has reduced the competition, but it is highly criticised by some sectors of civil society, under the argument that ultimately the LRF would prevent the state government from investing in places where it has collected taxes.


In a democratic country, the freedom for federated units to operate internationally can be considered beneficial. By decentralising the country's international activities, states get to promote actions that meet the specific needs of a certain region or population in particular. This decentralised model can have a positive impact on the bureaucratic machine's transparency too, because the population is closer to the state government and can keep track of projects' outcomes. However, the decentralised model can also cause problems of congruence with the country's international actions. In the Brazilian case, the federal government attempts to convey a strategic and coherent discourse in the field of BFP. When the number of state actors operating internationally increases, foreign policy tends to be more plural but may produce less harmonious results.

Federated states tend to establish relations with those that appear to be

PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE WORLD BANK

Ongoing projects in February 2014

Projects completed by February 2014



Source: World Bank database website, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

politically, socially and economically most useful. It is quite natural for federated units sharing borders with other countries to have closer relations with their neighbours. There are many technical cooperation projects being implemented by federated states. Similarly, if there are significant numbers of immigrants from a given country living in a region, it is to be expected that there will be stronger ties between the state and the country of origin of its residents. Such is the case, for instance, of the Japanese community in São Paulo, the communities of African origin in the Northeast (particularly in Bahia), and the German and Italian communities in the Southern states of Brazil (mainly in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina). The international relations of a federated unit are also guided by its economic situation, i.e. what and with whom they


trade. In this sense, it is possible to say that regions having less diverse commercial exchanges also tend to have more focused international relations. Finally, the choices made have a political dimension as well. Each federated unit has different political preferences, which reflect the preferences and trajectories of the various parties in government. A federated unit can use its own paradiplomatic actions as an instrument of "challenge diplomacy", in order to test and disseminate international integration alternatives to the federal government's foreign policy.

SEE ALSO:

Brazil Empire p. 16
New global order p. 22
International action of the cities p. 68
South America p. 84

RIO DE JANEIRO, OLYMPIC CITY

Removals of population for the construction of the Olympic Games infrastructure and sports parks



Sources: Olympic Committee Rio 2016, 2014; Popular Committees for World Cup website, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

The international action of cities

The international scene is no longer monopolised by nation states; it is also constituted by subnational actors - among them municipalities - that intervene in that space and change the patterns and modes of action of international relations. Globalisation has contributed to this phenomenon, because it has created mechanisms that have reduced space-time constraints and increased the international flow of people, products, information, and capital. As politics become globalised, cities can act as subnational actors operating internationally, just like federated states do. In Brazil, municipal governments have gradually become interested in international affairs and acted based on their own agenda of interests, sometimes independently of central government.


The realisation that many current problems cannot be solved in the absence of joint action at the local level has contributed to this reality. Throughout the 20th century, and particularly during the Cold War, the action of subnational actors was rather limited, since the state exerted greater control over its borders. However, with the end of the Cold War, new issues came up on the international agenda - in addition to military and strategic ones - which have stimulated the

participation of other actors (e.g. human rights, the environment, the fight against hunger and diseases, etc.). In addition, there is a stronger understanding that many of the world's problems are collective ones, thus demanding an articulated response. The C40 group is a good example: it represents a group of cities that considers global warming to be a problem of all (and not just of their respective countries' central governments), taking local and interconnected measures with a view to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and creating a more efficient logistics and organisational structure.

The fact that the world population is mostly urban also contributes to the ever-rising activism of municipalities in international relations. Increasingly, urban areas become economic and political centres and tend to seek their own interests as a consequence. A determining factor for municipal governments' venturing into decentralised diplomacy is the city's demographic and economic relevance. Although Brazil has more than 5,500 municipalities, many Brazilian regions suffer from urban macrocephaly. In other words, despite the existence of a large number of municipalities, many of them are satellites of larger cities and


BRAZILIAN MUNICIPAL DIPLOMACY

Municipalities in Brazil by thousands of inhabitants, in 2011



Source: CNM, 2014.

International cooperation infrastructure, by municipality, in 2011




Source: CNM, 2014.

depend on the economy and services concentrated there. It is generally in these big cities that municipal governments have ad hoc bureaucracies to deal with international affairs.

Besides size, geographical position is also a relevant factor in a city's interest to interact internationally and to create a specific bureaucracy for this. In a situation of close proximity to other countries, many economic, social, political, and security issues are not circumscribed by frontiers. In the case of neighbouring cities set in different countries, it is common for many people to work in one country and live in another, to shop in the neighbouring country, etc. Given this intense international flow (which is also local), municipalities naturally prepare themselves bureaucratically to relate to foreign actors even when the cities are relatively small. This helps to explain, for instance, the concentration in the South of Brazil of cities declaring to have an interest in international affairs. It also explains the high percentage of Uruguayan municipalities active in decentralised cooperation projects, despite the fact that there is a problem of urban macrocephaly in that country.

CITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Cities participating in the C40, in 2014




The decentralised diplomacy of cities gained momentum with Brazil's re-democratisation in the mid-1980s. In addition to promoting political openness, the 1988 Constitution is much less centralising in character than the previous one, and this has allowed municipalities to act more freely on the external level. An example of this new phase for the action of municipalities was the creation of the National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM) in February 1980; it defines itself as the largest municipal body of Latin America, as well as a non-partisan and non-profit organisation. The CNM aims to strengthen the emancipation of municipalities through logistical and technical support. Among other initiatives, it provides preparatory courses for civil servants of municipal governments who want to start working in decentralised diplomacy.

As the previous section about the international action of federated states has already pointed out, in Brazil there is no law regulating decentralised diplomacy, i.e. how municipalities engaging in international exchanges should act. A greater tendency towards plurality is one natural consequence of decentralisation, but so is the eventual loss of discourse uniformity. Nonetheless, the international action of cities has not undermined the coherence of the federal government's official diplomatic discourse. Cities tend to respect a political hierarchy before they act internationally, in order to avoid areas of competence of the federal government, such as security, defence, etc.

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Total of agreements with Brazilian municipalities, in 2011




Source: CNM, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014

PARADIPLOMACY OF BRAZILIAN CITIES

Cities engaged in international cooperation, in 2011



Source: CNM, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014


Generally speaking, the decentralised diplomacy activities in which Brazilian municipalities tend to engage focus on technical cooperation, or on issues that would not be resolved by actions exclusively from the federal government.

It should be emphasised that many cities use decentralised diplomacy to attract international tourists and to make cultural agreements with other cities or countries. Rio de Janeiro, for instance, was the first city in Latin America to establish its own domain on the internet (.rio). In addition, municipalities act according to their historical, social, and political roots. This is quite evident in the twinning agreements between cities, where cultural compacts are made, as well as technical cooperation projects and training programmes, among other things. The largest number of agreements between twin cities involves European cities, especially those in France and Portugal. The adoption of express bus corridors in Porto Alegre is one of several examples that illustrate the results of the decentralised diplomacy of cities. Nowadays, this bus system is quite common in Brazilian cities and abroad, but it was kick-started in the national territory thanks to a pioneering agreement with the city of Paris,

which had just started to implement it at home. The agreement was so well received that Rio de Janeiro Mayor's Office, in conjunction with the Rio state government, followed Porto Alegre's strategy and went to Paris to study the public bicycle system, and this has since been set up in some of Rio's neighbourhoods too.

PARADIPLOMACY IN THE AMERICAS

Municipalities in Latin America which participate in decentralised diplomacy, in %, in 2011



Source: CNM, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014

SEE ALSO:

Brazil-USA relations p. 18
 Development and industrialisation p. 20
 International action of federated states p. 66
 Argentina p. 88

Main Brazilian multinationals

If one looks at foreign policy as public policy, the role of business companies definitely has to be taken into consideration as one of its essential variables. Every foreign policy - BFP among them - has its roots in a certain political economy. Firstly, although firms are not primarily responsible for conducting foreign policy, there is no doubt that decision-makers in the Brazilian government take into account the private sector's interests when formulating foreign policy guidelines. Secondly, by operating abroad both in developed and developing countries, companies can affect Brazil's image in a positive or negative way. Business companies also defend their interests when it comes to internationalisation and economic integration.

The major Brazilian companies are very influential, not only internationally but also at the level of domestic politics (e.g. financing of electoral campaigns, lobbying in Congress and in State Legislative Assemblies, setting up social responsibility projects). Usually, the largest national companies are


also the ones most fully equipped to engage in international action. Due to their size, they move large amounts of capital and generate numerous jobs. This must be kept in mind in order to understand why Brazilian politicians often create political conditions favourable to the growth of these companies. When companies exhibit an increase in productivity, it is very likely that the national GDP and job creation will also be affected. In addition, these companies' directors usually have access to key decision-makers in Brazilian politics, either informally or at the institutions' invitation. Many politicians and the senior directors of Brazilian companies know each other personally, have attended the same schools, were colleagues at university, go to the same social events, etc. This establishes an informal communication channel between the private initiative and high-level politicians, allowing companies to express their wishes and to make requests, influencing - albeit through informal means - the formulation of public policies in Brazil, and foreign policy among them.

The internationalisation of the country's companies is of great interest both to the Brazilian economy and to its politics; in a globalised economy, it is crucial that Brazilian firms contribute to the country's integration therein. The internationalisation of national private capital can mean its strengthening, bring prestige to Brazil, create jobs, and facilitate trade agreements. It can also pave the way for arrangements that make trading easier, create consumer markets for Brazilian products, as well as technical cooperation agreements. When they operate abroad, companies are also looking to absorb new technologies, adapt to new realities, and thus gain expertise through the exchange of specialised knowledge with other countries, cultures, and technologies.

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, there is a complementary relationship - sometimes a contradictory one too - between the internationalisation of Brazilian firms and Brazil's international cooperation for development policy. The country's cooperation policy can contribute to the internationalisation of Brazilian companies, because it creates a port of entry into other countries. Quite often, national businesses establish themselves in other countries by taking advantage of the communication channels set up by Brazilian diplomacy within the cooperation framework. The Brazilian government also benefits when companies take on the development of various infrastructure projects abroad, and fund social responsibility projects such as building schools, day care centres, and hospitals.

MAIN BRAZILIAN COMPANIES IN THE WORLD

Place of activities, per company, in 2014




Sources: Companies' websites, 2014.

Brazil has a considerable number of business companies operating in other countries. In some cases, the company expands internationally through franchises, or closing deals with local investors. But there are also those that open subsidiaries and operations in other countries. The greatest number of Brazilian companies acting internationally is to be found in the service sector. These services are quite varied; they may be dedicated to economic and commercial consultancy, the logistics sector, or services related to marketing and internet use, among others. However, the businesses most visible to society in general are those in heavy industry, contractors, and the extractive industry. Vale (formerly Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, privatised in 1997) is one of the most active mining companies in the world and has operations in nearly all the continents. Petrobras, a mixed-capital firm controlled by government, is also one of the most active companies internationally. In addition to being competitive in the oil field, the company has developed a deep-water drilling technology that gives it the edge over its competitors. This is one of the reasons why Petrobras has a strong presence in some coastal countries, such as Angola. Outside the extractive sector there is also a considerable cluster of Brazilian companies that open factories and shops in other countries. Vulcabras|Azaleia is a good example: one of its brands sponsors football clubs in Argentina, in addition to the Brazilian volleyball team. One of Alpargatas' brands, Havaianas, has achieved enormous success in the international market for sandals, and its most distinguishing feature is the Brazilian flag used as detail on a strap of the footwear.


BRAZILIAN COMPANIES IN THE WORLD

Amount of companies by sector, in 2014



BRAZILIAN COMPANIES INTERNATIONALISATION

The 35 companies with the highest internationalisation index, in 2013



*The index considers relations between the domestic and the international in three areas: amount of assets, volume of revenues and number of employees.
Source: Fundação Dom Cabral, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

Although the internationalisation of its firms creates great opportunities for Brazil, it also raises challenges and produces contradictions. The activities of some companies (especially in the extractive sector) can cause impacts and be regarded as predatory by the society of the country in which they operate. Despite the fact that firms are neither representatives of the Brazilian government nor of the country as a whole, the criticisms levelled at them also end up reflecting on the country's image abroad. Complaints about the violation of labour regulations, for instance, have targeted the work sites of Brazilian contractors abroad, thus damaging the credibility of the official Brazilian discourse, based on the quest for a more equitable development. In South America, the actions of Petrobras in Bolivia, and Odebrecht in Ecuador (both with funding from the BNDES) have been criticised by public opinion and by the governments of both countries. By the very nature of its activities, Vale's operations abroad cause significant environmental impacts, along with social impacts such as the removal of families from prospecting areas. For this reason, the "Affected by

Vale" movement that exists in Brazil became very strong in Mozambique as well.

The international action of companies is a reality strategically supported by the government, but it does not generate positive impacts only. Therefore, it should also be seen as a challenge to the national image. Brazil tries to depict itself as a country that practices solidarity diplomacy, concerned with fair and equitable development models. It is not yet clear whether, and how, Brazilian companies' operations abroad may be included in this discourse. Since firms are not limited in their international actions by a regulatory or ethical rule book, it would appear that their attitudes resemble those of other globalised companies within the international system's framework, whose political economy is capitalism itself.

SEE ALSO:

Brazil-USA relations p. 18
Development and industrialisation p. 20
Organisations and social movements p. 72
Energy and integration p. 92

Non-governmental organisations and social movements

The past few decades have witnessed the growing complexity of transnational politics and of cross-border activism. The emergence and articulation of social actors who operate at different scales (from the local to the global, through the national and the regional), often at the same time, are now a reality. Transnational solidarities are being redefined. The anti- and alter-globalisation movements, the transnational advocacy organisations, the Zapatista movement or, more recently, the various protests around the world have forged a global

geopolitics of networks. In this new scenario, social movements spawning alliances, new agendas and areas of activity, as well as exerting various forms of political impact - many of which have direct or indirect repercussions on states' foreign policies - are increasingly numerous.

The Brazilian case is paradigmatic. Brazilian social actors enjoy a very active, extended and diverse civil society; they exhibit various forms of internationalisation and a wide range of cooperation models, as well as many

ways of expressing social conflict. Some of them are more centralised, operating primarily through strategic coalitions and by mobilising sector expertise. Others are more polycentric; they value ties of affinity and the translation of daily life experiences into opinion-forming processes, demands, agendas and forms of action.


Still on the subject of typologies: some social actors - those closer to the Itamaraty, governments, and institutions - try to influence government regulations and information regimes, and to participate in the decision-making processes of issues relevant to the country's future or policy reform. Other social actors are more oriented towards rupture than dialogue, and usually enjoy less proximity to the decision-making bodies of Brazilian diplomacy; they tend to influence foreign policy in a more exogenous and indirect manner, through actions that highlight the contradictions of Brazilian conduct abroad. Together, the chart on the evolution of Brazilian non-governmental organisations granted consultative status at the UN, and the map on the World Social Forum evidence two distinct patterns within an even greater diversity of actors and forms of internationalisation of organisations and social movements.

Brazilians social actors are pivotal to political and social democratisation; they take part in regional and global networks and have multiple cooperation projects abroad. However, they are not always recognised by Brazilian foreign policy; this creates a paradox, considering their international integration and how influential social actors are in domestic public policies.

In Brazil, this issue is at the heart of debates on foreign policy where social organisations demand greater participation as a means to democratise it - because it is increasingly seen as public policy. The establishment of advisory councils is a step in the right direction as it lets the voice of organisations be heard within the institutional environment during decision-making, and thus have an impact on agenda setting. However, it is equally essential to create bonds with citizens and social movements - inside and outside institutional


NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

NGOs with consultative status in the UN, between 1946 and 2012



WORLD SOCIAL FORUM

Host cities for the World Social Forum and related events, 2001-2014



and national boundaries, through information and awareness campaigns, and transnational networks that make room for the exchange of expertise and the socialisation of knowledge and practices, in order to improve living conditions and social justice. Therefore, the changes in the field of international cooperation for development do pose some challenges, but also some interesting possibilities not fully explored yet for extending these transnational solidarities.

The dynamics of international cooperation among actors, agendas, and projects are complemented by initiatives aimed at protesting and denouncing instead. Natural resources, the defence of common goods, land and the territory are at the heart of many socio-political conflicts in contemporary Latin America; given their geostrategic character, they are essential to the definition of foreign policy, touching upon some core tensions regarding national sovereignty, life, development models, and the states' consistency in their domestic and external performances.


These conflicts operate transversely and in various scales. Hence some high-profile transnational networks of social movements - such as the World March of Women and the Via Campesina - build global political coalitions, actions, campaigns and agendas that are simultaneously associated with social practices and local connections. It is important to highlight the territorialisation aspect of conflict and resistance; in other words, however much conflicts may be localised, they are not necessarily localist. This is the case of rural conflicts, specifically, where local and national actors forge regional and global interfaces. Via Campesina, for example, has become a prominent actor both by its ability to articulate movements and grassroots organisations, as well as to influence in specialist forums, contesting the meanings and directions of agricultural, food, and trade policies at both the internal and external levels.

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28
Water: vital resource p. 36
Poverty and inequality p. 44
Social networks and regional integration p. 96

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

World March of Women, in 2013



Source: World March of Women website, 2014.


Via Campesina, in 2013



Source: Via Campesina website, 2013.


RURAL CONFLICTS

Conflicts by federated state




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2014.

Families involved in conflicts



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2014.

Rural conflicts over time



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2014.

Labundo, 2014

Religious actors

RELIGIONS OF AFRICAN ORIGIN

Internationalisation since 1950



Brazilian religious movements have evolved through dynamic networks of international interactions that go far beyond the hierarchical bonds with their head offices abroad (such as the Vatican for Catholics). In the case of the Christian religions, they actively participate in missionary movements and try to evangelise across borders and win new followers, thus posing new challenges and contradictions to foreign policy. While contemporary spiritual doctrines are eminently universalist (i.e. anyone could be a member of any religion), religious practices entertain special relations with ethnic and national identities, social classes, and other variables such as age, gender, and rural or urban contexts. Therefore, demographic characteristics definitely influence not only the profile of the group of followers, but also their leaders' strategies in strengthening the community and attracting new followers. Some religious actors develop evangelisation strategies through transnational networks, aiming to expand their communities, but this process increases the complexity of the recipient countries' religious panorama at the same time.


Foreign missionary groups, such as some US evangelical groups, have been working in Brazil for decades. Presbyterian missionaries have operated in Brazil since the 19th century, and even before that there were some isolated Protestant experiences, like the French Calvinists who occupied Maranhão and Rio de Janeiro in the 16th century, or the Dutch along the Northeastern coast in the 17th century. However, one of the most influential religious phenomena in the global scene is the missionaryism undertaken by Brazilians. It used to be a task traditionally performed by Catholics, but it is now being surpassed in volume by evangelical groups. Brazil is nowadays the second largest exporter of missionaries in the world, just behind the US.

It is estimated that around 34,000 Brazilian Christians went abroad on a religious mission in 2010, a 70% increase in comparison with the figure in 2000. With the decline of Europe and the stagnation of the United States regarding their share in the total number of Christians in the world, the importance of countries of the South, especially in Africa and Asia, has grown considerably. Clearly, the new frontier for Christianity's expansion today is to be found in developing countries.


The Catholic Church encourages the movement of missionaries abroad through the National Missionary Council (COMINA) and the Missionary Cultural Centre in Brasília, which carry out training courses for those willing to work beyond the national borders. The missionary experiences of evangelical groups also have great impact on international relations: more than 70 of them evangelise outside Brazil. Their work abroad combines the evangelisation of foreigners and the provision of assistance to Brazilians, relying on a large media network of radios, TV channels, books, and newspapers. The UCKG, in particular, carries out humanitarian actions abroad, especially in Africa, where it distributes food and condoms to help in the fight against AIDS. Portuguese-speaking African countries are going through a recent phenomenon of religious conversion from Catholic practices to evangelical cults. In May 2013, the Angolan government banned the majority of Brazilian evangelical churches from working in the country. They have been accused of being a "business" and engaging in "false advertising". The UCKG was the only one recognised by the state and it functions under the supervision of various ministries; it had 230 temples in Angola and approximately 500,000 followers. The power of the

MISSIONARY

Main countries of origin, in 2010



Main countries of destination, in 2010




Source: Centre for the Study of Global Christianity, 2013.

Labmundo, 2014

UNIVERSAL CHURCH OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Institutional presence worldwide, in 2013



UCKG Media outside Brazil

TV	Radio	Magazines and newspapers
Angola	Angola	Angola
France	Argentina	Argentina
Italy	Ecuador	Ecuador
Mozambique	France	Italy
Portugal	Italy	Mozambique
South Africa	Mozambique	Portugal
Uganda	Portugal	South Africa
United Kingdom	United Kingdom	USA
Uruguay		
USA		

*Selected cases, including online versions

Sources: Universal Church website, 2014; Freston, 1999.

Brazilian Gospel Churches abroad

- Universal Church of the Kingdom of God
- International Grace of God Church
- God is Love Pentecostal Church
- World Church of the Power of God
- Reborn in Christ Church
- Sara Nossa Terra
- Igreja do Caminho
- Some Brazilian ministries of Assembly of God

... and at least other 70 religious groups

Source: Nascimento, 2004.

Labmundo, 2014

evangelical parliamentary wing in the Brazilian Congress and the internationalisation process of many of these churches point to the possibility that, in the future, there may be even more pressure on Brazilian diplomacy to work in favour of the freedom of action of these groups abroad.

The representatives of African-based religions also work on the promotion of their beliefs abroad, particularly in the Southern Cone. The state of Rio Grande do Sul, where a number of the followers of Afro-Brazilian religions are concentrated, acts as a platform for the international diffusion of these faiths, contributing to the opening of *terreiros* (temples) in Argentina and Uruguay. In this process, the cities of Santana do Livramento and Uruguiana (both in Rio Grande do Sul), and the cities of Paso de los Libres (Argentina) and Rivera (Uruguay) have served as links between the two sides and contributed to the spread of Afro-Brazilian religions in the Southern region. These exchanges are not new, having started in the 1930s; but it was during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s that the transnationalisation process was consolidated.


Up until then, Argentines and Southern Brazilians sought for religious knowledge in the centre of Brazil. From the 1980s onwards, *pais de santo* (priests) from Rio Grande do Sul began to visit the two neighbouring countries. In the 1990s there were already Uruguayan and Argentinian *pais* and *mães de santo* (priests and priestesses) with links to their peers in Rio Grande do Sul, and subject also to other influences: from Rio de Janeiro, Africa, and Cuba. In addition, various religious leaders, particularly from Salvador and São Paulo, make a point of returning to Africa in search of their belief's primary energy, in an effort that some researchers call "re-Africanisation" or "desyncratisation", which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although there were some signs of it in the 1930s. One of the most common destinations for candomblecists of the Yoruba strand is Yorubaland, the Yoruba people's cultural homeland situated in Nigeria, which has religious roots similar to Brazilian *candomblé*.

The impact that these religious and cultural exchanges may have on BFP should be investigated. What

relevance can the new religious actors, through their political networks, hold for BFP's agenda? This is an open question for future research programmes. Throughout the course of history, Brazilian foreign policy has associated its policies of approximation with Africa to practices of cultural diplomacy and educational cooperation, thereby presenting Brazil as a place where African deities are also celebrated. Thus Bahia and other regions of the country, with their Afro-Brazilian religiosity, would be a bridge between two worlds. It is interesting to note that, recently, these credentials have also been used in relation to Caribbean countries, as in the case of voodoo in Haiti.

FAITH CONTROL

Restrictions on religion by country, in 2014



Source: Pew Research Institute. 2014.

Labmundo, 2014


SEE ALSO:

- Culture and soft-power p. 50
- Religious pluralism p. 56
- Brazilians abroad p. 76
- Social networks and regional integration p. 96

Brazilians abroad

BRAZILIAN MIGRANTS ABROAD

In thousand persons per country of residence, in 2010




Sources: IBGE, 2010b; IOM, 2010.

Labmundo, 2014

Brazil has historically been considered a nation of immigrants, a fact that has contributed to its social, political and economic development. Only recently has the direction of migration flows started to be reversed, mainly from the 1980s onwards as the number of Brazilians who live abroad has grown - even if it is still small in relation to the total population (less than 1%). In 1990, 493,934 Brazilians migrated, especially to Paraguay (21%), the US (19%), and Japan (11%). In 2000, 975,986 left, the majority of which (73%) went to developed countries (Japan, 26 %, and the US, 23%) and to Paraguay (9%). In 2013, a total of 1,768,980 Brazilians migrated, 79% of them to developed countries. In 2013, the US (21%) and Japan (21%) remained as priority destinations, followed by European countries and, for the first time, China (7%). As regards the composition of these migratory flows, the majority comes from the middle classes, and women account for an increasing share of the total numbers. In addition to the general data, it is important to emphasise the place that Brazil occupies in international routes of trafficking of women.

BRAZIL AND MAIN MIGRATION FLOWS

Emigration and immigration in million persons, in 2011




Source: World Bank, 2011.

Labmundo, 2014

The configuration of migratory systems focuses on the choice of destination: the search for better employment and life opportunities leads Brazilians to the rich countries, especially the US and Europe, whereas the prior existence of migration flows between Japan and Brazil explains the weight of this country among Brazilian migrants, many of them of Japanese origin (the *dekassegui*). As for Paraguay, it is clearly a case of border migration, by the so-called *brasiguaios*.

MIGRANTS

Balance of migrants in million persons, in 2011






Source: World Bank, 2011.

Labmundo, 2014

The stability of the Brazilian migratory system can also be explained by the establishment of transnational networks that support migrants by facilitating their social integration in the country of arrival. The Itamaraty has identified hundreds of Brazilian associations abroad that not only help the exchange of information on housing or employment among the newly emigrated, but also the development of cultural, religious, economic, and political practices, serving of interlocution with governments. Some of these transnational practices stand out: the organisation of participation and political representation in defence of migrant rights, as well as the sending of remittances to the places of origin - a

REMITTANCES FOR BRICS


Evolution of received remittances, between 1990 and 2010 (in billion dollars, current prices)



Source: World Bank, 2011.

BRAZIL AND MAIN REMITTANCE FLOWS


Inbound and outbound, in 2011



Source: World Bank, 2011.

REMITTANCES

Balance of remittances in thousand dollars, in 2011



Source: World Bank, 2011.

financial flow that can have a major impact on their development.

In 2012, Brazil received \$2,582,640,313 dollars in remittances (from the United States, Japan, Spain, Portugal, and Paraguay, mainly), placing itself as the second largest recipient in the region, just behind Mexico, with more than \$23 billion dollars. In total, the main recipients worldwide were India (almost \$69 billion) and China (almost \$40 billion). It is also worth noting

how dependent in relative terms some countries are on these resources: e.g. Tajikistan (48% of its GDP), Kyrgyzstan (31%), Lesotho and Nepal (25% each).

The crisis has impacted the contours of migratory flows, placing Brazil as the main destination of European immigrants, mainly Portuguese, and changing the direction of remittances along this corridor - from the South to the North. The country is also attractive to migrants from countries of the global South, who are much less numerous but suffer with much more media visibility, as is the case of Haitians. These changes affect the debate on migration legislation: until recently, the agenda was marked by the defence of the rights of Brazilians abroad and the contributions of immigrants to national development. Nowadays the political debate revolves around the guarantee of foreigners' human rights in Brazil; this is what happened during the First National Conference on Migration and Refuge (COMIGRAR), where changes in the Law on Foreigners were advocated, and attention was drawn to

the working conditions of Bolivians in São Paulo, and the situation of Haitians in Acre.

The link between migration and development, and the tragic consequences of inadequate migratory policies experienced by Brazilian migrants in the last decade, suggest that governments (at federal and state levels) should be especially attentive to the collective and rational management of migratory flows, in order to encourage the advantages and reduce the problems of integration, discrimination and human insecurity faced by migrants. Signing the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families would be a first step to demonstrate the Brazilian government's commitment to migrants' rights and improving their life situation.

HAITIANS TOWARDS BRAZIL

Haitian migration routes to Brazil, in 2014



Source: Fernandes et al., 2014.

SEE ALSO:

- Culture and soft-power p. 50
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Research centres and universities

Data from Unesco indicates that between 2000 and 2007 there was a 50% increase in the number of students enrolled in higher education globally, and it estimates that by 2050 approximately eight million students will be taking HE courses outside of their own country. The OECD data for 2010 registers roughly 3.2 million international students around the world. Just in Latin America there were more than 23 million university students in 2007, according to Unesco, with more than 50% of them concentrated in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. These numbers show a global market not only for higher education services, estimated by the


OECD at around 40 billion dollars, but also in the field of academic research. The trend is facilitated by low transportation and communication costs, rising international migration, and the growth of private funding for the sector. In addition to the strategic value it holds for states – because it is closely associated to the formation of elites and laying down lasting transnational links among individuals and societies – the field of higher education and research has become a strategic economic venture, prompting interest in international regulation as the market opens to private groups from the US, the United Kingdom, France and, increasingly, Australia.

States are active in this field mainly by opening their universities' doors to foreign students and awarding various types of grants. Although Brazil still occupies a very modest position in this international race, it offers two large institutional scholarship programmes: PEC-G (for undergraduates) and PEC-PG (for postgraduates). As regards PEC-G, Brazil awarded approximately 7,700 grants between 2000 and 2013, 73% of which were to citizens from Portuguese-speaking African countries and 15% to Latin Americans. In the case of the PEC-PG, there were 1,880 grants between 2000 and 2012, 70% of them for Latin Americans and 20% for students from PALOP. The federal government has recently opened two universities expressly oriented towards international cooperation: UNILA, in 2008, and Unilab, in 2010.


Brazil turns out approximately 12,000 PhD graduates per year. Public investment priorities in HE are directed towards areas such as nanotechnology, digital TV, national defence, engineering, management, health and marine sciences, mainly through the Science without Borders programme, which up to 2013 had awarded more than 38,000 scholarships. The Open University of Brazil (UAB) system aims to expand the country's offer of higher education courses, particularly in teacher training, and presently has about 243,000 students enrolled in it. Some weak points remain, however. One of them regards geographic distribution, as 72% of Masters and 78.7% of PhD programmes are based in the country's South and Southeast regions. The IBGE data for 2010 indicates that the average years of schooling of the Brazilian population aged up to 25 years is only 5.8 years, compared with 12 years in South Korea, 13.3 years in Taiwan, and 13.4 in the US. In Latin America, 27.2% of the young people in Chile (between 17 and 24 years) are at university; in Argentina, it is 26.4% and 19.9% in Uruguay; in Brazil, it is only 13.2%. Moreover, Brazil invests only 1% of GDP in research and development, compared to 3.45% in Japan, 2.79% in the US, and 2.82% in Germany.

SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION


H Index of scientific papers published between 1996 and 2012, by country*



Scientific productivity in Brazil between 1996 and 2012



Evolution of scientific production in Brazil




Labmundo, 2014

to influence national agendas and policies in the field of higher education and research; this is done through their own institutional policies, indicators, and specific reports. By regulating the patents system, and the circulation of knowledge on the international market, the international intellectual property regime has also created an important interface with the advancement of scientific research, and the methods used for evaluating researchers and academic centres.

Rankings are used to show the comparative position of institutions as a whole, or certain aspects of their performance; they have also been used as benchmarking devices that confer international visibility to universities and research centres. The most popular ones are the *Academic Ranking of World Universities*, published by Shanghai's Jiao Tong University since 2003, and the *Times Higher Education Supplement* (THES) World University Rankings, started in 2004. Then there is *Webometrics*, an internet-based ranking of world universities.

UNIVERSITIES AROUND THE WORLD

150 best ranking universities, in 2013




There are doubts concerning the objectivity of these categorisation systems, but they have become indicators of research performance and academic prestige - including for obtaining international funding. The Brazilian universities that often come up among the world's 500 best are USP, Unicamp, UFMG, UFRJ, UNESP and UFRGS (according to Shanghai's ranking system). In the 2013 ranking, USP appears among the top 150, while UFRJ, UFMG, UNESP and Unicamp are among the top 400 and UFRGS among the top 500. In the *THES* top 200, only USP makes an appearance: it is in 175th place in 2007 and 196th in 2008, but no Brazilian university is listed in 2009 and 2010. According to that same ranking, in 2013 USP comes up among the top 250, and Unicamp among the top 350. On the other hand, *Webometrics* data from May 2014 puts USP in 29th place, UFRGS in 206th, UFSC in 235th, UFRJ in 240th, Unicamp in 335th, UFMG in 354th and UNESP in 373th. According to the same ranking but for the Latin American context, in 2014 Brazil had 25 universities among the top 1,000; Mexico had 6, Colombia and Argentina had 3 each; among the BRICS, China had 106 universities in the top 1,000 list; India had 4, Russia 8, and South Africa 6.

According to the Scimago Institutions Ranking, which assesses publication and citation numbers in the Scopus database, in 2012 Brazil occupied 13th place in the global scientific productivity table. This position puts it behind developed countries such as the US, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, but also lagging behind some developing countries and emerging powers: in


that same year, China came 2nd while India was 7th. In the Latin American context, however, Brazil stands out. According to the same source, Mexico appeared in 31st place, Argentina in 40th and Chile in 46th. The number of scientific papers published by Brazilians represents 54% of the total published in Latin America and 2.63% of those published worldwide. Therefore, the role of academic research in the projection of Brazil's soft power is beyond doubt.

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR FOREIGNERS

Scholarships granted by the Brazilian government, between 2000 e 2012




Scholarships granted by the Brazilian government, by origin of students, between 2000 e 2012



Sources: PEC-G, 2013; PEC-PG, 2013.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Top 10 world production of hardware and software, in 2013



Source: Associação Brasileira de Empresas de Software, 2013.

Regional participation of Brazilian production in 2013



Source: Associação Brasileira de Empresas de Software, 2013.

SEE ALSO:

Industrial complex p. 30
Minerals and mining p. 38
Regional integration projects p. 82
Higher education and student exchanges p. 114

Chapter 4:

SOUTH AMERICA: BRAZIL'S GEOGRAPHICAL DESTINY?






The geographical location of a country is not a matter of choice, but the direction and the content of its relations with neighbouring countries are. The permeability of borders, greatly reinforced by advancements in telecommunications, transport and global technologies, encourages financial flows, as well as the trade in goods and services and - although in a different manner - the flow of people. These same factors have strengthened Brazil's physical, economic, cultural and social proximity to its neighbours. South American regional dynamics is based on friendship and cooperation, but it also has some rivalries and conflicts at its roots; this results in an environment built according to historical, economic, political, physical, and security peculiarities. There is a large asymmetry between Brazil and the other countries in South America, which generates some paradoxes for its foreign policy. An analysis of the choices made by Brazil in relation with its neighbours, as well as the region's importance in its foreign policy agendas reveals that there is no consensus yet within Brazilian society about which direction to take, or what should the priorities be regarding Brazil's integration in the region. Actions by civil society and business, as well as initiatives by national and subnational governments to act jointly in various areas (education, health, defence and infrastructure), demonstrate the region's relevance, but some key questions about the neighbouring countries' perception of Brazil's regional leadership remain without an answer.

Integration projects in the Americas

INTEGRATION PROJECTS IN THE AMERICAS: DISPUTES AND RESISTANCES

Regional institutions in 2014



For a long period of its history, Brazil was not very enthusiastic about regional integration. Its economic model (i.e. export of products to Europe and the US) and the linguistic factor (it is the only Portuguese-speaking country in the region) contributed to that lack of enthusiasm. It all began to change as a Latin American school of thought based on the theory of dependency, and on a new understanding of centre-periphery relations, grew in importance. There was an intense exchange of ideas among Brazilian scholars and their peers in the region and in other countries, and together they created a rich and truly original theoretical

framework built from the developing world's point of view. Grounded in an analysis of the "deterioration in the terms of trade" phenomenon, they argued that countries exporting industrialised goods add more value to their trade than those selling primary products. This difference tends to deepen over time, which led the proponents of this approach to denounce the failures of traditional economic thought, which focuses on the comparative advantages of nations.

Dependentista thinking was fostered by ECOSOC's creation of the CEPAL. The latter pointed out that one

of the major economic problems of Latin America was the limited economic integration among its countries, and suggested that they should try to create complementarity in their production chains in order to strengthen regional trade. The idea was to create a mass market for large-scale production within Latin American countries, so that they could produce and export industrialised goods, thus breaking the logic of deterioration in the terms of trade. The Treaty of Montevideo, signed in February 1960, gave rise to the ALALC: its goal was the establishment of a free-trade area among Latin American countries. The ALALC was an answer to CEPAL's call for the creation of mechanisms of economic cooperation among the countries of the continent in order to bolster their business and pave the way to development.

However, the ALALC did not prosper, for economic and political reasons both domestic and systemic. It came up against several divergent opinions among its member states and, as a result, was replaced in 1980 by the ALADI. In comparison with its predecessor, the ALADI had less ambitious goals. In order to decrease the tensions caused by the different views among Latin American countries, it abandoned the idea of creating a free-trade area and advocated instead economic preference agreements between the countries of the region. Thus the 1980 organisation can be considered an "umbrella" agreement for other smaller economic integration agreements, presenting itself as a more flexible alternative in comparison with the ALALC. Some current economic agreements were signed within the framework of the ALADI, including the Mercosur. This institutional format, marked by flexibility, has contributed to the emergence of other regional integration processes such as CARICOM and the CAN. Mexico was the odd one out, as it made a preferential option for economic ties with North America and became a member of NAFTA.

The economic integration process in Latin America faces enormous challenges. The actions often taken by the US are one of them. Inspired by the creation of NAFTA, the US sought to expand that model and to establish ALCA, which was meant to include all the countries of the American

INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE AMERICAS

Regional institutions in 2014



continent (except Cuba) in a free-trade zone. ALCA offered its member countries the opportunity to reach the coveted American market. On the other hand, the Mexican example showed that, given the existing asymmetries, an agreement with the US would also create distortions in domestic economies. The ALCA agreement would weaken the regional integration blocs, and possibly bring about the deindustrialisation of national economies as they withstood competition from US products. Aware of these opportunities and challenges, Brazil and other countries agreed to open negotiations although some did so with great caution. Brazil led the negotiations along with the US and, according to the then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, it did everything in its power to over-extend the negotiation deadlines, until the proposal was permanently abandoned.

The US interests became quite evident during the negotiations about ALCA. It was hoping for a bloc in the same mould as NAFTA, i.e. including agreements on intellectual property, government procurement and services, but treating as sensitive the issues of liberalisation of the agricultural sector and the restriction of subsidies. As the ALCA negotiations stalled, the US has adopted the alternative strategy of negotiating several free-trade agreements

directly with each country or bloc. It is also favourable to “open regionalism” types of agreement, such as the Pacific Alliance (oriented towards trade with Asia). The US advances have been met with resistance, as demonstrated in the maintenance of Mercosur (despite many difficulties), the creation of ALBA (thanks to the Venezuelan leadership) and, at the political level, the establishment of UNASUR. The strategic interests of the US are not the only obstacle to integration

processes in the region. China emerges as a new type of threat, as it gradually occupies more space in the trade flows, but also puts the Brazilian leadership in check.

SEE ALSO:

Industrial complex p. 30
Congress, ministries and agencies p. 64
Brazilian multinationals p. 70
Defence and security p. 90

From Latin America to South America

Brazil's national identity has been defined throughout its history by many socially constructed concepts, such as: peaceful, international law abiding, in pursuit of development, Christian, underdeveloped, Third World, Western, American, Iberian-American, Latin American, and South American. In recent years, the aspects focusing on its relations with South America have been emphasised. The regional focus favoured by Brazilian political actors has varied over time. The invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Napoleon's troops led to a process of independence by Portugal and Spain's colonies in the Americas. The formation of new countries, which sprung both from systemic influences and domestic transformations, produced a wide variety of political regimes. Brazil went through a peculiar process, as it ensured its own autonomy by keeping the royal regime. The political order became stable after

the first few decades, which led a sizeable portion of the national elite to distance themselves from the neighbouring countries, seeing as they had adopted republicanism, a regime viewed as inferior, and were going through great instability.


Thus, throughout the 19th century, the country's national identity was formed by contrasting it to that of its neighbours: a monarchy among republics, an island of civilisation in the midst of barbarism, and a Portuguese-speaking world distinct from the Spanish one. During this period, the Americas were seen as a unit, a region different from Europe and under the supervision of the US. The term South America began to appear sparsely in diplomatic documents only several decades later, and was probably a concept dissimilar to the current one, as until the beginning of the 20th century it was common in the US to refer

to South America as the set of countries below the Rio Grande. The concept of Latin America appeared around 1850. The expression only comes up in Brazilian diplomatic documents after the 1890s, when other regional designations also arise, such as Pan-Americanism, Central, South, and North America. This was the moment of transition to the republican regime, which would reduce the sense of Brazilian singularity, distance Brazil from Europe, and help to forge a regional identity still marked by mistrust.

In the first decades of the Republic, the diplomatic discourse deployed the concept of South America primarily in reference to the Southern Cone, in opposition to the US and the region under its direct influence, which often included countries such as Venezuela, Panama and Colombia. The end of the Second World War was followed by frustration of the desire for a special relationship with the US, thus bringing Brazil closer to its Latin American neighbours, through an identity built upon underdevelopment in particular. The creation of CEPAL, of the ALALC, and Juscelino Kubitschek's launch of the Operation Pan-America, a forum of Latin American countries demanding US public resources for regional development, all contributed to that turn.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS

Regional integration organisations in the American continent created between 1945 and 2014, by date of foundation




The US response only came after the Cuban Revolution, with the launch of the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank. After the 1964 coup, Brazil leaned towards identification with the West. However, the country soon returned to an identity oriented towards the Third World and to Latin America. Brazil took on the role of a power “prepared to bear its responsibilities as regards relatively less developed countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally”, in the words of Chancellor Mario Gibson Barbosa. In the 1970s, Brazil’s regional identity was reinforced by growing frictions with the United States and by the oil crisis. Re-democratisation intensified this orientation, enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution since then, which sets regional integration and the formation of a community of Latin American nations as goals. Rivalries with Argentina were overcome, thus opening the way to the creation of Mercosur, one of Brazil’s mainstays as far as its international identity is concerned.

A properly South American outlook is a recent phenomenon that started in the 1980s, was further pursued in the 1990s, and more decisively bolstered during the Lula government. South America came to be seen as an area having greater legitimacy for a regional leadership project. In addition, it was felt that Latin America had lost its legitimacy as a region, after Mexico’s decision to sign into NAFTA in 1994. Within this context, Brazilian diplomacy worked to retrieve the concept of South America during Ambassador Celso Amorim’s first term as Chancellor, initially by proposing a free-trade area in the region (the ALCSA). Whereas this diplomatic priority had been much weakened during FHC’s government (despite it having organised the first meetings ever of South American heads of state, in 2000 and 2002), it became a distinguishing trait of the next government. The Secretariat of South America at the Itamaraty was established during the Lula government, followed by the creation of UNASUR in 2008.

Regional cooperation efforts were marked by an emphasis on the economy, notably in the 1990s, but during the Lula government new spheres were strengthened, such as the social, cultural, and defence dimensions; and the

FROM ALALC TO ALADI

Latin American Integration, between 1960 and 2014



political scope proper of integration, with special attention to presidential diplomacy. The Itamaraty and the Office of International Affairs of the Presidency worked together to this end. The emphasis on South America took place in tandem with a new regional turn, which reversed a past of low activity in the area. Today, South America is one of the major axes of Brazilian international integration, and regional cooperation has already been defined by the then President Lula as the “centre” of foreign policy. The strengthening of the region has been pursued as an alternative axis of power in an increasingly multipolar world order. Regional crises were dealt with through local forums, avoiding US intervention. The asymmetries within the region were acknowledged, new agendas were empowered (e.g. the Structural Convergence Fund- FOCEN), and the integration process in South America began to be seen as a starting point for Brazil’s new international integration.

The construction of a regional multilateral framework also helps to consolidate an apparently more cohesive South America region, where Brazil would take on a leadership role in the coordination and production of common goods such as economic development, infrastructural integration, and political stability. Instead of a free-trade area of the Americas, Brazil supported a proposal for the rapprochement of the Mercosur and the Andean Community projects. Instead of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation project (as Argentina tried to do in 1990), it has proposed the construction of a local South American forum in the field of defence and security, and the development of UNASUR, to the

detriment of the Organisation of American States.

Such alternatives point to South America as a high priority space for BFP, even though there is no consensus among political representatives and members of the Brazilian elite about this leadership. There is also criticism regarding Brazil’s inadequacy to afford the economic and political costs of an asymmetric integration.

The regional multilateral system includes a large variety of organisms, presidential summits and forums for consultation. The ALBA has a relevant Central American and Caribbean focus. The Alliance of the Pacific is oriented towards Asian markets.

Today, in addition to a renewed interest in its surroundings, Brazil shows a more complex understanding of its spaces for integration. In addition to South America, the Brazilian diplomatic rhetoric has been signalling the emergence of new coalitions and international articulations, such as South-South cooperation, the BRICS, the IBAS Forum, the ASA and ASPA Summits, as well as the CPLP, all of which can complement, or compete with, the Brazilian project of regional leadership.


SEE ALSO:

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Presidential diplomacy p. 62
Asymmetries and inequalities p. 94

Integration in South America

DIFFERENT INTEGRATION MODELS

Situation in 2014



Mercosur was born of the rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina, as they decided to create programmes of cooperation and productive complementarity between the two largest economies of South America at the time. The Asunción Treaty was signed in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, inaugurating one of the most ambitious and complex integration projects of the Americas. However, it was still unclear whether two


developing countries and historical rivals could lead a process of economic and political integration. This fact evoked distrust in the international community and uncertainty among members of the bloc. Initially, Mercosur had low institutional density; the rationale was that it would make no sense to create various norms and bureaucratic rules which might stifle it. According to this logic, Mercosur should be left to develop freely until it reached institutional maturity and a normative overhaul became necessary. As the country was the most relevant one in economic, demographic and territorial terms, the Brazilian government expressed its preference for a model of open regionalism, capable of creating domestic and regional stability, and of reintegrating Brazil and Argentina into world politics and economy. Paraguay and Uruguay, on the other hand, saw the bloc as an opportunity to ensure economic growth and access to investments.

The first years of Mercosur proved to be a great success both in economic and institutional terms. In addition to a significant increase in trade among member states, everything seemed to indicate that the countries had overcome their historical disagreements and were looking to cooperate for development. However, this period of

euphoria lasted less than a decade. Various economic and political crises shook the domestic scene of Mercosur member countries, ushering in a time of questioning and uncertainty. In face of the speculative attacks on the Brazilian economy, the Federal government devalued the real in January 1999, thus creating an exchange rate extremely favourable to the export of products to Argentina. As a result, the deficit in the neighbouring country's balance of trade got worse, making it impossible to keep the peso/dollar parity exchange rate. Argentina plunged into an economic crisis that spread to the political arena and contributed to generate institutional instability in the country. During this period, Paraguay was also the scene of an institutional crisis, thus confirming the pessimistic outlook for the Mercosur member countries and, consequently, for the bloc's future. The disparity of interests and perspectives regarding Mercosur became clear. Countries ignored their commitment to joint solutions and began to act ever more unilaterally.

This turbulent scenario has started to show signs of improvement since the dawn of the 21st century. The Brazilian government has embraced the view that it must develop a partner relationship with its neighbours, and this brings forth the vision of a common future for the region. According to this logic, Brazil could only benefit from a politically unified and economically dynamic Southern Cone. In order to achieve this objective, and being aware of its own importance in the region, Brazil should take on the costs necessary for the success of South America's integration process. However, there is no consensus within Brazilian society about this. Efforts have been made to reduce disparities and to create co-operation mechanisms around various

MERCOSUR AND UNASUR CHRONOLOGY



agendas (such as security, social development, and physical integration). Not only is rescuing and strengthening Mercosur one of the priorities of the Brazilian government, but the idea of regional integration is back in favour again. A number of institutional and financial arrangements have been set up, such as FOCEM and MAC. Lastly, Mercosur has been expanded since it was joined by Venezuela - possibly to be followed, as has been announced, by Bolivia.


Today, South American integration faces systemic and regional challenges. The economic growth of China, as well as the US attempts to extend free-trade agreements outside of the WTO's multilateral framework, vie with the integration process. In addition, political and economic instability within the domestic sphere of South American countries creates difficulties for dialogue and cooperation. Finally, the process of regional integration is constantly being questioned in the local scene for commercial and political reasons, revealing a lack of consensus in Brazilian society as regards the economic importance that the region (and especially Mercosur) holds for the country in terms of competitive trade integration. The region is one of the main destinations of industrialised Brazilian products. The Brazilian elite, and large swathes of other South American ones, seem to hesitate about the relevance of the integration project, enticed as they are by the short-term advantages of trade agreements.

SEE ALSO:


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MERCOSUR TRADE


Brazilian trade flows within Mercosur countries between 2000 and 2011




Trade balance among Mercosur member countries between 2007 and 2013 (in billion dollars)



Brazilian exported goods to Mercosur countries, in trillion dollars, between 1989 and 2013



Participation of manufactured goods in Brazilian exports, per countries or regions, in 2013



Source: AliceWeb at MDIC website, 2014.



Argentina: a strategic partnership

It is with Argentina that Brazil has its densest, most complex and contradictory partnership in the international system. The history of this bilateral relationship is marked by comings and goings, political rivalries and economic crises. Also, the gradual construction of a strategic partnership goes against Brazil's traditional low sensitivity for regional themes. The lack of political consensus within Brazilian society about the direction that regional integration should take must equally be taken into account.

The beginning of the 19th century was marked by strong rivalry and by the

build up of a regional balance of power in which even neighbouring Uruguay and Paraguay were involved. The Brazilian political imaginary depicted the other countries in South America as being caudillo-led and disorganised. The interventions in Uruguay's domestic politics are good examples of the dispute between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires to shape the regional order. The Paraguay War happened at a time of consolidation of the Argentinian Republic and the start of greater cooperation with Brazil.

The transition to the Republic in 1889 saw the rise of pro-US feelings,

supported in different ways by figures such as the Baron of Rio Branco and the diplomat Oliveira Lima. However, this new regime still viewed Argentina as the country's greatest potential enemy. Brazil-Argentina bilateral relations were also permeated by US strategic interests. This was made evident by the Brazilian preference for the Roosevelt Corollary to the detriment of the Drago Doctrine.


A relationship based on official cordiality prospered throughout the first half of the 20th century, but suffered deterioration after the Second World War. The economic disparities grew, and the styles of international integration became increasingly distinct. Such inequalities, together with Brazil's internal instability and the changes in its political regime, contributed to an increase in this rivalry.

The Geisel government (Azeredo da Silveira was then Chancellor) was a time of acute estrangement, marked by the crisis around the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam. Brazil was trying to politically restrain Argentina at the time. The Itaipu dispute formally ended in 1979, during the Figueiredo government, thanks to decisive interventions by President Videla and Ambassador Oscar Camilión (in Brasília), and the signing of the Itaipu-Corpus Agreement. The 1980s were marked by rapprochement between the two countries, and by an intense programme of cooperation in which the idea of integrating their production chains and nuclear programmes gained influence. It was also the moment of re-democratisation of state-society relations, and this bilateral reconciliation helped to increase the democratic credentials of both states in their respective strategies of international integration. The Falklands War in 1982, in which Brazil supported Argentina, reinforced this convergence.

TOURISM BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

Top destination cities in Brazil for Argentine tourists, in 2010


Top departure cities of Brazilian tourists to Argentina, via Buenos Aires's airports, in 2010



Sources: CGBA's Tourism Observatory, 2013; SEBRAE/PR, 2010; Ministry of Tourism, 2014.

FOREIGN INVESTORS IN ARGENTINE COMPANIES


FDI in companies based in Argentina, in billion dollars, in 2011



Source: Central Bank of Argentine Republic, 2011.

MAIN INVESTMENTS


Distribution of Brazilian FDI in Argentina, by sector, in 2011 (in %)




Source: Central Bank of Argentine Republic, 2011.

TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

Main products, between 2011 and 2013



Brazilian trade balance with Argentina, in billion dollars



In the 1990s, the nuclear cooperation programme was launched and further progress was made in creating a project of regional economic integration (which provided the basis for Mercosur). In 1997, the two countries declared themselves to be "strategic allies".


Today the bilateral relationship is marked by disparity. Argentina has experienced severe crises and has an

economy dependent on Brazilian trade and investments. It is the fifth largest destination of Brazilian investments abroad, attracted by its strong economic growth recently, and by the devaluation of the peso against the real. Trade flows are marked by the sales of manufactured products, as Argentina is the main market for Brazil's exports of these goods. Recently, Brazilian investors have been worried about economic and legal instability in the neighbouring country. Bilateral trade has been affected by protectionist measures, mainly on the Argentinian side. Brazil-Argentina relations have always been a traditional theme in domestic politics. FIESP recently suggested that, given the difficulties encountered by exporters, it might be worth seeking other markets with demands similar to Argentina's, such as India and South Africa. In the tourism sector, Argentinians visiting Brazil (about 1.7 million in 2012) are more numerous than Brazilians travelling to Argentina (972,668 visitors in 2013), according to their respective Ministries.

The advancement of the bilateral relationship and of the regional project (e.g. Mercosur, UNASUR) has come up against many hurdles, such as the two countries' economic instability, the Argentinian political crises, the international economic depression, and the autonomist bias of Brazilian political and diplomatic thinking. In spite of this, cooperation between Brazil and Argentina has been pivotal in building


TOP 10 INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE

Intra-industry trade index among South-American countries, average between 2003 and 2011



GDP EVOLUTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Brazilian and Argentine GDP, between 1901 and 2001 (in million dollars)



a more peaceful and integrated region. Also, BFP seeks to incorporate Argentina into Brazil's own strategies of international integration, be it as the coordinator of regional integration projects (ex-President Nestor Kirchner was UNASUR's first Secretary-General), or through support for Argentina's participation in international forums such as the financial G-20. Its Argentinian neighbour is traditionally the first destination to be visited by Brazil's President-elect. The Workers' Party governments have widened the spheres of cooperation by diversifying the actors and interests involved in the integration project. The diversification of Brazil's areas of international operation (e.g. the BRICS, IBAS, South-South cooperation) has reconfigured, but not diminished, the importance of Argentina on Brazil's foreign policy agendas.

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- Brazilian Empire p. 16
- Brazil-USA relations p. 18
- International action of the cities p. 68
- Energy and infrastructure p. 92

Defence and security in the region

Created in Salvador, Bahia in December 2008, around six months after the signing of the treaty that established UNASUR, the South-American Defence Council (CDS) is the most relevant expression of the growing cooperation among countries in the region in this domain. Its creation also reveals the strategic importance of South America to Brazil, as it is the Council's main advocate. It is not a military alliance (along the lines of NATO, for example), nor is it the first case of regional cooperation in the defence and security sphere. In the past, many other regions have developed mechanisms for the resolution of border conflicts, to combat terrorism, and for collective action against armed insurgencies and separatism, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE (1994), the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group – ECOMOG (1990), or the African Standby Force (2003).

The region's strategic importance for Brazil is reflected in the current National Defence Policy, launched in 2008 and revised in 2012. In its official documents on strategy and policy, the Brazilian Ministry of Defence reiterates that security is the condition in which the state, society and


individuals feel free from risks, pressures or threats - including extreme need. Defence, in turn, is considered to be the effective action necessary to secure or maintain the desired level of security. It is worth noting that, according to the Brazilian state's official documents, South America and the South Atlantic are seen as strategic settings with which the country ought to intensify its cooperation links. In the case of South America, it is a region free of nuclear weapons, considered to be relatively peaceful, and it is currently undergoing processes of institutional consolidation and integration; these are elements that help to increase mutual trust and to find negotiated solutions to conflicts.

In the defence field - certainly one of the greyest areas of state politics - cooperation fulfils a truly strategic role in building common views about the threats perceived both within and outside the region. Therefore, as a body that promotes the circulation of information, the Council contributes directly to settling differences within the region, as well as facilitating convergent multilateral positions. Within the framework of democratic and law-abiding states, this approach can contribute to learning from the region's historical experiences with dictatorships. In this process, the regional dialogue between civilians and the military is a key element.

Integration also makes regional military cooperation possible, as well as the integration of the industrial base of defence. Moreover, integration in the field of defence has a crucial geopolitical dimension. In contrast to the Inter-American system of security, which includes the United States in relations with Latin American countries, the CDS' mandate is more focused on the promotion of dialogue among all South American countries in a forum that encourages policy coordination,


MILITARY SPENDING BY CONTINENT

Evolution of military spending per country, between 1988 and 2012 (in billion dollars)



Source: SIPRI, 2014b.


Evolution of military spending in the region by countries between 1988 and 2013 (in billion dollars)



Source: SIPRI, 2014b.

LATIN AMERICA IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Monthly average of assigned troops for peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2013



* Venezuela and Guyana did not send troops for peacekeeping missions in this period
Source: UN, 2014e.

Labundo, 2014

Labundo, 2014


building of consensus and a regional identity, as well as collective action around projects (e.g. the Centre for Strategic Defence Studies - CEED [2011], the army training exercises and military personnel qualification, humanitarian and peace operations, and development of the defence industry and technology). The CEED is based in Buenos Aires, and its objectives are to encourage research, formulate doctrine, and promote cooperation in South America, with special attention to the region's strategic natural resources (e.g. mineral resources), disaster prevention operations, and the threats associated with transnational crime. Another project under development within the CDS framework is the South-American Record in Defence Spending, responsible for developing methods to measure and publicise the defence budgets of countries in the region. In January 2012, six countries had already reported their data: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. Today, statistics about the military spending of the region's countries are provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI.

In terms of threats to collective security, the region has gone through some major conflicts, some of which still produce territorial and political tensions (e.g. those involving Chile, Peru and Bolivia; Ecuador and Peru; Argentina and Chile; Colombia and Venezuela), but it tends to be considered a relatively peaceful region, where internal conflicts and urban insecurity issues seem more relevant than interstate ones. Transnational crime and drug trafficking networks are well-structured and pose a strategic challenge to governments and their public security institutions, such as the police force and border control units.

However, there are other types of threats to security in the region. The threat of territorial fragmentation has been present on the South American agenda. In September 2008, Michelle Bachelet, the *pro tempore* President of UNASUR at the time, convened an extraordinary meeting of Presidents to address the Bolivian crisis. The most important outcome was the support offered by South American heads of states and government to Bolivia's constitutional government, thus rejecting any attempts of civil coup or breakdown of the institutional order that

MINERAL RESOURCES IN SOUTH AMERICA

Amazon Cooperation Treaty in 2013



might put the country's territorial unity in jeopardy. As a sign of the times, South American countries have decided to solve their problems among themselves, without appealing to the mediation of extra-regional powers. This decision is particularly important given the fact that in October 2009 Colombia signed a military agreement with Washington, allowing the presence of military and civilian US citizens on Colombian soil in order to combat drug trafficking in the country, besides granting the US military the use of its Air Force, Army, and Navy bases.

In addition to mineral resources deemed to have strategic value (e.g. oil, fissile material), the region's wealth in terms of biodiversity and water resources must be equally underscored. Both are important components of regional security and defence policy. Accordingly, biopiracy can be considered one of the main threats to regional security.

Some environmental conflicts have emerged in the last decade (for instance, the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay concerning the installation of paper industries, due to their negative effects on the environment). In addition to UNASUR, which serves as a body for coordination, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation also provides consultation and regulation of collective environmental problems: it operates in deforestation monitoring, projects related to the Global Environmental Facility, cooperation

among university institutions (e.g. UNAMAZ), environmental and health surveillance systems, as well as in programmes on the use of biodiversity.

The Amazon region has great strategic value for Brazil; it has an extended border zone, covers approximately 32% of the national territory, comprises 8 million Brazilian citizens (who inhabit the region), and 46% of the total indigenous population of Brazil. It is also where the Calha Norte Programme – PCN is being developed, among others. Since its creation in 1985, the PCN has been subordinated to various federal agencies, and this has led to problems of bureaucratic coordination. Currently it is under the Ministry of Defence, and focuses on two main areas: the assurance of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the promotion of regional development. In addition, the PCN encourages the expansion of the Brazilian army's local presence, as well as land demarcation – this can sometimes precipitate tensions, and even serious conflicts with environmental organisations (both national and international) and indigenous groups.

SEE ALSO:


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Energy, infrastructure and integration

Like Brazil, the other South American countries were also once colonies of exploitation of the European powers. As a result, the same

economic model, based on the export of primary products to Europe, can be seen throughout the continent. This historical legacy is

INTEGRATION PROJECTS WITHIN SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Integration and development axes and projects of intermodal bioceanic roads, in 2010



Source: IIRSA, 2010.

Labmundo, 2014

gradually being overcome, but the marks it has left are still present today. One of them is the lack of physical integration among South American countries. The geographic factor (e.g. the Amazon, the Andes, and the Pantanal) should not be underestimated. Although progress has been made, the infrastructure in most South American countries still faces a number of problems, such as over-concentration in the most economically active centres and the lack of investment, including on maintenance programmes. These characteristics can also be found in the regional infrastructure as a whole. This situation, already so full of contradictions, is further aggravated by the way in which investments are thought out. South America's existing infrastructure is designed mostly on the basis of each country's domestic plans, relegating any structural projects of regional integration to the background.

The lack of physical integration in South America gives rise to various economic, political, and social difficulties. The free movement of people, which is provided for in the Mercosur and the Andean Community's founding treaties, for example, is significantly impaired by the lack of good quality transportation means at affordable prices - although there may be, in some bilateral relations cases, legal provision to encourage cross-border human mobility. Given the absence of logistics and transportation infrastructure, trade among countries also suffers serious impediments.

The IIRSA was launched in 2000 to tackle the lack of physical integration in the region. The IIRSA is part of a set of regional projects intended to strengthen South America in various aspects: economic, institutional, social, political, etc. However, many of these projects are still at an early stage of development. Following COSIPLAN's institutionalisation within UNASUR in 2009, South American leaderships believe that only through the physical integration of their countries will it be possible to create an economy of scale in the region, made up of complementary production chains. Given South America's territorial extension and the disparate realities that exist within the continent, ten axes of integration and development have been created. Their

overarching goal is to meet the different needs arising from each location's peculiarities.


One of the more relevant initiatives is the planning of bioceanic corridors. Investments have been set aside for the construction and repair of intermodal routes (i.e. linking highways, railways and waterways), in order to connect ports in countries bordering the Pacific Ocean to ports on the Atlantic Ocean. This project would not only ensure that the flow of people and goods within the region are improved, but also facilitate the export of South American products to consumer markets overseas: South and East Asia, Europe and Africa. Another high profile project by IIRSA is the construction of a gas pipeline from Bolivia to Brazil's Centre-South, thus ensuring the supply of natural gas to the Brazilian economy's most dynamic and industrialised regions.

The energy infrastructure is one of the most important challenges to be grappled with in the region. South America has a surplus in the production of various sources of energy, especially because of Venezuela and Colombia. Brazil is a major producer but also the largest consumer of energy in the continent, and for this reason its balance shows a slight deficit. In spite of the regional surplus, many countries still face difficulties in the access to energy sources. This is due, among other things, to the lack of transmission lines between the countries. The investment in energy transmission within the region is a top priority, as energy is essential to development and economic growth. In addition, the intraregional connection of transmission lines could generate an important energy market in the continent: the offer is there and so is the demand, but the means to sell are absent.

Another regional initiative in the field of energy has to do with the construction of a binational oil refinery by Brazil and Venezuela. Petrobras is building the Abreu e Lima Refinery in Pernambuco, and an agreement of participation and co-financing has been signed with the Venezuelan state-run PDVSA. The goal is to build a refinery controlled by both countries and capable of processing heavy oil on a large

ENERGY IN SOUTH AMERICA


Production and consumption by millions of oil kt or equivalent, in 2011




TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA

Freight transportation quality index¹, in 2012

Port² quality index, in 2012



Roads in South American countries in 2010 (in thousand kilometers)



scale. Brazil hopes that then it will not need to export crude oil in order to buy oil by-products any more. Presently, the country does not have sufficient capacity to process all the oil it produces.


SEE ALSO:

Development and industrialisation p. 20
Industrial complex p. 30
Energy matrix p. 34
Brazilians abroad p. 76

Asymmetries and inequalities


SEARCH FOR CONVERGENCE

FOCEM allocation of resources by destination country and sector in million dollars, between 2009 and 2012



Source: Mercosur/FOCEM website, 2014

Evolution of FOCEM resources by destination country, between 2009 and 2012 (in million dollars)



Source: Mercosur/FOCEM website, 2014.

Integration projects need to take into account the multiple dimensions – political, economic, social, cultural, technological and environmental – that underpin the deep inequalities within states, as well as the asymmetries among national economies. How these dimensions are dealt with, and the emphasis given to some but not to others could either strengthen or weaken regional processes. The US initiative of Pan-American integration through the economy, by the creation of free-trade zones, has elicited strong resistance from social movements against the idea, due to the social consequences and environmental impacts that trade can bring about in contexts of wide inequality. Adopting an opposite stance, the ALBA promotes bottom-up integration models built upon the needs and peculiarities of different social groups.

Acknowledgment of the region's asymmetries, and of the inequalities and peculiarities inherent to each national context, is a fundamental step in the creation of spaces that integrate effectively. In the case of South America, despite its great potential in the current global context, there are significant disparities among countries and multiple layers of inequality that still need to be confronted. According to IMF data, the region's rates of economic growth should remain relatively high in 2014, 2.5 % on average, and 3% in 2015. Peru (5.5 %) and Bolivia (5.1 %) stand out as the most dynamic economies, while Argentina (0.5 %) and Venezuela (-0.5 %) are those with the lowest growth. As for Brazil, a rate of 1.8% is estimated for 2014. According to the IMF, the major obstacles to keeping substantial rates of growth are the fall in commodity prices and the cost of foreign financing, coupled with business' loss of confidence. The forecast by CEPAL is of a slight decrease in FDI, which in 2013 amounted to \$185 billion dollars

for the whole of Latin America, funnelled into the service, manufacturing, and natural resources sectors. Approximately 82% of this investment went to the region's six major economies (35% of the total went to Brazil). The countries that received the least FDI were Chile, Argentina and Peru. Brazil remains, therefore, the largest economy in the region, with a GDP of 2.2 trillion dollars, followed from afar by Argentina (with \$465 billion dollars), Venezuela (\$371 billion) and Colombia (\$353 billion).


In addition to these absolute values, the patterns of wealth redistribution among the population differ quite a lot in each national context. In relative terms, of GDP per capita, there is a strong asymmetry between countries such as Chile or Uruguay (around \$15,000 dollars), and Bolivia, Guyana, or Paraguay (less than \$4,000 dollars). The population of South America still faces challenges in terms of average life expectancy (65 years in Guyana, almost seven fewer than in Brazil, and 13 fewer than in Chile), poverty (8.2% of Colombians live on less than \$1.25 dollars a day, whereas only 0.2% of Uruguayans do), and unemployment (11% in Colombia versus 4% in Peru).

The data is even worse in the case of rural populations, indigenous peoples and women, the usual targets of multiple forms of discrimination that create inequalities. For example, according to CEPAL figures covering the whole of Latin America, women represent less than 25% of state positions of power; as regards education, 80% of adults living in rural areas have fewer than ten years of study. These inequality levels clearly require the adoption of inclusive policies, in order to ensure more cohesion and social justice in the region.

Integration should take into account the existence of disparate economies and inequalities at various levels (regional, national, and local). For this reason, the various regional models currently under debate try to put forward initiatives (e.g. CAF, IDB, Bank of the South, FOCEM) to overcome such asymmetries and promote cooperation among South American countries. One of these initiatives is the Bank of the South, which focuses on the economic and productive development of the region, as an alternative


INEQUALITY IN UNASUR

Absolute and per capita GDP in 2012




Source: UNDP, 2013a.

Total population and population density in 2012




Source: World Bank, 2014b.

Life expectancy in 2012 (in years)




Source: World Bank, 2014b.

Unemployment in 2011 (in % of EAP)




Source: World Bank, 2014b.

Military expenditure absolute and per capita in 2012




Source: SIPRI, 2014b; World Bank, 2014b.

Export of high-tech goods and % of manufactured exports in 2012


*No data available for Uruguay
Source: World Bank, 2014b.

Human Development Index in 2012

No data available
French Guiana is not a member of Unasur

Source: UNDP, 2013a

Annual average of goods and services exports and imports between 2005 and 2012 (in billion dollars)

*No data available for imports by
Guyana and Suriname


Source: World Bank, 2014b.

to the IDB's orthodox outlook. Within the context of Mercosur, the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) finances projects geared at narrowing the gaps, fostering competitiveness, promoting social cohesion and supporting integration among member countries. Brazil contributes with the most resources (around 70 %) while Paraguay, being the main beneficiary, receives approximately 50% of the funding, directed mainly at projects of structural convergence and infrastructure development. The Alliance of the Pacific, on the other hand, focuses mainly on trade liberalisation and economic competitiveness; it also intends to launch a cooperation fund to finance projects in the areas of environment, innovation, science and technology, social development, and business. Finally, the Bank of ALBA finances projects aimed at generating benefits in various areas for the majority of the population: food, education, culture, environment, energy, transportation, trade, etc. Other initiatives of cooperation in the region seek to create solidarity and complementarity among countries, making use of diverse strategies to improve their international political integration, competitiveness and productivity in business, military security, or people's welfare, depending on the model. Therefore the challenges related to overcoming domestic inequalities and disparities among national economies retain a high priority in the regional agenda.

SEE ALSO:

Industrial complex p. 30
Poverty and inequality p. 44
Religious actors p. 74
Argentina p. 88

Gini index in South America in 2010



Source: UNDP, 2013a

Social networks: Latin America or South America?

The majority of regional integration models focus on the economic dimension, neglecting to a great extent the effects that processes of trade liberalisation and incentives to competitiveness have on people, particularly in contexts of high asymmetries and inequalities at the regional and national levels. Economic growth based on commodity exports and extractive production models, which are so frequent in South America, has particularly negative impacts for indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, riverside communities, and communities affected by development policies that tend to disregard local particularities, both cultural and environmental, in various manners.

Indigenous people represent more than 60% of the population of Bolivia, and even in Brazil, where they constitute a minority, there are 241 different groups - which illustrates the ethnic


diversity of South America. Despite some progress, the data on social participation, economic integration, employment and education, among other indicators of historical social exclusion and discrimination, remains quite alarming. Against this background of inequality and lack of policies of recognition, the creation of indigenous peoples' organisations and networks to defend their rights has prospered. These networks and movements have played a central role in setting up blueprints for the protection of their rights, both nationally (mainly in Bolivia and Ecuador, where *Buen Vivir/Sumak Kawsay* has been adopted as a development model that contemplates a collective dimension, as well as harmony with nature) and internationally (e.g. the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in 2007).

Beyond the issues related to indigenous peoples, these networks

also bring to light the conflicts and environmental consequences caused by unbridled exploitation of natural resources, which is part and parcel of most development models in the region. This gives rise to a wide agenda shared by numerous networks and social movements concerned about biodiversity, the fallouts of mining and extraction (e.g. the People Affected by Vale movement), the management of water resources (e.g. the People Affected by Dams movement), or the major infrastructure projects envisaged in integration processes (such as IIRSA/COSIPLAN). Hence, those affected cannot be seen simply as victims who intervene in reactive and accusatory


AMERINDIANS AND EDUCATION ACCESS

Percentage of Amerindians aged 20 to 29 years with over 13 years of study, by gender*




SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Indigenous populations and social movements in Latin America, in 2014



Percentage of young people aged 15 to 19 years with complete primary education, by gender*




*Censuses were conducted in the following years: Brazil (2010); Colombia (2005); Costa Rica (2011); Ecuador (2010); Mexico (2010); Nicaragua (2005); Panama (2010); Peru (2007); Uruguay (2011).

Source: CEPAL, 2013b.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICTS

Social conflicts over natural and geostrategic resources, in 2014



mode. They are trying to build projects that safeguard nature and life in general, uphold rights and the de-commodification of social relations, thereby proving that integration should be done with the participation of indigenous peoples, grassroots movements, cultural minorities, and networks that bring together transnational collective ideals.

The people are an essential dimension of Latin American integration; therefore, they ought to be the protagonists of development drives in those spaces, in order to avoid new forms of exclusion. A human development approach is essential, thus making sure that integration processes do not end up exacerbating the dynamics of social disintegration and geographic disparities. The positive effects derived from bringing together societies and peoples can be fostered by initiatives in areas such as migration, health, education, cultural exchanges and tourism, among others.

The free movement of people between countries, the creation of spaces for socio-cultural exchange and the

legitimation of Latin American cultural values, the development of sustainable tourism, the distribution and marketing of fair trade products, the continental programmes for literacy, education and training, or the promotion of arenas of regional convergence in several sectors of social life illustrate some of the policies driven by the various regional integration projects in Latin America today. Some are formal projects, such as the UNILA, seeking integration through higher education; some are informal, such as the Intercultural and Indigenous Universities which welcome the articulation and participation of excluded populations. Between Latin America and South America, many questions arise today about the political place of alterity, diversity, cultural practices, and indigenous knowledge in projects already underway.

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28


Water: vital resource p. 36

Genetic wealth p. 40

Organisations and social movements p. 72


UNIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION

Openings offered at UNILA, between 2010 and 2014



Source: UNILA's website, 2014.

Courses offered at UNILA, between 2010 and 2014



*In 2013 there was no entrance exam for UNILA.

**Data for 2015 is a projection.

Source: UNILA's website, 2014.

Students, by nationality and entry year, between 2010 and 2014



Source: UNILA's website, 2014.

Chapter 5:

NEW COALITIONS, MULTILATERALISM AND SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION





Enara Echarr Muñoz

This chapter discusses the construction of a Brazilian foreign policy with global aspirations – one based on relations with countries of the Global North but unafraid of opening up new fronts, both from the bilateral and multilateral points of view. Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century continues to be a staunch supporter of the principles and practices of multilateralism, but it also innovates by establishing new coalitions. The emphasis on South-South cooperation is part of this process of construction of a worldwide BFP, as it is advantageous to Brazilian multilateral diplomacy; however, it is also the bearer of public/private contradictions and tensions. This chapter presents some main characteristics of the innovations and challenges that have largely distinguished Brazilian foreign policy this century, as regards North-South and South-South relations, the UN system, the multilateral economic agencies, the creation of the BRICS group, and the new international coalitions, as well as in relation to the new agendas of cooperation for development.

Brazil in North-South relations


Although there have been times when Brazil sought to have greater autonomy in foreign policy, it has always seen itself as part of the West, almost always an ally of the Global North countries - particularly the US. Brazilian relations with the major central

powers were, as a rule, strengthened by trade links with the US and Europe, by cultural exchanges, and the fact that Brazil has always viewed these countries as partners that could contribute to its national development. Brazilian society is formed

by immigrants and their descendants, from countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany. The majority of the population declares itself Christian and the national language has Iberian origins. In addition to its geographical position, the cultural, economic and political ties that lead Brazil to see itself as a Western country are quite evident. Since 1988, democratic norms and respect


MAIN SOURCES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL

Investments flows in 2010, by immediate investor and sector, in billion dollars




BRAZILIAN TRADE PARTNERS

Evolution of Brazilian trade flows, between 1997 and 2013 (in billion dollars)




Evolution of Brazilian trade balance between 1997 and 2013 (in billion dollars)



BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRADE

Exports between 2000 and 2013

Imports between 2000 and 2013



for human rights have also marked the construction of the national political system. However, this good relationship with the West and the adherence to democratic principles are not free from divergences, especially when Brazil attempts to be more autonomous internationally.

Historically, the US is one of Brazil's main trading partners and it acknowledges the country's relevance for the political and economic stability of the region. Brazilian and American diplomats went as far as to say that the relationship between the two countries had reached such an advanced stage of maturity that differences of opinion could exist, without this directly affecting the good rapport between them. President Barack Obama, on a visit to Brazil, argued that the US should consider its relations with the country to be at the same level of importance as relations with China and India. However, this maturity was publicly put in check when it emerged that the US National Security Agency (the NSA) had been spying on President Dilma Rousseff, monitoring her computer and phone calls.


European countries also have positive relations with Brazil. Taken as a whole, the European Union is Brazil's main trading partner. At the bilateral level, the relationship between Brazil and France deserves to be highlighted. In addition to the intense historical and cultural exchanges between the two countries, France has always proved to be an important ally of Brazilian causes in Europe. However, this stance has started to change recently, most notably in the French campaign

against Roberto Carvalho de Azevedo's candidacy to the post of Secretary-General of the WTO. Germany, meanwhile, is responsible for part of the technology used in the construction of the nuclear power plants of Angra dos Reis. The Netherlands is the main investor in Brazil, followed by the US and other European countries. It is worth mentioning that countries of the Global South, in spite of their increasing commercial and political significance for Brazil, are not major investors. China's growing commercial standing, for example, has not yet been translated into FDI flows to Brazil.


Relations with the Global North show points of divergence on the environmental agenda, to the extent that Brazil, along with other big countries of the South, supports the notion that there are differentiated responsibilities in the fight against global warming. As greenhouse gases take centuries to dissipate, Brazil attributes to countries of the North the main share of responsibility for global warming. Security is another regime in which differences in official positions can be seen. Besides the historical Brazilian plea for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, recently Brazil has questioned some of the decisions made by this body. Although it often contributes with troops to the UN peace-keeping missions, Brazil is a fierce critic of the decision-making process and how resolutions are channelled. In the field of human rights, particularly in debates within the Human Rights Council, Brazil has also held positions different from those of many Western states.

CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES


Voting at the UN Security Council on intervention in Libya, in 2011




Voting at the UN Security Council on sanctions against Iran, in 2010



Pursuit of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, in 2014



Diversity of groupings at the WTO, in 2014




SEE ALSO:

Globalisation and the new order p. 22
Itamaraty p. 60
Brazilians abroad p. 76
Latin and South America p. 84

UN system: the environment and human rights

CONFERENCES OF THE PARTIES

Members who joined the Delegations at COP meetings between 1995 and 2014




As a founding member of the UN, Brazil's diplomatic history has been traditionally guided by a belief in multilateralism, adherence to the principles of negotiation, the building of wider consensus, and respect for international law. This attitude is conveyed in Brazil's participation in the development of the multilateral system, although the history of this interest has not been linear or exempt from disputes.


Throughout the Cold War, the country's foreign policy in the human rights regime alternated between support of the concept of sovereignty and the concept of international integration. The Independent Foreign Policy period (1961-1964) managed to overcome the traditional fear of intrusion in national affairs by the superpowers, and to support the theme of human rights – of social rights in particular – in multilateral forums. The country is among those having ratified the highest number of international conventions, including those that recognise the authority of the International Criminal Court and the Inter-American Court. The Constitution of 1988 gives priority to

BRAZILIANS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Officials in the UN system by professional categories and by country, in 2012



Civil servants in peacekeeping operations and special political missions by country



Source: Giannini, 2014

Labmundo, 2014

the issue in the country's international relations.

During the Lula government, Brazilian diplomacy in the field of human rights was guided by the principle of non-intervention, but always accompanied by the notion of "non-indifference". The objective was to signal that, by ignoring national contexts, purely condemnatory resolutions become counterproductive and cause the countries' isolation. This did increase the criticisms from activists and sectors of the press. The change in attitude was compounded by the Brazilian diplomacy's traditional criticism of the great

KYOTO PROTOCOL

Situation in 2014



powers' selective focus on developing countries when issuing convictions for human rights violations.


At home, the field of human rights is an example of the diversification of actors involved in Brazilian foreign policy, with participation of various state agencies from the three spheres of government, social movements, civil society organisations and the media. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have played an important role in the promotion of human rights, particularly in the context of authoritarian regimes in Latin America between 1960 and 1980, but now share the political arena with several national and regional organisations, such as Conectas, INESC and Rebrip.

Brazil is also very active in multilateral environmental forums, having hosted two major conferences on the subject (1992 and 2012). The country has participated in negotiations for the creation of a system aimed at reducing the effects of global warming. Traditionally, Brazilian diplomacy has advocated the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, i.e. developed countries should shoulder greater responsibilities in global agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol) on the basis of their historical emissions. Brazil also supports carbon capture and the use of biofuels to mitigate the problem. A comprehensive multilateral agreement still seems difficult to reach, in particular at a time of sluggish international economic growth. In spite of the US position in relation to the Kyoto Protocol, the scheme came into force in 2005 with Russia's adherence, and by the end of 2012 the treaty's provisions were extended until 2020. Multilateral meetings occur annually (the Conference of the Parties) in the quest for consensus. In these meetings, Brazil is one of the countries with the largest delegations. At a time when the debate about the impact of human actions on the future life of the planet is intensifying, the country has been one of the advocates of the "sustainable development" concept, arguing that it is possible to reconcile economic growth with low environmental impact, and that fauna and flora conservation does not need to restrain countries of the Global South in their search for development.

Brazil has been a moderate critic of the current system of representation


HUMAN RIGHTS

Countries where Amnesty International has offices, in 2014




Source: Amnesty International's website, 2014.

International Criminal Court, participation of countries in 1998 Rome Statute, in 2014



Source: International Court of Justice's website, 2014.

International Criminal Law, in 2014



Source: International Court of Justice's website, in 2014.

in multilateralism (e.g. the UN Security Council), but keeps strong participation patterns in multilateral bodies and in the formulation of international regimes (e.g. development, food security, and trade). In recent years, it has also sought to increase its participation in peace operations (such as the MINUSTAH, in Haiti).

Even so, out of around 80,000 employees in total, there are fewer than 600 Brazilian civilians working in the UN system. According to the Itamaraty, other member states, especially the

developing countries, are faced with the same problem of under-representation, which means missed opportunities in terms of knowledge exchanges, projection of soft power, and greater participation of Brazil on the international political agenda.

SEE ALSO:

Football and sports [p. 52](#)
 Tourism [p. 54](#)
 Religious pluralism [p. 56](#)
 Research centres and universities [p. 78](#)

World economic agencies

Brazil has participated as a founding member in the most important economic agencies created in the post-Second World War period. The new economic order began to be defined by contractual and institutionalist precepts based on Keynesian paradigms. The first institutions saw the participation of little more than 50 member states, but the entry of peripheral countries in the 1950s and 1960s would reinforce the interest in multilateralism in the quest for economic development. In economic forums, Brazil has traditionally been sympathetic to the special and more supportive treatment of developing countries, accusing multilateral arrangements of not acknowledging international asymmetries and thus favouring the developed countries.

The great changes that took place in the 1980s (such as the political fragmentation of the Third World, the economic rise of Asia, the end of the USSR, the more visible impacts of the oil crises, the financialisation of the international economic system, and the crises in the 1990s and 2000s), along with domestic problems in many developing countries, drove Brazil into financial difficulties, as it had to make structural adjustments and seek assistance from international agencies in order to deal with the deficits in its balance of payments. Like other countries, Brazil was led into a dependent relationship with the International Monetary Fund. From the 1980s onwards the IMF began to assume a more prominent role in the negotiations of the financial system, as it instituted structural adjustment programmes as solution packages to rescue the economies of indebted countries. The Fund mediated the relationship between debtor countries and international creditors, and demanded economic adjustments to generate surpluses for payment of the debts.

In Brazil, whereas the FHC government sought to build a good rapport


with the agency, the Lula government politicised the relationship by paying its loans in advance and, later on, by lending money for the Fund to counter the effects of the post-2008 crisis. The Lula government was a moderate critic of the international financial system, demanding greater participation of emerging countries in the IMF's

decisions through redistribution of the quotas that give their holders the right to vote; it also requested that financial institutions step up their dialogue with the Economic and Social Council of the UN. An analysis of the evolution of the Brazilian rhetoric about the agency indicates that the 2008 crisis led the Lula government to toughen its discourse of independence from the IMF, and against its austerity policies and conditionalities.


In addition to the IMF, one of the forums of great activity for Brazilian economic diplomacy has been the World Trade Organisation. The WTO (1995) is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which since 1947 promoted rounds of negotiations to harmonise the customs policies of member countries,

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

IMF's loans by countries, between 1984 and 2016 (in billions of Special Drawing Rights)



Quotas at the IMF by country, in billions of Special Drawing Rights, in June 2016



Source: IMF, 2014a.


Labundo, 2016

and thus carry out the progressive liberalisation of world trade. Brazil criticised the body for being favourable to rich countries, and advocated the introduction of a regime of concessions without reciprocity so developing countries could benefit from open trade. In 1986, Brazil and other exporters of agro products formed the Cairns group (currently with 19 members), seeking to put the issue of liberalisation of agricultural trade on the agenda for discussion. In 2003, Brazil and a group of developing countries (known as the “commercial G-20”) organised themselves to put pressure on WTO negotiations, and it has since consolidated its position as a relevant partner in agricultural discussions. The country has also been active in the WTO through the dispute settlement system and has already initiated 26 cases, with important victories over the US, the European Union and Canada. An important event was the election of Roberto Azevedo, a Brazilian, as Director General of the institution in 2013, an indication of the prestige of Brazilian economic diplomacy, particularly among countries of the Global South.

During the 1990s, the country put in place a series of policies to ensure its integration into the economic system via unilateral trade liberalisation, which had a strong impact (not always positive) on various sectors of the economy. Regional integration projects were also initiated, such as the Mercosur (which has an open regionalism bias), in parallel to debates about ALCA and a rapprochement with the European Union. During the Lula years, there were incremental changes in the Brazilian trade foreign policy. There was increasing resistance to regional agreements with the core countries, in particular with the US. The WTO came to be considered the most appropriate

WORLD MERCHANDISE TRADE

Intraregional and interregional trade in 2012 (in billion dollars)




forum to negotiate trade with developed countries (as it is a dispute settlement body). Issues of interest to the rich countries (e.g. access to government bids, protection of foreign investment, or amendment of the rules for the trade in services) were avoided, in order to maintain a degree of freedom in conducting independent industrial policies. Brazil sought trade agreements preferably with emerging countries, and their concrete results are expected for the coming years.

During the Dilma government, which has suffered from low growth as a result of the core countries' financial crisis, international economic forums have shown limited success in consensus-building (not just in

the IMF, but also in Doha Round of the WTO). Even the financial G-20 (to which Brazil does not belong) has not managed to advance political and economic commitments that might limit the negative impacts of the financial crisis. The failure of Brazilian diplomacy to make new agreements, and its belief in a satisfactory outcome to the Doha Round of talks, are the two mainstays that have made BFP a favourite target of criticism of the Worker's Party governments, accused of being too ideological and insufficiently pragmatic. In 2014, a development bank, based in Shanghai, was launched within the BRICS framework, as well as a fund for the prevention of future liquidity problems of its members. The objective is to make one more option of funding available to the BRICS and the developing countries, in addition to mainstream economic agencies (i.e. the IMF and World Bank). The future will tell if the BRICS move will produce the geopolitical and economic effects anticipated.

FROM GATT TO THE WTO

Tariff protection (in %) and quantity of participants in negotiations, between 1947 and 2014



SEE ALSO:


Agribusiness p. 28
Industrial complex p. 30
Population and diversity p. 42
Brazilian multinationals p. 70

New partners and coalitions


TRADE BETWEEN REGIONS

Evolution of Brazilian trade, with traditional and new partners, between 2000 and 2013 (in billion dollars)


Mercosur*



Africa



Middle East



Source: AliceWeb at MDIC website, 2014.

Since the end of the 20th century and start of the 21st, some countries and regions have been gaining importance in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda (e.g. the BRICS, IBSA Forum, commercial G-20, African countries and the Middle East). At first glance, a brief analysis of this phenomenon may give the impression that it is an innovative and reformist trend. In fact, Brazil takes advantage of a juncture in time in which the systemic and domestic contexts are favourable in order to resume relations with former partners. However, neither the characteristics nor the international integration of these “new” partners, nor Brazil’s, have remained unchanged over time. For this reason, such relations can bring positive results to Brazil, but they equally suggest some challenges.

The search for diversification of partners is not new in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. In the middle of the 20th century, Brazil also tried to increase its international presence by strengthening or creating links with peripheral countries, or those of the socialist bloc. The movement was marked by a search for greater Brazilian autonomy, and it was located within a global discourse that advocated the strengthening of sovereignty, as well as fairer and more equitable

development among countries. These principles were recovered at the beginning of the 21st century by Brazil and other partners from the political South. The Brazilian stance and that of the majority of the countries of the South is not reformist, inasmuch as it does not aim at a radical change of the norms, rules and institutions guiding the global order. The Brazilian discourse revolves around the demand for greater participation of peripheral countries in the existing decision-making world forums. In this, Brazil is joined by other countries and together they push for greater decision-making power in international debates.

The attempt to liaise with less traditional partners is made easier by a favourable political and economic climate, both at the systemic and domestic levels. Internally, Brazil managed macroeconomic stabilisation at the end of the 1990s, and in the early 2000s its GDP growth rates were above 5% per year. Free from economic adjustment programmes and with an expansion in the state’s capacities, Brazilian foreign policy gained more autonomy. Meanwhile, the world economy was buoyant, thus creating opportunities for new agreements. The rise in economic, demographic and political capacity in countries of the political South was impressive: South Africa, India, Indonesia, Angola, Nigeria, Turkey, Mexico and, especially, China; the Russian economic recovery should also be mentioned. Unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of the 2008 financial crisis affected mainly the US and Europe, thus reinforcing how important it was for Brazil to establish relations beyond the western economies.

Therefore, it is quite clear that Brazil’s endeavours to resume relations

TRADE AGREEMENTS

Countries that have agreements with Brazil, in 2014




Source: AliceWeb at MDIC website, 2014

ARTICULATION AND PURSUIT OF GREATER PARTICIPATION

Summits and ministerial meetings until 2014



Projects with funds from the IBSA Fund, in 2014



Sources: Itamaraty, 2014b; IBSA's forum website, 2014.

with countries of the South are the result of political and economic calculations. The world was changing, and new opportunities had come up. There were incentives for Brazil to seize this favourable moment. It is worth noting, however, that resuming partnerships with countries of the political South does not replace, or compete with, the traditional relations between Brazil and the US and Europe. Brazil can have a positive, pragmatic diplomacy with all the countries it has relations with, without neglecting any of them.


Relations between Brazil and some less traditional countries bring about a series of commercial, political and technological advantages. In the economic domain, the dynamism of these countries' consumer markets benefits Brazilian foreign trade. In addition, these countries are less conservative in making agreements on sensitive issues, such as aerospace and security. Russia has begun to consolidate itself as an important partner in the field of security, selling weapons (such as land vehicles, helicopters and anti aircraft battery) and technology to Brazil. Russia is also an important partner in the project for construction of the Brazilian Satellite Launch Vehicle, while

China has an agreement with Brazil for construction of satellites (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite - CBERS). The partnership between India and Brazil has proved crucial too, in the pharmaceutical and the biofuel sectors. These brief examples show how the renewal of relations with these countries can potentially bring positive results for Brazil.

However, moving closer to other countries of the South presents some challenges too. In the commercial realm, China's strong growth and the competitiveness of its industrialised products bring the risk of re-primarisation of Brazilian exports. In addition, Brazil's relationship with these countries is not as asymmetric as its relations with the US and Europe, but there could emerge a core-periphery relationship (with Brazil sometimes being in the core, sometimes in the periphery) which could put good political relationships in jeopardy. In the context of political coordination, the possibility of keeping harmonised positions over the long term is equally uncertain. Different political, economic and social realities within these countries foment dissimilar political interests on various topics.

TRADE WITH THE BRICS

Evolution of trade between 2000 and 2013 (in billion dollars)



Source: AliceWeb at MDIC website, 2014.

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28

Itamaraty p. 60

Presidential diplomacy p. 62

Brazilians abroad p. 76

Towards a more democratic global governance?

At the beginning of the 21st century, the recovery of economic dynamism in developing countries allowed the political South to reunite around more concrete proposals, in contrast with the causes supported by Third-Worldism and other 20th century movements (e.g. the G-77, the Non-Aligned, and NIEO). Many of these countries no longer position themselves as applicants for preferential trade with the industrialised countries. Like in the 1950s and 1960s, countries of the South are still fighting for development models that promote justice and fairness at the international level, but today their main concern is the

reform of decision-making instances and systems of representation.


Brazil has historically decried the oligopolised nature of decision-making forums worldwide. The Brazilian diplomatic discourse points out that, on various issues, peripheral countries have little or no participation in decision-making. In addition, the main roles at international financial institutions are still reserved for US and European nationals, or candidates backed up by them. Besides the lack of representativeness, the informality of some decision-making forums, such as the G-7 and the G-8, is also the

target of criticisms. The absence of formal rules brings insecurity to other countries, and weakens multilateralism. In an informal institution it is not clear who the members are, what is the group's purpose, what is discussed, or how and whether documents are transparent.


Together with other developing countries, Brazil fights for reform of major international agencies. To the extent that it occupies an intermediate position in the distribution of world power, Brazil would find it impossible to demand these changes on its own. So to increase its political capital and therefore its voice at the international level, Brazil tries to act jointly with other countries that share similar characteristics, and also want to transform the decision-making process of international institutions. This is one of the reasons why Brazil takes part in political coordination groups, and looks for political articulation with countries from various regions of the world, but mainly from the South (which also press for greater representation in international

MORE PLURAL COALITIONS IN WORLD POLITICS?

Credentials of coalitions in political consultation groups, in 2014



Credentials of coalitions in the WTO, in 2014



¹ Demographic data and GDP refer to 2012.

² European Union has a permanent seat at the Financial G-20.

Sources: World Bank Database, 2014; Unctad, 2014.

³ QUAD is composed of 4 influential actors in the WTO negotiations: USA, European Union, Japan and Canada.


⁴ G-90 is composed of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Central America and the Caribbean.

forums). Thus the plea for overhauling some international institutions gains strength and legitimacy, while Brazil tries to present itself as a necessary interlocutor with credibility on several themes.

This movement has been reasonably successful. Within the WTO, negotiations were dictated by the QUAD group, but the peripheral countries united around the commercial G-20 and managed to change the course of negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003. After the 2008 financial crisis, the financial G-20 was promoted to summit group status and viewed as one of the main discussion forums worldwide. The importance of reforming the IMF's distribution of decision-making power was recognised by several countries, including ones from the North. Positions in major international organisations, such as the FAO and WTO, have since been occupied by Brazilians. Given some of these changes, one could say that global governance has become a little more plural. Countries and societies previously without a voice began to participate more actively in international discussions. However, it is not yet clear whether global governance can become more democratic. Although they have been expanded, the decision-making forums still do not include an adequate representation of developing countries. The participation of civil society organisations is also incipient. In addition, reforms in the decision-making process of some institutions are slow and face resistance in the domestic arena, as in the case of the US Congress, which is slow to ratify the reform of IMF quotas.

Current BFP starts from the premise that the country has a lot to gain from taking part in these new mechanisms of global governance (such as the financial G-20). It justifies its decision on the basis of the political prestige, the strategic importance and the credentials that derive from this participation for the Brazilian economy. However, participation in these groups can also generate inconsistencies in a Brazilian diplomatic discourse that has traditionally denounced the potential harm of informal groups for multilateral spaces. Besides, dialogue with countries of the South that do not participate in those mechanisms can be impaired in terms of legitimacy.

DIVERSITY OF GROUPINGS AND NEW COALITIONS




SEE ALSO:

Itamaraty p. 60
Latin and South America p. 84
North-South relations p. 100
UN system p. 102

Cooperation: from recipient to donor status?


ODA EVOLUTION

Main donors, in billion dollars, between 1970 and 2010



RECEIVED ODA

Evolution of the ODA received from DAC/OECD Member States, between 1960 and 2010 (in billion dollars)



In Brazil, the debates on foreign policy and its relationship with the system of international cooperation for development (ICD) have changed tone since the Brazilian government and its various agencies began to play an increasingly important role as a country that also offers cooperation projects. Actually, Brazil had taken part in cooperation programmes since the 1960s, in partnership with other middle-income and low-income countries. However, it is only from the 2000s onwards that its role has become more substantial both in quantitative and qualitative terms. So ICD has since been a more integral element in debates about the direction of foreign policy, and it has been seen as a tool of soft power. From the 2000s onwards, with the changes of scale in Brazilian foreign policy, the profile of Brazil's activities in ICD have also undergone transformation.

Brazil has traditionally been the beneficiary of programmes and funding. In fact, like other emerging powers, it still receives official development assistance (ODA) from OECD countries. In 2012, China, Mexico and Turkey were on France's top-10 list; India, China, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and Peru were on Germany's top-10 list (the third largest donor member of DAC in that year). In 2009, Brazil received \$310 million in ODA; then \$403 million in 2010, reaching \$648 million in 2011, and a little more than one billion in 2012. Before the Second World War, the cooperation agreement negotiated by the Getulio Vargas government with the US was one of the important factors in the Brazilian industrialisation process, with the creation of the National Steel Company in Volta Redonda. In the 1960s, the US government increased its official aid to Brazil after the military coup, claiming strategic and security reasons. The commercial motive has always been very







important too, in justifying the concession of ODA to Brazil. In the case of Germany, to this day Brazil comes up as an important beneficiary of cooperation in the environmental sector, where German companies stand out in terms of business and technology. In other words, development cooperation is a common currency in many states' foreign policy, but it has different interests and justifications.

Data for 2012 published by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) indicates that the main donor countries are the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. However, only Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have gone over the mark of 0.7% of GDP devoted to ODA. Net ODA rose in nine countries (especially Australia, Austria, Iceland, South Korea and Luxembourg), while major drops were recorded in 16 DAC members (especially in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal). After individual countries, the European Union also stands out, having disbursed approximately \$18 billion dollars in ODA in 2012, with Turkey, Serbia, Palestine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan as its priority destinations.

Among major donors of the North, the bilateral relations agenda is a key variable to understanding each country's priorities, except in the case of the United Kingdom, whose ODA is channelled mainly through multilateral agencies. The US has more than 80% of their ODA transferred via bilateral bodies. From an organisational point of view, cooperation for development among members of the DAC is usually integrated to foreign policy, with the relevant department or agency bureaucratically situated under the responsibility of their respective ministries of foreign affairs. According to the OECD, there seems to be four main organisational models: a) the ministry takes the lead and is responsible for policy-making and implementation (e.g. Denmark, Norway); b) the department of cooperation for development or an agency within the ministry leads the agenda and is responsible for policy-making and implementation (e.g. Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland); c) the ministry has overall responsibility for policy-making and an independent executive agency is responsible for

TOP 10 - RECEIVED ODA


Main flows of received ODA received, by the emerging countries, in billion dollars, in 2012



Source: DAC/OECD, 2014.

BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN THE WORLD

Brazilian funding for cooperation projects, in million reais current prices, in 2010



Source: IPEA, 2013.

implementation (e.g. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, US, France, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden); d) a specific ministry or an agency for ICD, in addition to the ministry of foreign affairs, is responsible both for policy-making and implementation (e.g. Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom).


There are several academic interpretations regarding the states' motivations to develop cooperation policies or, as it is called in some countries of the North, foreign aid. The reasons vary: the need to form alliances; ideological alignment; political advantages; strategic and military relevance; the search for multilateral influence; opening up of commercial markets; and humanitarian values, among others. In the case of emerging powers, a historical and political identity shared among developing countries, the provision of more appropriate expertise because it is adapted to similar contexts, the rejection of hierarchical relationships between donor and receiver, as well as the importance of cooperation with mutual advantages can all be considered as relevant factors. Little is known yet about South-South cooperation (SSC) practices, or about the connections and contradictions between these practices and the motivations of the states that implement them. Currently, there are many studies on the subject underway.

When doing an analysis of SSC from the point of view of the states' domestic sphere (and Brazil's among them) the multiplicity of experiences, agendas and actors, as well as the diverse institutional designs created and implemented by these states must be taken into account. The

interests of domestic actors do not always converge, and this may increase tensions and conflicts - even more so when a truly public and institutionalised cooperation policy does not exist, as is the case of Brazil. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was created in 1987, and until recently it mostly managed the projects and funding received. Even today, it still lacks the institutional capacity to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the cooperation projects offered by Brazil. The first reports on Brazilian cooperation were published in 2010 and in 2013 by IPEA, in partnership with the ABC; in them, the priorities are made clear, both in thematic (agriculture, health, education) and geographical (Latin America and Africa) terms. Brazil does not present itself as a donor, but as a partner of other developing countries.

BRAZILIAN COOPERATION

Cooperation flows, by region, in 2013



Source: IPEA, 2013.

SEE ALSO:

Energy matrix and environment p. 34
Culture and soft-power p. 50
Global economic agencies p. 104
South-South Cooperation p. 112

South-South cooperation: main actors

South-South relations have been present in Brazilian foreign policy agendas since at least the 1960s, whether through cooperation agreements (technical, scientific, educational, in health, etc) or through a rhetorical emphasis on the importance of solidarity among developing countries in North-South relations (e.g. GATT, UNCTAD, New International Economic Order). However,

an important discursive turn took place in 2003, which emphasised South-South cooperation (SSC), solidarity diplomacy, horizontal relations, as well as the idea of Brazilian public policies as best practices, accompanied by a significant growth of the public budget destined to projects of international cooperation for development (ICD). According to official data published by IPEA and the

ABC, the Brazilian ICD rose from \$158 million in 2005 to around \$923 million dollars in 2010.


In 2010 alone, approximately 68% of all Brazilian ICD went to Latin America, 23% to Africa, 4.5% to Asia and the Middle East, 4% to Europe and 1% to North America. In the case of Latin America, the top five represent 80% of all the cooperation of Brazil with the region, and include Haiti (47%), Chile (16%), Argentina (9%), Peru (4.5%) and Paraguay (4%). In the case of Africa, the PALOP represent 76.5% of all the cooperation with the region: Cape Verde is the first (24%), followed by Guinea-Bissau (21%), Mozambique (13%), Sao Tome and Principe (10%) and Angola (7%).

These figures show clearly that Brazil's involvement with ICD in general, and SSC in particular, has gathered momentum and become more solid. The scale of Brazilian cooperation is, naturally, well below the levels of the OECD/DAC main member states and China. However, Brazil's SSC activities do not necessarily involve direct financial transfers to partner countries, because ICD is statistically set out as public expenditure in the annual budget's current expenses. Therefore, it does not include investment loans granted by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), activities implemented by subnational entities, or the remission of debts of other developing countries. Besides, the statistics of IPEA only take into account the public funds that are 100% non-refundable.

Another characteristic that draws attention is that technical cooperation was responsible for about 6.3% of the

COOPERATION IN HEALTH

Brazilian activities in the health sector, in 2014



BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH CORPORATION

Embrapa's international operations by country, in 2014



total budget for 2010, or a little more than \$57 million dollars; humanitarian aid reached 17.5%; cooperation in education was 3.8%; scientific and technological cooperation: 2.6%; peace missions: 36%; and the contributions to multilateral organisations were 33.7% of the total budget. Agriculture, health and education are the three main sectors of Brazilian SSC, with emphasis on the activities of Embrapa and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation.

Technical cooperation is not a priority in terms of expenditure, although it is celebrated in many countries thanks to its ability to adapt to other developing countries' local contexts, and also because it mobilises social policy experiences and the expertise of civil servants. Geographically speaking, Brazilian technical cooperation is concentrated in two main regions: Latin America and Africa. The ABC database reports that between 1999 and 2012 there were 84 countries that Brazil cooperated with: 40 of them were African countries, 13 Caribbean, 11 in South America, 11 in Asia, 7 in Central America, 1 in North America (Mexico) and 1 in Oceania (Papua New Guinea). Between 2005 and 2010, Latin America was the region receiving the largest number of technical cooperation projects from ABC, while Africa had the largest share of the agency's budget.

This concentration of projects in Latin America and in Africa reflects the historical formation of Brazilian society (in terms of shared identities), the strategic interests of companies undergoing a clear internationalisation process (e.g. oil and mining, infrastructure and civil engineering, agribusiness and biofuels) and, more recently, some changes in foreign policy (i.e. new power coalitions). Since 2003, the Brazilian government has stepped up its diplomatic missions in developing countries. Today, Brazil has 38 embassies in Africa, while the US has 55, France 50, China 41, Turkey 35, India 29 and Mexico 8, according to the data available on their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs websites.

SEE ALSO:

Brazilians abroad [p. 76](#)

Latin and South America [p. 84](#)

South-South Cooperation: Africa [p. 116](#)

South-South Cooperation: Latin America [p. 118](#)


MAIN BRAZILIAN COOPERATION PROGRAMMES

Brazilian cooperation activities by sector and partner country, in 2014



Source: ABC's website, 2014.

Total of activities, em 2014



Source: ABC's website, 2014.

South-South cooperation in education

Education is one of the four main focus areas of Brazil's government cooperation, in addition to agriculture, health and defence. Brazilian cooperation in education involves agents such as the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (technical cooperation), the Ministry of Education (scholarship programmes, international exchange and technical cooperation programmes), but also the SENAI (professional training) and, to a much lesser degree, some NGOs with expertise in non-formal education. However, the majority of projects concentrate in the higher education sector.

According to the two reports published by IPEA and ABC (in 2010 and 2013), the Brazilian government has disbursed an amount equivalent to \$174 million dollars in grants for higher education between 2005 and 2010. During that period, Brazil allocated approximately 7.4% of all its international cooperation to education. Between 2009 and 2010, public spending on this type of cooperation increased by 40.7%. More than 97% of the total expenditure

on educational cooperation went on scholarships for undergraduate and post-graduate students, whose geographical distribution has reflected the priorities of foreign policy. In 2010, approximately 73% of undergraduate scholarships went to students from the PALOP, while 70% of scholarships for post-graduate students went to South Americans. Historically, the main planners and executors of international exchange and scholarship programmes have been CAPES, CNPq and the MRE's Division of Educational Affairs (formerly known as Division of Educational Cooperation). Post-graduate scholarships (PEC-PG) and undergraduate ones (PEC-G) are the main instrument of Brazilian cooperation in education.

The PEC-G programme offers scholarships to foreign undergraduate students who are selected in their own countries according to procedures established by the national Ministry of Education and the Brazilian embassy in that country. The PEC-PG programme offers scholarships to foreign graduate students for Master's

or PhD courses in Brazil. In 2010, the majority of the 1,643 PEC-G students came from Cape Verde (532), Guinea-Bissau (436), Angola (147), Paraguay (123), Sao Tome and Principe (63) and Mozambique (33), whereas in the case of PEC-PG the candidates came from Colombia (143), Peru (59), Argentina (36), East Timor (26), Cape Verde (21), Mozambique (17), Angola (13), Guinea-Bissau (11), but none from Sao Tome and Principe. Master's and PhD students usually have access to financial support, besides not having to pay any registration fees to study in Brazilian institutions. The Itamaraty pays for the return ticket of the selected candidates. It is worth noting that in order to prevent "brain drain", every selected candidate must return to their country at the end of their course. By doing this, it is expected that Brazilian cooperation will cause a positive impact on the partner country's society.


In addition to the scholarship programmes, the bilateral cooperation programmes with East Timor, Cuba, Argentina, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau also deserve special mention. Within the multilateral context of Mercosur, the Programme of Regional Academic Mobility, which has been in force since 2006, aims to strengthen cooperation in education among its member states. The programme includes graduate courses in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. In Brazil, the Higher Education Secretariat (SESu) and CAPES have been responsible for managing these programmes since 2008. In 2010, they contributed a total of \$1 million, and approximately 75% of these funds were directed to Argentinian students.

In the professional training sector, ABC and SENAI are strategic partners. In 2007, professional training accounted for 22.4% of the ABC's total disbursements. International cooperation also brings to developing countries the SENAI's experience on issues such as quality control of food and packaging, cuisine and gastronomy, automotive and production systems, pulp and paper, construction, energy, oil and energy from renewable sources, mining, and other subjects.

In the 1960s, the SENAI model was diffused in Third World countries through the Inter-American Centre for Research and Documentation

BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN EDUCATION IN AFRICA

Activities in the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP), between 2000 and 2014



HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENT EXCHANGES: NORTH AND SOUTH


South-African students abroad, in thousands, in 2014



Origin of foreign students in South Africa, in thousands, in 2014




Brazilian students abroad, in thousands, in 2014



Origin of foreign students in Brazil, in thousands, in 2014




Chinese students abroad, in thousands, in 2014



Origin of foreign students in China, in 2014




Indian students abroad, in thousands, in 2014



Origin of foreign students in India, in thousands, in 2014



Mexican students abroad, in thousands, in 2014



Origin of foreign students in Mexico, in thousands, in 2014



Source: Unesco, 2014.



◦ Values lower than 0.1

Labmundo, 2014

of the ILO. Since 1970, SENAI has been active in the cooperation with other countries in Latin America: Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru and Suriname. Since the 1980s, with the support

of JICA, SENAI has increased its portfolio of projects in Latin America and has also started to have a more active presence in the PALOP (mainly in Angola) and in East Timor.

SEE ALSO:

Congress, ministries and agencies p. 64
Itamaraty p. 60
Brazilians abroad p. 76
Latin and South America p. 84

South-South Cooperation: Africa

The geopolitical and geo-economic reconfiguration of the contemporary world reveals the importance of some emerging powers (South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico and Brazil) which have been gaining more prominence in the field of South-South cooperation (SSC), to the point where they have been redefining the relations, models and practices that used to guide traditional North-South cooperation. Already the African continent received a large share of Official Aid to Development from the traditional donors of the OECD/DAC, because of the interests (political, economic, cultural, etc) of the old colonial metropolises and the superpowers, and also because of the recent Millennium Development Goals agenda, which required focus on the poorest countries. Today, these poor countries stand out also as an area of activity of SSC, being a priority destination for the activities of countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa. The IBAS (India,

Brazil and South Africa), for example, has disbursed \$27 million dollars in contributions, most of it directed to African countries (45.3%), with 31.1% for agriculture and 26.1% for health.

Within this context, Brazilian SSC with Africa is also growing in importance, having reached 39.5% of the total government budget for technical cooperation. For historical (i.e. the Portuguese colonisation) and institutional reasons (such as the CPLP), its major partners in the African continent are the PALOP. Also worthy of special mention are the member countries of the Cotton-4 (Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and Chad), a group that aims to develop the cotton sector with Brazilian support, particularly through Embrapa.

There are important projects implemented by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency in the fields of agriculture, health, and education in partnership with other agencies and institutions. However, it is in agriculture development and in the food supply industry that Brazil plays a relevant role, as an agricultural power that holds important know-how, and whose advances in the fight


against hunger over the last decade are internationally recognised. According to FAO, Brazil cut malnutrition down from 11% to 6% between 1990 and 2008, thus improving the situation of approximately 5 million people. These experiences aimed at efficiently combating the hunger problem at home have since become references in the Brazilian SSC, defined as an exchange of practices and transfer of public policies. Such is the case of the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA), which gave origin to the PAA-Africa, which was developed in partnership with FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) in five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The Centre of Excellence in the Fight against Hunger, an association between the WFP and the Brazilian government, also operates in this sector, benefiting countries such as Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Kenya, Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Agriculture is, therefore, one key area of Brazilian activity on the African continent, with strong participation from Embrapa, followed by other actors - such as the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, the Ministry of Agrarian Development and the Department of Vocational and Technological Education. These bodies have acted in projects of triangular cooperation in partnership with multilateral and bilateral agencies (e.g. FAO, DFID, JICA).


However, food supply must also be considered a field of contradictory tendencies and strong disputes between,

COOPERATION VIA IBSA FUND

Approved budget by regional participation, in 2014 (in %)




Approved budget by sector, in 2014 (in %)



Source: IBSA Forum, 2014.

MULTI AND BILATERAL COOPERATION


Approved budget by country and sector, by the IBSA Fund and PAA-Africa, in 2014 (in million dollars)



Sources: PAA-Africa's website, 2014; IBSA Forum, 2014.

EMBRAPA AND COOPERATION


Projects by Embrapa and other Brazilian activities in agriculture, by country, in 2014



Source: ABC's website, 2014.

BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN AFRICA


Activities by sector and partner country, in 2014



on the one hand, the recognition of the right to food as a basic right (as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and, on the other hand, the rise in the economic importance of agribusiness, which trades on food commodities and sometimes tries to generate strikingly high profits in the food sector. In addition, it engages in speculative practices in this sector, which has led to high concentration and oligopolisation of the food market, as well as the high volatility of its prices. The case of the triangular cooperation project in the Nacala corridor, in Mozambique, illustrates some of the public/private tensions caused by different understandings and sometimes diverging interests.

COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE


Brazilian activities completed and in progress, in 2014



Therefore, in discussions about food supply it is important to consider the various actors involved, giving special salience to governments (the main actors in SSC), citizenship, networks and social movements (whose participation has been essential in the domestic and international debate on the right to food), as well as corporations (which have great influence and impact in this field). It should be noted that, according to the Dom Cabral Foundation's 2013 Ranking of Brazilian Transnationals, among the 10 most transnationalised Brazilian companies there are three dedicated to the food industry: JBS-Friboi, Marfrig Foods and Minerva Foods. In the ranking's latest edition, the strong impact of Brazilian foreign policy on the firms' internationalisation process is quite clear, confirming them as powerful actors in Brazil's international relations.

By situating the different actors, it is possible to understand the disputes surrounding the meanings and implications of the right to food, one of the most violated human rights even today. Analysing the various areas and actions that may, at some level, influence how this right is guaranteed and fulfilled requires taking into account the possible inconsistencies

Top 10 of Brazilian cooperation, in million reais, in 2010



that some policies can bring about in the development processes of partner countries, as well as the very definition of development according to actors involved in SSC. That is why the theme is particularly interesting for the analysis of South-South dialogues, development models, rights claims, and the various pressures for placing social cohesion at the heart of SSC agendas.

SEE ALSO:

Agribusiness p. 28
 Brazilian multinationals p. 70
 Research centres and universities p. 78
 South-South Cooperation: Latin America p. 118

South-South Cooperation: Latin America

Latin America is a region particularly active in South-South cooperation initiatives (SSC), thus contributing to, among other things, strengthening the processes of integration. The countries most active as providers of SSC are Brazil (with 149 projects in the region, i.e. 29% of the total), Mexico (with 107) and Argentina (94), according to data from the General Iberian-American Secretariat. These initiatives are part of their foreign policy agendas, thus demonstrating these countries' growing investment in the South-South axis, along with the need to enhance their individual and

collective presence in international relations and negotiations. To a large extent, cooperation projects and actions are based on domestic experiences that, in answer to requests, the donor partner attempts to replicate in other developing countries. Therefore, the sectors concentrating the majority of Latin American SSC activities are agriculture, government, and healthcare, which together exceed 40% of the total. The major beneficiaries of Latin American cooperation are Ecuador (66 projects), El Salvador (with 47), and Bolivia (with 46).

Brazilian SSC has Latin America as its priority geographical destination; according to a report by IPEA, in 2010 it received 195 million reais, i.e. 68% of the total (taking all modalities of cooperation into account), and 53% of technical cooperation, concentrated in the sectors of agribusiness and food supply, health and education - in line with the social dimension that the government has been advocating in the process of internal development as well.

The main actor of this policy remains the ABC, but specialised advisory bodies and secretariats are becoming more and more numerous, attached to the various ministries responsible for the implementation of technical cooperation projects. Considering just the priority sectors of activity,

some examples in the region are: Fio-cruz (an agency under the Ministry of Health that provides training, technology transfer, support for the strengthening of health systems, etc), the Ministry of Social Development (which was pivotal in designing and projecting internationally the *Fome Zero* and the *Bolsa Família* programmes), and Embrapa (under the Ministry of Agriculture, it plays an active role in technology transfers in this field).


Despite the openly governmental character of SSC initiatives, there are other actors with interests in these areas: from private agents whose role in cooperation might increase with the creation of public/private partnerships, to civil society organisations claiming for more supportive, inclusive and participatory public policies. The confluence of these actors - who have distinct interests, discourses and political projects - generates some complex and sometimes contradictory dynamics around SSC.

Corporations, for example, have increasing access to financing from the BNDES through its internationalisation line of loans, mainly in the sectors of petrochemicals (e.g. Braskem), pharmaceuticals (e.g. Eurofarma), construction (e.g. Andrade Gutierrez), foods (e.g. JBS-Friboi) and agribusiness (e.g. Cooperativa Lar). Social organisations have more difficulty internationalising their activities, although there have been some interesting initiatives in this sense, as in the case of Viva Rio, invited by the UN to take part in the Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. The Viva Rio organisation runs projects in areas such as security, education, health, environment, culture and sports in that Caribbean country.

Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America (with a GDP per capita of only \$425 dollars) and is particularly relevant to the region's SSC. In the case of Brazilian SSC, in particular, it is the main beneficiary of projects and actions in the most diverse areas, with emphasis on food supply, agriculture, and the strengthening of human and institutional capacities. According to data from SEGIB, Brazil was the largest provider of cooperation to Haiti in 2011, having contributed approximately \$20 million dollars, transferred either directly or through multilateral organisations (such as the WFP).


COOPERATION WITHIN THE AMERICAS

Activities by subregion, in 2012



SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION BY ABC IN LATIN AMERICA


Activities by sector, in 2014



BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Activities by sector and partner country, in 2014

Public policies



Logistics



Defence



Culture



Science and technology



Industry and energy




It is also worth highlighting some other experiences of triangular cooperation. According to IPEA, Haiti is the main beneficiary of this modality too, with more than 92 million reais (almost 50% of the total for the region), followed by Chile, Argentina and Peru. It is interesting to note that this role as an active actor in SSC does not prevent Brazil from being the main beneficiary of net ODA in the region. In 2012, the country received 20.7% of the total ODA directed to Latin America.

Agriculture



Source: ABC's website, 2014.

Top 10 Brazilian partner countries, in million reais



Source: IPEA, 2013.

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
BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN HAITI

Activities by sector and main actors involved, in 2014

Actors



Sectors of operation



Source: ABC's website, 2014.

Labmundo, 2014

SEE ALSO:

International action of cities [p. 68](#)
 Asymmetries and inequalities [p. 94](#)
 Social networks and regional integration [p. 96](#)
 South-South Cooperation: Africa [p. 116](#)

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